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I. INTRODUCTION 
Drug diversion litigation continues to grow and evolve by leaps and 
bounds.  While the practice has seen an increase in complexity over the years, 
the speed and scope of some recent developments have been striking, and in 
some respects confounding.  Since the publication of the 2015 article about 
diversion practice in the Albany Law Review,1 diversion practice under the 
 
* Judge Mulrooney is the Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration Chief 
Administrative Law Judge, and co-author of Drug Diversion Administrative Revocation and 
Application Hearings for Medical and Pharmacy Practitioners: A Primer for Navigating Murky, 
Drug-Infested Waters, 78 ALB. L. REV. 327 (2015).  He has previously practiced law as an Assistant 
United States Attorney, a Department of Justice/INS Trial Attorney, an Assistant District Attorney, a 
Navy Judge Advocate, and a Judicial Law Clerk, as well as a Judge on the Navy-Marine Corps Court 
of Criminal Appeals and an Administrative Law Judge at the Social Security Administration.  Judge 
Mulrooney received his Juris Doctorate (cum laude) at Albany Law School in 1985.  The views and 
legal analysis expressed in this Article reflect the views of the Authors in their private, not official 
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Administrative Procedure Act (APA)2 has been buffeted by the accounts in the 
press,3 Congress,4 and swerves in legal interpretation in the published final 
orders issued by the Drug Enforcement Administration (the DEA or the 
Agency).5  Whether viewed as clarifications, enhancements, or afflictions, the 
modifications visited on diversion enforcement by Congress and the DEA itself 
will require some significant course adjustments by the practicing bar on both 
sides of the litigation equation.   
This update is divided into three parts: Part II will address diversion law 
alterations crafted by Congress and signed by President Barack Obama; Part III 
will analyze new legal interpretations by the Agency in its final orders; and Part 
IV will parse the legal landscape for a current location check, some possible 
clues for what lies over the horizon for the enforcers, the regulated community, 
and the attorneys on both sides of the aisle, as well as some thoughts about why 
where we are now seems so different from where we were previously headed.  
Even without legal sonar or a crystal ball, there is merit to engaging in a 
measured level of informed reckoning about where rocks and hazards are likely 
to linger below the surface of the murky, drug-infested waters of diversion 
litigation. 
 
capacities, and not those of the Department of Justice and/or Drug Enforcement Administration.  Cases 
are decided by existing legal authority and the facts presented by the parties.  This Article is not 
intended to indicate, and does not reflect, how a particular issue of law or fact will be (or has been) 
decided in any litigation where the Author is (or was) the assigned judge.  
**  Ms. Legel was a Judicial Law Clerk at the Drug Enforcement Administration, Department of Justice 
from 2015 to 2017.  She received her Juris Doctorate (magna cum laude) at Marquette University Law 
School, where she served as a Comment Editor on the Marquette Law Review.  The views and legal 
analysis expressed in this Article reflect the views of the Authors in their private, not official capacities, 
and not those of the Department of Justice and/or Drug Enforcement Administration. 
1. John J. Mulrooney, II & Andrew J. Hull, Drug Diversion Administrative Revocation and 
Application Hearings for Medical and Pharmacy Practitioners: A Primer for Navigating Murky, 
Drug-Infested Waters, 78 ALB. L. REV. 327 (2015). 
2. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–59 (2012). 
3. See, e.g., Lenny Bernstein & Scott Higham, Investigation: The DEA Slowed Enforcement 
While the Opioid Epidemic Grew Out of Control, WASH. POST, Oct. 23, 2016, at A1; Editorial Board, 
Locating Blame in the Opioid Epidemic, WASH. POST: THE POST’S VIEW (Oct. 30, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/is-the-dea-partly-to-blame-for-the-opioid-
epidemic/2016/10/30/ [https://perma.cc/D7WS-RYVG] (insert URL into Google.com search engine; 
then follow “Locating blame in the opioid epidemic – The Washington Post” hyperlink) [hereinafter, 
THE POST’S VIEW]. 
4. See infra Part II. 
5. See infra Part III. 
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II. CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT 
On April 19, 2016, President Obama signed the Ensuring Patient Access 
and Effective Drug Enforcement Act of 2016 (EPAEDEA) into law.6  The co-
sponsors of the EPAEDEA touted the amendment as a measure to “bring much-
needed clarity to several key provisions of the Controlled Substances Act” and 
to “facilitate greater collaboration between registrants and relevant Federal 
actors in combatting prescription drug abuse.”7   
The EPAEDEA amends the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) in three 
respects: (1) any registrant served with an order to show cause (OSC) may now 
submit a corrective action plan (CAP) to the Agency, which the Agency must 
consider in order to determine whether it justifies the discontinuance or deferral 
of administrative proceedings; (2) the term “imminent danger to the public 
health or safety,”8 a prerequisite finding to justify the issuance of an immediate 
suspension order, has been defined, or some would say, born; and (3) the phrase 
“factors as may be relevant to and consistent with the public health and safety,” 
which is the language used in the catch-all public interest factors to be 
considered by the Agency in determining whether to register or maintain 
registration for manufacturers9 and distributors10 of controlled substances, has 
been defined.11 
A. The Corrective Action Plan (CAP) 
1. The EPAEDEA’s CAP Provision’s Additions, Justifications, and Problems 
Previously, the OSC to be served on the applicant or registrant was only 
required to “contain a statement of the basis” for the Agency’s proposed denial, 
revocation, or suspension of registration, and to provide a time and place for 
the applicant or registrant to appear.12  The EPAEDEA added the requirement 
that every OSC issued by the DEA must “notify the applicant or registrant of 
 
6. Ensuring Patient Access and Effective Drug Enforcement Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-145, 
130 Stat. 353 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 823(j), 824(c), (d)). 
7. 162 CONG. REC. S954 (daily ed. Feb. 23, 2016) (statement of Sen. Hatch). 
8. Ensuring Patient Access and Effective Drug Enforcement Act of 2016 § 2 (codified as 
amended at 21 U.S.C. § 824(d)(1)). 
9. 21 U.S.C. § 823(a)(6), (d)(6) (2012). 
10. Id. § 823(b)(5), (e)(5).  The language is also similar to the catch-all factor for distributors of 
List I chemicals, but is not exactly the same.  Id. § 823(h)(5) (“[S]uch other factors as are relevant to 
and consistent with the public health and safety.” (emphasis added)). 
11. Ensuring Patient Access and Effective Drug Enforcement Act of 2016 § 2 (codified as 
amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 823(j), 824(c), (d)). 
12. 21 U.S.C. § 824(c). 
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the opportunity to submit a corrective action plan on or before the date of 
appearance.”13  The EPAEDEA also added the requirement that, if a CAP is 
timely filed by a registrant, the Agency is required to consider it to “determine 
whether denial, revocation, or suspension proceedings should be discontinued, 
or deferred for the purposes of modification, amendment, or clarification to 
such plan.”14  Stated differently, before the DEA can proceed to secure an 
administrative sanction against a registration holder or deny an application for 
registration, it must now consider a written improvement plan, filed by the 
registrant or applicant, which outlines that registrant or applicant’s intentions 
to correct the regulatory transgressions alleged in the OSC.15  
Co-sponsors of the EPAEDEA promoted the CAP provisions as 
“provid[ing] the DEA with the clarity to collaborate with the very people 
responsible for ensuring that [controlled substances] get to the patients who 
need them without hurting and harming th[e] distribution chain and while 
clamping down on diversions and abuse.”16  It was touted as “a mechanism for 
companies who inadvertently violate the Controlled Substances Act . . . to 
remediate the violation before their registration is suspended and the supply of 
drugs to patients is interrupted.”17  It was explained that the EPAEDEA would 
“encourage greater self-reporting of violations,” while helping to “ensure that 
supply chains remain intact for legitimate uses such as the alleviation of pain 
and illness.”18  One co-sponsor described the CAP as “a mechanism for 
companies that violate the Controlled Substances Act to correct their practices” 
before their registration is suspended or revoked, noting that “[e]ven 
inadvertent violations may lead to suspension or revocation, disrupting the 
supply chain for the company’s prescription drugs[, which] in turn can cause 
hardship for patients who rely on the company’s drugs for treatment and 
cure.”19  In sum, the CAP was touted primarily as a method to ensure that 
patients continue to retain access (hence the “ensuring patient access” feature 
 
13. Ensuring Patient Access and Effective Drug Enforcement Act of 2016 § 2 (codified as 
amended at 21 U.S.C. § 824(c)(2)(C)). 
14. Id. (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 824(c)(3)).  
15. See id. 
16. 161 CONG. REC. H2330 (daily ed. Apr. 21, 2015) (statement of Rep. Blackburn). 
17. 162 CONG. REC. S954 (daily ed. Feb. 23, 2016) (statement of Sen. Hatch).  While the co-
sponsors repeatedly emphasized the benefits of the CAP for “companies,” the bill does not limit the 
classes of registrants or applicants who can submit a CAP, and thus all registrants and applicants—
individual practitioners, pharmacies, distributors, and manufacturers—can submit a CAP to the 
Agency. 
18. Id. 
19. 162 CONG. REC. S2006 (daily ed. Apr. 13, 2016) (statement of Sen. McConnell). 
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of the bill’s cumbersome title) to controlled substances in the event of 
“inadvertent violations”20 of the Controlled Substances Act by “companies”21 
in the distribution supply chain.22 
The stated justification for the CAP is significantly undermined, however, 
by an absence of evidence in the Congressional Record or elsewhere to support 
the position that pending administrative proceedings in any way limit even a 
single patient’s access to medication, the purported reason the bill was 
introduced in the first place.23  By the terms of the statute, the CAP provisions 
do not apply to the Administrator’s determination regarding an immediate 
suspension pending resolution,24 and in every other adjudication, registrants 
retain their authority to conduct regulated activities until the Agency issues its 
final order.25  In other words, if a registrant or applicant is served with an OSC 
but believes that it has made sufficient improvements to its operating 
procedures to ensure that the transgressions charged do not re-occur (or if it 
believes that the transgressions charged did not actually occur), it has—and had 
before the EPAEDEA—the right to request an administrative hearing and 
present evidence on its own behalf before any sanction can be imposed upon 
it.26  Registrants and applicants have always been afforded the opportunity to 
 
20. Id.; 162 CONG. REC. S954 (daily ed. Feb. 23, 2016) (statement of Sen. Hatch). 
21. 162 CONG. REC. S954 (daily ed. Feb. 23, 2016) (statement of Sen. Hatch); 162 CONG. REC. 
S2006 (daily ed. Apr. 13, 2016) (statement of Sen. McConnell).  
22. 162 CONG. REC. S2007 (daily ed. Apr. 13, 2016) (statement of Sen. McConnell); see 162 
CONG. REC. S954 (daily ed. Feb. 23, 2016) (statement of Sen. Hatch). 
23. See 162 CONG. REC. S2006–07 (daily ed. Apr. 13, 2016) (statement of Sen. McConnell); 
162 CONG. REC. S954 (daily ed. Feb. 23, 2016) (statement of Sen. Hatch). 
24. Ensuring Patient Access and Effective Drug Enforcement Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-145, 
§ 2, 130 Stat. 353 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 824(c)(5)).  When served on a registrant, an 
Immediate Suspension Order (ISO/OSC) is accompanied by an OSC, affording the opportunity for 
post-deprivation due process.  See Mulrooney & Hull, supra note 1, at 364–65 (describing immediate 
suspension proceedings).  The decision to immediately suspend a registration is a final decision by the 
Agency, and while a registrant could potentially submit a CAP in response to the accompanying OSC, 
a determination on that CAP could in no way affect the already-final decision to immediately suspend 
the registration.  However, inasmuch as every ISO/OSC has an accompanying OSC, the CAP 
provisions are available to respondents in all administrative proceedings, whether commenced with an 
ISO/OSC or an OSC.  It would, thus, be inaccurate to broadly state that the CAP provisions do not 
apply to immediate suspension cases. 
25. Ensuring Patient Access and Effective Drug Enforcement Act of 2016 § 2 (codified as 
amended at 21 U.S.C. § 824(c)(1)); see 21 U.S.C. § 824(c) (2012) (“Before taking action pursuant to 
this section, or pursuant to a denial of registration under [21 U.S.C. § 823], the Attorney General shall 
serve upon the applicant or registrant an order to show cause why registration should not be denied, 
revoked, or suspended.” (emphasis added)).   
26. Ensuring Patient Access and Effective Drug Enforcement Act of 2016 § 2 (codified as 
amended at 21 U.S.C. § 824(c)(1)); see also 21 U.S.C. § 824(c). 
CURRENT NAVIGATION POINTS IN DRUG DIVERSION LAW (DRAFT) MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW VOL. 101 
2017] CURRENT NAVIGATION POINTS IN DRUG DIVERSION LAW 339 
present evidence of any corrective actions they have taken to ensure that the 
charged conduct does not continue, including plans to avoid future 
transgressions, and the Agency has always considered such evidence in making 
its final determination on whether to preclude or curtail the applicant’s or 
registrant’s regulated activities.27  Similarly, the parties have always been able 
to discuss the merits of the case amongst themselves, either before a request for 
a hearing is made or during the pendency of the administrative proceedings, 
and if an applicant or registrant offers a proposed plan of corrective action and 
the Agency (through counsel representing it in the administrative proceeding) 
determines that it is no longer prudent to continue administrative proceedings, 
then the Agency (the party which initiated proceedings in the first place) is free 
to seek termination of the case, which the DEA Administrative Law Judge 
(ALJ) will grant.  Inasmuch as DEA administrative proceedings are remedial28 
and non-punitive in nature,29 a written proposal to correct alleged deficiencies 
should, of course, merit special consideration by the Agency in its evaluation 
of the prudence and expense of continuing to seek preclusion or curtailment of 
regulated activity, but there was no apparent reason for the EPAEDEA to direct 
that such a proposal be considered and ruled upon in isolation, outside of an 
ongoing administrative proceeding.  If, in the Agency’s view, a proposed plan 
of action merits discontinuation or deferral of proceedings, it is (and has always 
been) free to seek termination of administrative proceedings at any time, or it 
can decide by final order that no sanction is appropriate based on all of the facts, 
including any remedial actions taken and plans put in place.  Thus, the 
EPAEDEA’s CAP provisions present as a solution to a problem that did not 
(and does not) seem to exist.   
Furthermore, the CAP provisions create no incentive (and potentially create 
a disincentive) for regulated companies or individuals to “self-
report[] . . . violations,”30 to correct wrongdoing before an OSC is filed, or even 
to follow or continue following whatever plan is deemed sufficient to 
discontinue or defer proceedings once the proceedings are discontinued or 
 
27. See, e.g., Farmacia Yani, 80 Fed. Reg. 29053, 29066 (Drug Enf’t Admin. May 20, 2015); 
Terese, Inc., 76 Fed. Reg. 46843, 46848 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Aug. 3, 2011).  While the Agency only 
considers evidence of remedial measures if a registrant accepts responsibility for past transgressions, 
Krishna-Iyer, 74 Fed. Reg. 459, 464 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Jan. 6, 2009) (“Because of the grave and 
increasing harm to public health and safety caused by the diversion of prescription controlled 
substances, even where the Agency’s proof establishes that a practitioner has committed only a few 
acts of diversion, this Agency will not grant or continue the practitioner’s registration unless he accepts 
responsibility for his misconduct.”), a registrant who submits a corrective action plan is necessarily 
admitting that there is something to be corrected. 
28. Farmacia Yani, 80 Fed. Reg. at 29066. 
29. Samuel S. Jackson, D.D.S., 72 Fed. Reg. 23848, 23853 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Apr. 24, 2007). 
30. 162 CONG. REC. S954 (daily ed. Feb. 23, 2016) (statement from Sen. Hatch). 
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deferred.  Instead, the EPAEDEA is akin to a state legislature mandating that 
law enforcement authorities allow shoplifting suspects caught in the act to 
outline how they intend to replace purloined items on store shelves; allow 
intoxicated drivers to pull to the side of the road and park their previously 
swerving vehicles; or perhaps allow bank robbers to round up and return ink-
stained money and agree not to rob any more banks—all before any of those 
wrongdoers actually admit fault and without any consequence that might deter 
such behavior in the future.  Such mandates sound absurd because they would 
be absurd.  The ability to submit a written plan for improvement may provide 
incentive for registrants to step up their compliance once charges are filed—or 
at least, outline a plan and promise to do so—but before that time, they can act 
freely knowing that they can always come up with a convincing plan to fix their 
problems later and avoid sanction.31  And, even in cases where the Agency does 
elect to discontinue proceedings based on a CAP, the statutory mechanism 
designed by Congress in the EPAEDEA provides no guarantee that the 
promises made in the CAP will be fulfilled, or for how long.32  Assurances by 
the CAP filers are not required, and the EPAEDEA provides no consequences 
to unfulfilled CAP representations—even in cases where those representations 
result in the discontinuation of proceedings.33  The only thing assured by the 
Agency’s discontinuance of proceedings through the acceptance of a CAP is 
that administrative proceedings will be discontinued.34  The benefits for the 
industry are plain, but for the public, the benefits are not as clear. 
To the extent the legislation was driven by the hypothetical potential that 
the flow of painkillers could be interrupted due to improvident Agency 
 
31. One co-sponsor explained that “the best example of why [the EPAEDEA] is needed is a story 
that comes from home,” going on to detail an account of a constituent who tried to obtain seizure 
medications for her son in anticipation of an ice storm (lamenting that it was one of many that winter, 
which “seemed as if [they] would never stop”), but—although the pharmacist was sympathetic—the 
pharmacy would not fill the prescription because “it was too early” and “there would be problems with 
the DEA and other agencies” if it were filled.  161 CONG. REC. H2330 (daily ed. Apr. 21, 2015) 
(statement of Rep. Blackburn).  It is unclear exactly how such a registrant (if an OSC was filed for 
filling such prescriptions) would propose any convincing corrective action for that violation, other than 
maybe the pharmacist would feel less sympathetic next time and would refuse to fill the prescription.  
A considered reflection of the story reveals it to be a sort of advocacy for an after-the-fact forgiveness 
for actions founded in sympathy which ultimately result in “ensur[ing] that patients who have a 
legitimate need for medications can receive them,” id., even if those actions are clear, intentional 
violations of the CSA.  Id.  Whatever heart strings are pulled by the story of the reluctantly compliant 
pharmacist, it would be challenging to fashion the morale of the tale into any objectives supported by 
the provisions of the EPAEDEA as it was enacted. 
32. See generally Ensuring Patient Access and Effective Drug Enforcement Act of 2016, Pub. 
L. No. 114-145, 130 Stat. 353 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 823(j), 824(c), (d)). 
33. See id. 
34. Id. 
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revocations supported only by inadvertent, even minor, isolated violations, the 
law could have been crafted to achieve that objective.  For example, the focus 
of the bill could have been directed to imbuing the CSA with a sanctions 
framework founded in Congress’s assessment of the seriousness of specific 
violations.  Congress could have supplied guidance to the exercise of Agency 
discretion in particular types of cases or where conduct rose to a certain level.  
Likewise, the Agency could have been directed to give additional weight to 
remedial evidence in weighing the sanction decision, or Congress could have 
otherwise modified the CSA to address concerns regarding medication 
availability when a registration is ultimately revoked or limited by the Agency.  
The list of possible methods to address patient access to controlled substances 
under these limited circumstances is potentially limitless, but the path chosen 
instead was to enact legislation that created new rights for industry, and left the 
Agency without guidance as to how to implement the new laws. 
2. The Agency’s Treatment of the CAP Provisions 
The new legislation provides only that, “[u]pon review of any [CAP] 
submitted by an applicant or registrant . . . the Attorney General shall determine 
whether denial, revocation, or suspension proceedings should be discontinued, 
or deferred for the purposes of modification, amendment, or clarification to 
such plan.”35  It does not specify what date is meant by the filing deadline of 
“on or before the date of appearance,”36 and it provides neither a procedure for 
the filing of a CAP, nor the standards to be applied to adjudicate it.  The 
EPAEDEA likewise does not provide guidance to the Agency about the 
supervisory level within the organization at which the CAP should be 
evaluated, and it does not provide an indication of the criteria by which the 
Agency is to evaluate filed CAPs, or the procedure or timeline for the Agency 
to follow once it determines whether (or not) to discontinue or defer 
proceedings.  The CAP legislation provides for no review of the plan by a DEA 
ALJ in the event that proceedings are not discontinued or deferred, and it is 
silent on whether administrative proceedings should be abrogated or delayed in 
the event of a CAP filing, or if they should continue to proceed concurrently 
with whatever timeline on which the CAP review proceeds.   
Enabling regulations have not yet been promulgated.  In the absence of 
regulations, the Agency has supplied instructions regarding EPAEDEA CAP 
rights (CAP advisals) on OSCs it has issued since EPAEDEA became 
 
35. Id. (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 824(c)(3)). 
36. Id. (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 824(c)(2)(C)). 
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effective.37  However, at least in one case, the manner in which the Agency has 
adjudicated a CAP raises an interesting issue.   
In Thomas Horiagon, M.D., the Agency explained that its OSC “notified 
[r]espondent of his right under 21 U.S.C. [§] 824(c)(2)(C) to submit a corrective 
action plan [CAP] to the Deputy Assistant Administrator and [provided] the 
procedure for doing so.”38  This is a strong indicator of the Agency’s intent to 
avoid the creation of an appealable final order by having the CAP issue decided 
by the Deputy Assistant Administrator, rather than the Administrator.  The 
Horiagon final order noted that the Deputy Assistant Administrator did issue a 
CAP decision, but it also included a CAP determination by the Administrator 
that was based on an alternate legal theory.39  Thus, the CAP determination was 
ultimately rendered by the Agency head. 
The APA provides that: 
Agency action made reviewable by statute and final agency 
action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court 
are subject to judicial review.  A preliminary, procedural, or 
intermediate agency action or ruling not directly reviewable is 
subject to review on the review of the final agency action.40   
Apart from interlocutory appeals considered and decided by the 
Administrator,41 administrative decisions rendered by its ALJs42 and program 
heads43 have historically been considered preliminary, procedural, or 
 
37. See, e.g., Marcus W. Anderson, M.D., 82 Fed. Reg. 42117, 42118–19 (Drug Enf't Admin. 
Sept. 6, 2017); Binh M. Chung, M.D., 82 Fed. Reg. 40601, 40602 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Aug. 25, 2017); 
Arnold E. Feldman, M.D., 82 Fed. Reg., 39614, 39616 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Aug. 21, 2017). 
38. Thomas Horiagon, M.D., 81 Fed. Reg. 79051, 79051 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Nov. 10, 2016). 
39. Id. at 79052 (concluding “that there [were] adequate grounds for denying [the CAP]” so the 
Administrator therefore “rejecte[ed] [the respondent’s] CAP.”). 
40. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2012). 
41. 21 C.F.R. § 1316.62 (2017). 
42. E.g., id. § 1316.47(b) (giving ALJ discretion to rule upon a request to enlarge the time 
granted to a respondent to answer an OSC); id. § 1316.50 (giving ALJ discretion to require notarized 
power of attorney from representative regarding scope of authority); id. § 1316.52 (providing non-
exhaustive list of discretionary determinations entrusted to ALJs during DEA administrative 
proceedings); id. § 1316.57 (giving ALJ discretion to exclude, or upon good cause, admit evidence not 
timely disclosed by a party); id. § 1316.58 (giving ALJ discretion to direct pre-hearing summaries of 
proposed witness testimony); id. § 1316.62 (giving ALJ discretion to rule upon a motion seeking leave 
to file an interlocutory appeal). 
43. E.g., id. § 1301.16 (requiring permission from the Agency for certificate of registration 
application withdrawals after the issuance of an OSC); Matthew Valentine/Liar Catchers, 80 Fed. Reg. 
50042, 50042–43 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Aug. 18, 2015) (noting that DEA Administrator had previously 
remanded case involving an application withdrawal denial issued by the Deputy Assistant 
Administrator for Diversion Control (DAADC) for additional detail; reviewed and disregarded the 
discretionary decision issued by the DAADC; granted the applicant’s withdrawal application, and 
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intermediate—and thus, are not directly reviewable.  If the Agency elected to 
leave a decision regarding the CAP up to the Deputy Assistant Administrator 
(or some other subordinate official)—rather than the Administrator—it would 
likely avoid the unintentional issuance of an appealable final order.  However, 
to the extent the Agency has already issued written CAP denials signed by the 
Agency head (in addition to ruling on a CAP in a final order dispositive of a 
whole case), it may have inadvertently created a path for ready review by the 
federal courts.  If a CAP denial issued by the DEA Administrator constitutes a 
final order of the Agency, a denial of the requested relief (discontinuance or 
deferral of proceedings) could be subject to potential review in the courts.  
Congress has authorized “any person aggrieved by a final decision of the [DEA 
Administrator]” under the CSA to seek review “in the United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia or for the circuit in which his principal 
place of business is located.”44   
If an order issued by the Administrator is not a final action, under the APA, 
then it must be a “preliminary, procedural, or intermediate action” that is 
“subject to review on the review of the final agency action.”45  However, the 
final agency action in DEA administrative cases is the ultimate determination 
by the Administrator regarding the disposition of administrative sanction 
action.46  The final action may be informed by a recommended decision by a 
DEA ALJ where a hearing was requested and held.47  Because the CAP is filed 
separately from a request for hearing (or waiver),48 it is not automatically part 
of the administrative record to be reviewed by the Agency—and neither is any 
decision issued regarding the CAP.  In order for the CAP and the Agency’s 
decision to continue proceedings despite a filed CAP to even be considered in 
the Agency’s final order, the aggrieved party would need to somehow appeal 
the “preliminary” decision made to continue proceedings49 to the Administrator 
through the process of the administrative hearing.  In the instance where the 
Administrator signed a decision wherein the Agency declined to discontinue or 
 
determined that the entire case was moot); see also Bobby D. Reynolds, N.P., 80 Fed. Reg. 28643, 
28643–44, 28643 n.2 (Drug Enf’t Admin. May 19, 2015) (acting absent any request by either party to 
do so, DEA administrator sua sponte reviewed application withdrawal request that had been filed 
exclusively with the DAADC). 
44. 21 U.S.C. § 877 (2012). 
45. 5 U.S.C. § 704. 
46. 21 C.F.R. §§ 1301.46, 1316.67. 
47. Id. §§ 1301.43, 1316.47, 1316.65(a). 
48. See id. § 1301.43 (authorizing responses to an OSC); Thomas Horiagon, M.D., 81 Fed. Reg. 
79051, 79051 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Nov. 10, 2016) (referencing the OSC instruction to “submit a [CAP] 
to the Deputy Assistant Administrator and the procedure for doing so”). 
49. See 21 C.F.R. § 1301.43; Horiagon, 81 Fed. Reg. at 79051. 
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defer proceedings at some point prior to consideration of the administrative 
record, this would place the parties in the position of appealing the 
Administrator’s own determination to the same Administrator to determine 
whether to affirm his previous decision, or would at least create the anomalous 
result of having the DEA Administrator review his own decision at the time a 
final order is issued—with no warrant for doing so in the EPAEDEA or the 
regulations.  While the APA affords an agency head authority to issue a final 
order in administrative proceedings, the specter of having an appeal of the 
Administrator’s decision to himself risks an imprudent buffeting of the 
Supreme Court’s admonition that “no man can be a judge in his own case.”50 
The CAP is a new phenomenon, and it is reasonable to assume that the 
Agency’s approach will benefit from some level of evolution.  That said, to the 
extent that the DEA elects to have its Administrator review CAP submissions 
in the first instance, it enhances the opportunity for judicial review of any 
decision declining to discontinue or defer proceedings. 
In view of the highly-regulated and technical nature of the registrants who 
engage in controlled substance regulated activity, the determination by 
Congress that the regulating agency is required (not merely permitted) to 
consider a remedial plan that is submitted to it,51 by even the most egregious 
violators of standards that have been static and in place for decades, before 
proceeding with administrative proceedings, is a remarkable step.  The CAP 
decision to discontinue or defer proceedings—a decision entirely separate from 
the formal administrative process that affords pre- or post-deprivation due 
process to all registrants and potential registrants of the Agency52—is 
undoubtedly now an important one for the Agency.  If, as may well be the case, 
CAP submissions and the Agency’s decision of whether to discontinue or defer 
proceedings based upon those submitted CAPs are ultimately subject to review 
by the courts, the regulated community may eventually enjoy the benefits of an 
evolving body of case law that mandates the discontinuation or deferral of 
administrative proceedings where various levels of remediation are 
convincingly proposed.  To the extent it blossoms, judicial review of CAP 
determinations will likely provide decades of fertile litigation opportunities for 
the regulated community and will add an additional litigation burden on DEA 
regulators. 
 
50. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955). 
51. Ensuring Patient Access and Effective Drug Enforcement Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-145, 
§ 2, 130 Stat. 353 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 824(c)(2)(C)). 
52. See id. (codified as amended at § 824(c)(3)). 
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B. Imminent Danger to Public Health and Safety for Immediate Suspension 
Orders 
Under the CSA, the DEA Administrator has authority53 to immediately 
suspend a registration, and to keep that registration suspended during the 
pendency of administrative revocation proceedings, in any case “where he finds 
that there is an imminent danger to the public health or safety.”54  The 
EPAEDEA created, for the first time, a statutory definition for the phrase 
“imminent danger to the public health or safety.”55 
The Administrator has always been required to determine that an 
“imminent danger to the public health or safety” exists before immediately 
suspending a registration.56  However, before the EPAEDEA, that language 
was not specifically defined in the statute,57 and it was broad enough to afford 
the Agency head with latitude to make a determination as to whether, informed 
by the Agency’s expertise and experience, particular conduct or circumstances 
posed such a threat.58  In fact, given that this extraordinary measure depends on 
post-deprivation due process, it is remarkable that during the more than four 
decades that a long line of Administrators had been determining whether there 
was an “imminent danger to the public health or safety” to justify immediately 
suspending a registration before that phrase was defined in the EPAEDEA, 
apart from a forty-year-old case from the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals,59 and 
a small handful of isolated unpublished exceptions from the district courts,60 
the courts have historically sustained the Administrators’ pre-EPAEDEA 
 
53. The statute assigns this authority to the Attorney General, who has delegated it to the DEA 
Administrator.  28 C.F.R. § 0.100(b), 0.103(a) (2017). 
54. 21 U.S.C. § 824(d) (2012); see 21 C.F.R. § 1301.36(e). 
55. Ensuring Patient Access and Effective Drug Enforcement Act of 2016 § 2 (codified as 
amended at 21 U.S.C. 824(d)(2)). 
56. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 
Stat. 1256 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 304). 
57. See 21 U.S.C. § 824(d). 
58. The regulations provide that the immediate suspension order “shall contain a statement of 
[the Administrator’s] findings regarding the danger to the public health or safety.”  21 C.F.R. 
§ 1301.36(e). 
59. Norman Bridge Drug Co. v. Banner, 529 F.2d 822, 824–25, 828–29 (5th Cir. 1976) (finding 
that the Administrator’s ISO was unsupported due to staleness based on a seven-month delay in its 
issuance). 
60. See, e.g., Bates Drug Stores, Inc. v. Holder, No. CV-11-0167-EFS, 2011 WL 1750066, at *3 
(E.D. Wash. May 6, 2011); Memorandum Decision and Order, MacKay v. Bolman, No. 2:09-cv-285 
CW (D. Utah Apr. 7, 2009), ECF No. 13; Order and Findings of Law and Fact, Apothecary Arts 
Pharmacy, Inc. v. Gonzales, Civ. No. 06-119 (RCL) (D.D.C. Feb. 3, 2006), ECF No. 5. 
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determinations of an imminent threat to public health or safety.61  It is equally 
remarkable that, notwithstanding the dearth of court review of this public-
safety tool, or any other readily apparent reason, Congress determined that the 
“imminent danger to the public health or safety” standard required a statutory 
definition that imposed a dramatic diminution of the Agency’s authority to 
issue Immediate Suspension Orders (ISOs)62 at a time when, by all accounts, 
opioid abuse, addiction, and deaths were increasing markedly.63 
In an effort to supply additional definition to the phrase “imminent danger 
to the public health or safety,” the EPAEDEA enhanced the required showing 
to secure an ISO with the following language: 
[T]he phrase ‘imminent danger to the public health or safety’ 
means that, due to the failure of the registrant to maintain 
effective controls against diversion or otherwise comply with 
the obligations of a registrant under [the CSA], there is a 
substantial likelihood of an immediate threat that death, serious 
bodily harm, or abuse of a controlled substance will occur in 
the absence of an immediate suspension of the registration.64 
In the post-EPAEDEA era, for the Agency to support the Administrator’s 
determination that the public health and safety is imperiled without a cessation 
of regulated activity while (often lengthy) administrative revocation 
proceedings are conducted, the Agency now bears the high burden of 
establishing that there is a “substantial likelihood” that a registrant’s failure “to 
maintain effective controls against diversion,” or non-compliance with the 
CSA, will result in an “immediate threat” of specific, enumerated harms, to wit: 
“death, serious bodily harm, or abuse of a controlled substance.”65 
Even apart from the onerous task of demonstrating a link between a 
registrant’s alleged transgressions and an impending death, serious bodily 
harm, or abuse, the Agency now must shoulder the burden of showing that the 
“likelihood” of those evils, based on the purported transgressions, is 
“substantial.”66  The courts have concluded in other contexts that “substantial 
 
61. See, e.g., Novelty Distribs. v. Leonhart, 562 F. Supp. 2d 20, 27–29 (D.D.C. 2008); Neil 
Laboratories, Inc., v. Ashcroft, 217 F. Supp. 2d 80, 87 (D.D.C. 2002). 
62. See Ensuring Patient Access and Effective Drug Enforcement Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-
145, § 2, 130 Stat. 353 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 824(d)(2)). 
63. See, e.g., Drug Overdose Deaths in the United States Continue to Increase in 2015, CDC, 
https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/epidemic [https://perma.cc/AKA4-52SR] (last visited Sept. 21, 
2017). 
64. Ensuring Patient Access and Effective Drug Enforcement Act of 2016 § 2 (codified as 
amended at 21 U.S.C. § 824(d)(2)). 
65. Id. 
66. Id. 
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likelihood” means that the referenced event or circumstance is “considerably 
more likely.”67  Thus, before a single witness is produced or any piece of 
evidence admitted at a hearing, to sustain its ISO, the DEA is now required to 
establish by substantial evidence that the transgression(s) or violation(s) it has 
encountered will render death, serious bodily harm, or abuse considerably and 
imminently more likely.68  However unlikely the Agency is to successfully bear 
this heavy burden in the case of individual practitioners or pharmacies, it is all 
but logically impossible, due to the obvious attenuation between the distributor 
or manufacturer registrant and the potential victims, to make the requisite 
showing up the production chain, in the case of a distributor or manufacturer.  
Stated differently, there are simply too many levels between distributors and 
manufacturers to logically establish any causation of death, serious bodily 
harm, or abuse to a specific patient down the chain to support an immediate 
suspension after the EPAEDEA.  If it had been the intent of Congress to 
completely eliminate the DEA’s ability to ever impose an immediate 
suspension on distributors or manufacturers, it would be difficult to conceive 
of a more effective vehicle for achieving that goal. 
C. Defining “Factors As May Be Relevant to and Consistent with the Public 
Health and Safety” 
The new definition of “imminent danger to the public health or safety” and 
the CAP provisions received the most attention when the EPAEDEA was 
signed by President Obama on April 19, 2016.69  In fact, even the White House 
Statement that issued on the day that the EPAEDEA was signed by President 
Obama fails to mention the third change that the EPAEDEA made to the CSA.70  
Although it received scant attention when compared with the other two 
changes, the EPAEDEA’s addition of a definition for “factors as may be 
relevant to and consistent with the public health and safety,” which is the 
language used in the catch-all public interest factor to be considered by the 
 
67. See, e.g., United States v. Thorn, 317 F.3d 107, 117 (2d Cir. 2003), aff’d in relevant part, 
446 F.3d 378, 382–84 (2d Cir. 2006) (considering the term “substantial likelihood” in the context of 
the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines); United States v. Mathis, 738 F.3d 719, 740 (6th Cir. 2013) (same). 
68. Mathis, 738 F.3d at 740. 
69. See Harriet Ryan & Kim Christensen, Amid Opioid Epidemic, Rules for Drug Companies 
are Loosened, L.A. TIMES, July 27, 2016, http://www.latimes.com/local/california/la-me-pharma-bill-
20160728-snap-story.html [https://perma.cc/MCG8-DUXW]; Harris Gardner & Emmarie Huetteman, 
Actions by Congress on Opioids Haven’t Included Limiting Them, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2016, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/19/us/politics/opioid-dea-addiction.html [https://perma.cc/VJK7-
CU5H]. 
70. Statement by the Press Secretary on S. 192, S. 483, S. 2512, 2016 WL 1567506 (White 
House) (Apr. 19, 2016). 
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Agency in determining whether to register or maintain registration71 for 
manufacturers72 and distributors73 (but not prescribers, pharmacies, and 
researchers)74 of controlled substances, is worth examining.   
Under the CSA, the Agency “shall register an applicant” to manufacture 
controlled substances in schedule I or II “if [it] determines that such registration 
is consistent with the public interest and with [the country’s] obligations under 
international [agreements],”75 and “shall register an applicant” to distribute a 
controlled substance in schedules I–V or manufacture controlled substances in 
schedules III–V “unless [it] determines that the issuance of such registration is 
inconsistent with the public interest.”76  The CSA provides six factors that 
“shall be considered” in determining the public interest with regard to 
manufacturers,77 and five factors that “shall be considered” in determining the 
public interest with regard to distributors.78  For both manufacturers and 
distributors, one of the factors to be considered is a catch-all factor that 
encompasses “such other factors as may be relevant to and consistent with the 
public health and safety.”79  The separate section of the CSA addressing 
suspension and revocation of existing registrations lists, as one of the grounds 
for suspension or denial, “a finding that the registrant . . . has committed such 
acts as would render his registration under section 823 . . . inconsistent with the 
public interest as determined under such section,”80 and thus the public interest 
factors in Title 21, Section 823 are relevant to the inquiry of whether applicants 
shall be registered as well as the inquiry regarding whether current registrations 
should be suspended or revoked.  Therefore, for both (and only) manufacturer 
and distributor applicants and registrants, the Agency can consider “factors as 
may be relevant to and consistent with the public health and safety,”81 in 
 
71. Ensuring Patient Access and Effective Drug Enforcement Act of 2016 § 2 (codified as 
amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 823(j)), 824(c), (d)); 21 U.S.C. § 823(a)–(f) (2012). 
72. 21 U.S.C. § 823(a)–(a)(6), (d)–(d)(6) (2012). 
73. Id. § 823(b)–(b)(5), (e)–(e)(5).  
74. Id. § 823(f)(5).  
75. See id. § 823(a). 
76. Id. § 823(b), (d), (e). 
77. Id. § 823(a), (d). 
78. Id. § 823(b), (e). 
79. Id. § 823(a)(6), (b)(5), (d)(6), (e)(5).  There are similar catch-all factors for practitioner 
(doctor and pharmacy) registrants and List I distributor registrants, but they do not contain the same 
language that was defined by the EPAEDEA.  See id. § 823(f)(5) (“Such other conduct which may 
threaten the public health and safety.” (emphasis added)); id. § 823(h)(5) (“[S]uch other factors as are 
relevant to and consistent with the public health and safety.” (emphasis added)). 
80. Id. § 824(a), (a)(4). 
81. Id. § 823(a)(6), (b)(5), (d)(6), (e)(5). 
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addition to other enumerated factors, when reviewing whether to grant an 
application or sanction a registration.82 
Before the EPAEDEA, “factors as may be relevant to and consistent with 
the public health and safety” was not statutorily defined.83  The EPAEDEA 
adds the following: “In this section, the phrase ‘factors as may be relevant to 
and consistent with the public health and safety’ means factors that are relevant 
to and consistent with the findings contained in [21 U.S.C. § 801].”84 
Co-sponsors of the EPAEDEA, like the media and the White House in its 
press release, did not emphasize the new definition to the extent they did the 
other two changes.  One co-sponsor, apparently referencing this new definition, 
stated that the EPAEDEA “will better delineate the standards a company must 
satisfy in order to obtain a [CSA] registration,”85 although he did not explain 
why such delineation was needed.  A few months later, at another session, he 
more explicitly explained that the EPAEDEA “makes three important changes 
to the [CSA],” and, as relevant to this definition, explained that “it clarifies the 
factors that the Attorney General is required to consider when deciding whether 
to register an applicant to manufacture or distribute controlled substances.”86  
He continued: 
The current text of the [CSA] instructs the Attorney General to 
consider factors that “may be relevant to and consistent with 
the public health and safety,” but it does not provide any 
guidance as to what those factors might be.  This vague 
language creates uncertainty among advocates regarding the 
standards they must meet to obtain a registration. 
 [ The EPAEDEA] reduces this uncertainty by tying those 
standards to Congress’s findings in [21 U.S.C. § 801] 
regarding the benefits, harms, and commercial impact of 
controlled substances.  This change will bring clarity to the 
registration process and provide better guidance to regulators 
as they consider applications to manufacture or distribute 
controlled substances.87 
 
82. Id. § 823(a)–(e). 
83. See id. § 823. 
84. Ensuring Patient Access and Effective Drug Enforcement Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-145, 
§ 2, 130 Stat. 353, 354 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 823(j)). 
85. 162 CONG. REC. S954 (daily ed. Feb. 23, 2016) (statement of Sen. Hatch). 
86. 162 CONG. REC. S2006 (daily ed. Apr. 13, 2016) (statement of Sen. McConnell). 
87. Id. at S2006-07. 
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Therefore, the single basis of support offered for the addition of this definition 
was that it would purportedly make the catch-all factor clearer for potential 
registrants.88 
To the extent that this portion of the EPAEDEA was aimed at providing a 
supplemental definition because the catch-all factors used by the Agency were 
too vague, it is not altogether clear why the insertion of a definition that extends 
only to manufacturers and distributors was adequate to achieve that goal.  It 
might seem that if the catch-all language for manufacturers and distributors 
created such “uncertainty among advocates”89 for those registrants that it 
required a more specific definition linking it to certain congressional findings, 
then it is likely that advocates for pharmacies, physicians, and List I distributors 
would also be uncertain about the catch-all language in the equivalent factors 
applicable to those applicants/registrants, as the language is remarkably similar.  
However, Congress elected to leave the existing catch-all language for 
practitioners90 and List I distributors91 in place—and to leave it undefined.  
Thus, the EPAEDEA either created an enhanced definition for two types of 
applicants/registrants that was not truly necessary, or it created an enhanced 
definition only for those types of registrants, while failing to address the same 
problem for the remaining applicants and registrants covered by the CSA.  
Additionally, to the extent that Congress had perceived a need to do so, it 
certainly had the ability to supplement the public interest factors with specific, 
enumberated sub-factors.   
While it has yet to be tested, this newly-defined factor should be watched 
closely in the years to come.  Time will tell if the CSA enhancements supplied 
by Congress in the EPAEDEA achieved its espoused beneficial objectives, or 
whether the entire effort proves to have been a solution in search of a problem.  
Whether the new language serves as a helpful clarifier or creates wide potential 
for manufacturers and distributors—but, notably, not other types of 
registrants—to dramatically constrict the range of evidence available for 
regulators to properly consider within the confines of § 801 (or whether it will 
do both or neither) will only be discernible after all sides take the new statute 
for a test drive.   
III. AGENCY PRECEDENT 
Agency legal thinking, as expressed through the final orders it has issued 
recently, has taken dramatic swings and detours that are certain to affect 
 
88. See id. 
89. Id. 
90. 21 U.S.C. § 823(f)(5) (2012). 
91. Id. § 823(h)(5). 
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diversion litigation, the options chosen by prosecutors, and the advice given to 
clients.  Both sides of the litigation equation should be familiar with other 
nuanced details, set forth only in Agency final orders, that may affect the 
parties’ relative positions. 
The most tectonic shifts in recent Agency legal interpretation arguably 
occurred in the field of practitioners in general, and pharmacies in particular.  
In a relatively brief period of time, the DEA, through its final order precedent, 
has modified numerous legal standards, the bulk of which may ultimately 
increase the challenges faced by its own agents and prosecutors to prevail in its 
enforcement efforts.   
A. The Public Interest Factors for Practitioners 
In the course of supplying a framework for the granting and sanctioning of 
DEA controlled substance registrations for practitioners, Congress directed that 
the Attorney General92 must consider and balance five factors (the Public 
Interest Factors).93  The Public Interest Factors regarding practitioners are as 
follows:  
(1) The recommendation of the appropriate State licensing 
board or professional disciplinary authority[;] 
(2)  The applicant’s [or registrant’s] experience in dispensing, 
or conducting research with respect to controlled substances[;] 
(3)  The applicant’s [or registrant’s] conviction record under 
Federal or State laws relating to the manufacture, distribution, 
or dispensing of controlled substances[;] 
(4) Compliance with applicable State, Federal, or local laws 
relating to controlled substances[; and] 
(5)  Such other conduct which may threaten the public health 
and safety.94 
While the text of the CSA relating to the Public Interest Factors has not 
been changed, the Agency’s interpretation of the public interest standard for 
practitioners generally, and certain aspects of Public Interest Factors One and 
Two95 in particular, have been evolving. 
 
92. This authority has been delegated to the Administrator.  28 C.F.R. §§ 0.100(b), 0.103(a) 
(2017).  The Administrator, in turn, may delegate this authority to the Deputy Administrator.  Id. 
§ 0.104. 
93. 21 U.S.C. §§ 823(f), 824(a)(4). 
 94. Id. § 823(f)(1)–(5). 
95. Id. § 823(f)(1)–(2). 
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1. The Re-Re-Tweaking of Public Interest Factor One 
In Wesley Pope, M.D., the Agency directed some attention to explaining 
how it intends to handle evidence under Public Interest Factor One in the 
future.96  Public Interest Factor One requires the Agency to consider, in 
determining the public interest, “[t]he recommendation of the appropriate State 
licensing board or professional disciplinary authority.”97  Inasmuch as the 
ultimate responsibility to determine whether a registration is consistent with the 
public interest has been delegated exclusively to the DEA and not to entities 
within a state government,98 it is not surprising that the actions of state licensing 
and disciplinary authorities have not historically played a case-dispositive role 
in diversion cases under Factor One.99  Notwithstanding the seeming simplicity 
of the language utilized by Congress in this straightforward provision, final 
orders from the Agency regarding this factor have presented a surprising level 
of inconsistency.100   
The plain language of Public Interest Factor One reflects that Congress 
made the existence of a “recommendation of the appropriate State licensing 
board or professional disciplinary authority”101 the clear condition precedent 
for consideration of evidence under this factor.  Where a “recommendation” by 
one of those bodies exists and is part of the record,102 it is to be considered in 
the Agency’s determination of whether granting or continuing a registration is 
in the public interest, and where the record does not contain a recommendation 
from a state licensing authority or disciplinary board, no evidence may be 
 
96. Wesley Pope, M.D., 82 Fed. Reg. 14944, 14965 n.36 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Mar. 23, 2017). 
97. 21 U.S.C. § 823(f)(1). 
98. Edmund Chein, M.D., 72 Fed. Reg. 6580, 6590 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Feb. 12, 2007), pet. for 
rev. denied, Chein v. DEA, 533 F.3d 828, 835 (D.C. Cir. 2008), and cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1139 (2009). 
99. See, e.g., George Mathew, M.D., 75 Fed. Reg. 66138, 66145 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Oct. 27, 
2010) (declining to adopt as dispositive under Factor One the state medical board’s sanction of 
suspending respondent’s medical license, the Agency then stayed the suspension in a case where 
respondent was prescribing controlled substances without physically examining patients or 
maintaining medical records); Patrick W. Stodola, M.D., 74 Fed. Reg. 20727, 20730 (Drug Enf’t 
Admin. May 5, 2009) (considering the Agency’s acknowledgement that “the record contain[ed] no 
evidence that the [state] ha[d] taken action against [r]espondent’s medical license” as a Factor One 
consideration and dismissed the issue without analysis).  This is not to say that state licensing and 
disciplinary actions do not ever play a case-dispositive role.  In situations where a registrant or 
applicant lacks the requisite authority to handle controlled substances in his or her state, the Agency 
has determined that revocation or denial is mandatory.  E.g., Rezik A. Saqer, M.D., 81 Fed. Reg. 22122, 
22126 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Apr. 14, 2016); see Mulrooney & Hull, supra note 1, at 333–34. 
100. See Mulrooney & Hull, supra note 1, at 338–43. 
101. 21 U.S.C. § 823(f)(1) (emphasis added). 
102. See, e.g., John Porter Richards, D.O., 61 Fed. Reg. 13878, 13878 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Mar. 
28, 1996) (relying upon a letter containing a recommendation from the Ohio State Board of Medicine). 
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considered under Factor One.103  The plain language of the statute thus renders 
a binding, binary choice based on whether or not the appropriate state agency 
has made a recommendation.104   
Notwithstanding the apparent clarity of congressional intent, over time 
some, but not all, agency precedent progressively morphed into a “broader 
view” of the term “recommendation.”105  This broader view embraced the 
principle that, through an analysis of the actions of state licensing authorities, 
the Agency may be able to divine what the state would have recommended to 
the DEA regarding the disposition of a registration application or revocation if 
it had actually made a recommendation, in cases where it did not actually make 
such a recommendation.106  Under the broader interpretation, the Agency has, 
at times, found that various forms of disciplinary action107 provide evidence 
from which a recommendation against registration or continued registration 
may somehow be extrapolated and then considered under a Factor One 
analysis.108  Similarly, under this broad approach, the Agency has held that the 
 
103. See 21 U.S.C. § 823(f)(1). 
104. Even if the straightforward language used by Congress did not render resort to legislative 
history regarding Factor One superfluous, a review of the legislative history does not alter the result.  
An isolated reference to a House Committee hearing notes that the inclusion of the state 
recommendation among the mandatory factors to be considered by the DEA, and the placement of it 
first among the Factors, was designed to ensure that “deference would continue to be given to the 
opinions of the state licensing authorities.”  Diversion of Prescription Drugs to Illegal Channels and 
Dangerous Drug Diversion Control Act: Hearing on H.R. 4698 Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the 
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 122–23 (1984) (statement of Gene R. Haislip, Deputy Assistant 
Administrator, Office of Diversion Control, Drug Enforcement Administration).  This testimony 
supports the obvious intent of the language to incorporate the “recommendation” of state authorities 
regarding the disposition of DEA application and revocation decisions. 
105. Compare Ralph J. Chambers, M.D., 79 Fed. Reg. 4962, 4969 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Jan. 30, 
2014) (quoting Tony T. Bui, M.D., 75 Fed. Reg. 49979, 49986 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Aug. 16, 2010)), 
with Scott D. Fedosky, M.D., 76 Fed. Reg. 71375, 71377 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Nov. 17, 2011), and 
Gilbert Eugene Johnson, M.D., 75 Fed. Reg. 65663, 65666 n.3 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Oct. 26, 2010). 
106. See cases cited supra note 105. 
107. E.g., Tyson D. Quy, M.D., 78 Fed. Reg. 47412, 47417 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Aug. 5, 2013) 
(state license placed on probation); Daniel Koller, D.V.M., 71 Fed. Reg. 66975, 66981 (Drug Enf’t 
Admin. Nov. 17, 2006) (state license suspended); Gregory D. Owens, D.D.S., 67 Fed. Reg. 50461, 
50463 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Aug. 2, 2002) (state license placed on probation); Robert M. Golden, M.D., 
65 Fed. Reg. 5663, 5664 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Feb. 4, 2000) (state license subjected to consent order); 
Saihb S. Halil, M.D., 64 Fed. Reg. 33319, 33320–21 (Drug Enf’t Admin. June 22, 1999) (state license 
revoked); Jude R. Hayes, M.D., 59 Fed. Reg. 41785, 41786 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Aug. 15, 1994) (state 
license placed on probation); Wilbert McClay, Jr., M.D., 59 Fed. Reg. 30612, 30614 (Drug Enf’t 
Admin. June 14, 1994) (state license suspended); Myrtle L. Miller, D.O., 58 Fed. Reg. 64005, 64006 
(Drug Enf’t Admin. Dec. 3, 1993) (state license revoked). 
108. Chambers, 79 Fed. Reg. at 4969 (“DEA precedents have typically taken a broader view as 
to the scope of [Factor One].” (quoting Bui, 75 Fed. Reg. at 49986)); Kenneth Harold Bull, M.D., 78 
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restoration of a respondent’s state license,109 or the mere fact that a respondent 
holds a state medical license,110 can be interpreted as a recommendation in favor 
of registration or continued registration. 
In Pope, the Agency included a footnote that may signal how it will 
consider state actions that do not constitute recommendations to the DEA,111 at 
least insofar as those actions ultimately result in the registrant or applicant 
retaining state authority.112  Citing two cases decided by the Agency in 2002,113 
the Agency explained that “the Agency’s case law contains some older 
decisions which can be read as giving more than nominal weight in the public 
interest determination to a [s]tate [b]oard’s decision (not involving a 
recommendation to the DEA) either restoring or maintaining a practitioner’s 
state authority to dispense controlled substances,”114 but noted that “these cases 
cannot be squared with the Agency’s longstanding holding” that the 
Administrator must make a determination independent from any state 
determination as to whether “controlled substance privileges would be in the 
public interest.”115  In the same footnote, the Agency, referencing several more 
 
Fed. Reg. 62666, 62672 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Oct. 22, 2013) (“DEA has interpreted [F]actor [O]ne more 
broadly and thus considers disciplinary actions taken by a state board as relevant in the public interest 
determination . . . .”). 
109. E.g., Quy, 78 Fed. Reg. at 47417; Vincent J. Scolaro, D.O., 67 Fed. Reg. 42060, 42064–65 
(Drug Enf’t Admin. June 20, 2002); William E. Brown, D.O., 58 Fed. Reg. 64004, 64005 (Drug Enf’t 
Admin. Dec. 3, 1993). 
110. E.g., Margy Temponeras, M.D., 77 Fed. Reg. 45675, 45684 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Aug. 1, 
2012) (“Although not dispositive, [r]espondent’s possession of a valid unrestricted medical 
license . . . weighs against a finding that [r]espondent’s registration would be inconsistent with the 
public interest.”).  But see Farmacia Yani, 80 Fed. Reg. 29053, 29058 n.13 (Drug Enf’t Admin. May 
20, 2015) (ruling by Agency where it “considered” evidence that the respondent pharmacy was 
registered with the state and that the state board took no action against the pharmacist license of its 
owner and pharmacist-in-charge, but stating that the evidence does not “constitute a 
recommendation . . . as to whether the DEA should grant the [pharmacy’s] application” for a DEA 
registration). 
111. Wesley Pope, M.D., 82 Fed. Reg. 14944, 14965 n.36 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Mar. 23, 2017). 
112. Id.  While Pope only explicitly addressed how a state authority’s reinstatement of a state 
license (or inaction as to a state license) would be considered, if the state board revokes or suspends 
the practitioner’s ability to handle controlled substances in the state in which the practitioner is 
registered with the DEA, the Agency routinely holds that such practitioner “does not meet the CSA’s 
essential requirement for maintaining a practitioner’s registration,” e.g., Steven Bernhard, D.O., 82 
Fed. Reg. 23298, 23300 (Drug Enf’t Admin. May 22, 2017), and thus no consideration under Factor 
One is necessary to the disposition of the case. 
113. Pope, 82 Fed. Reg. at 14965 n.36 (citing Gregory D. Owens, 67 Fed. Reg. 50461, 50463 
(Drug Enf’t Admin. Aug. 2, 2002); and then citing Scolaro, 67 Fed. Reg. at 42065). 
114. Pope, 82 Fed. Reg. at 14965 n.36 (citing Owens, 67 Fed. Reg. at 50463). 
115. Id. (quoting Mortimer Levin, D.O., 57 Fed. Reg. 8680, 8681 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Mar. 11, 
1992)). 
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recent cases, acknowledged that “in other cases, [it] has given some weight to 
a [state board’s] action in allowing a practitioner to retain his state authority 
even in the absence of an express recommendation,”116 but noted that “the 
Agency has repeatedly held that a practitioner’s retention of [his or her] state 
authority is not dispositive of the public interest inquiry.”117   
Based on its language in the footnote in Pope, the Agency appears to be 
signaling that it may be willing to consider evidence that a state entity has 
reinstated (or not acted upon) a registrant’s or applicant’s state license under 
Factor One, but that it may give such evidence no more than “nominal 
weight,”118 and, in any event, such evidence will not be dispositive.  Inasmuch 
as the Agency has long held that retention of state authority is a threshold 
statutory requirement for entitlement to hold a DEA registration,119 this analysis 
may result in more confusion than clarity, because the line between assessing 
threshold state controlled substance authority and evidence to be considered 
under Factor One is arguably somewhat blurred.  If this footnote signals a 
deliberate navigation to a more consistent application of how evidence will be 
considered (or not considered) under Factor One, this aspect of Pope would 
likely be welcomed by the practicing bar and the regulated community.  After 
many years and no small amount of vacillation, it now appears that the Agency 
may be considering a swerve back to the plain language provided by Congress 
relative to Factor One, meaning that for a state action to be considered with any 
measurable weight under Factor One, it must constitute a recommendation from 
a state licensing or disciplinary board, not merely some action related to state 
licensure.  The Factor One language in Pope does specifically note that the 
respondent’s state board “has not made a recommendation to the Agency with 
respect to whether his [DEA registration] application should be granted,”120 
which sounds like some movement towards a plain-language Factor One 
approach, but the decision stopped short of settling the matter.  However, a 
subsequent final order, David D. Moon, D.O., provides some reason to believe 
that the Agency is moving in a cognizable direction back towards a plain-
language requirement for an actual state recommendation, with less reliance on 
 
116. Id. (citing Paul Weir Battershell, N.P., 76 Fed. Reg. 44359, 44366 (Drug Enf’t Admin. 
July 25, 2011)). 
117. Id. (citing Battershell, 76 Fed. Reg. at 44366). 
118. Id. (citing Owens, 67 Fed. Reg. at 50463 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Aug. 2, 2002); and then citing 
Scolaro, 67 Fed. Reg. at 42065). 
119. James L. Hooper, M.D., 76 Fed. Reg. 71371, 71372 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Nov. 17, 2011), 
pet. for rev. denied, Hooper v. Holder, 481 F. App’x 826 (4th Cir. 2012). 
120. Pope, 82 Fed. Reg. at 14965 n.36. 
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trying to distill intent from non-recommendations.121  For all sides of the 
litigation aisle, less dependence on legal alchemy is likely welcome.   
Another interesting Factor One question addressed by the Agency is 
whether an adverse action taken, or recommendation given, by a state authority 
other than the state in which the applicant seeks to be registered (or the 
registrant seeks to maintain his registration) could ever be considered by the 
Agency and, if so, what weight it would be given.  In Zizhuang Li, M.D., the 
Agency rejected the Government’s argument that revocation of the 
practitioner’s state license in Mississippi should be considered in determining 
whether to grant an application for licensure in California,122 holding that the 
Mississippi Medical Board was not the “appropriate” state licensing board.123  
Li thus appears to foreclose consideration of adverse actions taken in states 
other than the state in which a respondent seeks a new or continued registration 
under Factor One.  The practicing bar on both sides will likely wonder why the 
Agency’s interpretation seems to preclude any consideration of an adverse 
action taken by a state, merely because it is a different state than the one in 
which the registrant seeks to hold a DEA registration.  However, it is still 
unclear whether the Agency would extend Li so far as to ignore such evidence 
if it were in the format of an actual recommendation made to the DEA regarding 
a registration by a different state’s licensing authority. 
Although rarely pursued by litigants on either side, a recommendation 
garnered from a state tribunal for or against a DEA sanction, depending on the 
facts of the case and the strength of the recommendation, could potentially 
constitute powerful evidence for the Government or a respondent, and Pope at 
least suggests that from now on, such a recommendation may be the only 
evidence that will be considered with any weight under Factor One.  The 
takeaway here is that, in a post-Pope world, both sides should be looking harder 
at Factor One.   
2. Is Public Interest Factor Two Shrinking, Melding, Both, or Neither? 
The Pope case also presented a fascinating next chapter in what could 
arguably be characterized as the Agency’s progressive constricting of evidence 
properly considered “experience” under Public Interest Factor Two in 
practitioner cases.124  Factor Two compels consideration of “[t]he applicant’s 
 
121. See, e.g., David D. Moon, D.O., 82 Fed. Reg. 19385, 19387 n.5 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Apr. 
27, 2017). 
122. Zizhuang Li, M.D., 78 Fed. Reg. 71660, 71663 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Nov. 29, 2013). 
123. Id. 
124. See Pope, 82 Fed. Reg. at 14964–65 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 823(f)(2) (2012)). 
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experience in dispensing, or conducting research with respect to controlled 
substances.”125  Inasmuch as the statutory definition of “dispense” includes 
“prescribing” and “administering,”126 this Section addresses experience 
regarding those regulated activities as well.127  
Before discussing the Factor Two aspects of Pope, a consideration of the 
language and history of Factor Two is pertinent.  It is axiomatic that the 
interpretation of any statute begins and ends with an examination of clear, 
directive language.128  “[U]nless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted 
as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning,”129 and “[w]here 
language is clear and unambiguous, it must be followed except in the most 
extraordinary situation where the language leads to an absurd result contrary to 
clear legislative intent.”130  The plain language of Factor Two supplies a 
mandate by Congress for the Agency, in determining the public interest, to 
consider “[t]he applicant’s experience in dispensing, or conducting research 
with respect to controlled substances.”131  The simplicity of the language directs 
no more than a mandatory evaluation of the experience that an applicant brings 
to the regulated activity the applicant seeks to conduct within the scope of a 
DEA certificate of registration.  Congress did not limit or qualify the experience 
that the Agency is required to consider under this factor, nor did Congress 
authorize the Agency to ignore offered evidence on the subject by caprice.  If a 
party to an administrative registration adjudication offers relevant evidence 
regarding the applicant’s or registrant’s experience that is not otherwise 
inadmissible, the language selected by Congress appears to unequivocally 
require its admission and consideration under Factor Two. 
 
125. 21 U.S.C. § 823(f)(2). 
126. Id. § 802(10). 
127. For general background regarding the language and reach of Factor Two, see Mulrooney & 
Hull, supra note 1, at 343–46. 
128. See Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980) (“We 
begin with the familiar canon of statutory construction that the starting point for interpreting a statute 
is the language of the statute itself.  Absent a clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary, 
that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.”); see also Woods v. Standard Ins. Co., 771 
F.3d 1257, 1265 (10th Cir. 2014) (stating that if a court finds statutory language clear, its inquiry ends; 
only if language is “ambiguous” does court turn to legislative history); Falvo v. Owasso Indep. Sch. 
Dist. No. I-011, 233 F.3d 1201, 1203 n.2 (10th Cir. 2000) (same).  It is well-settled that “words should 
be given their ‘ordinary meaning.’” Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 108 (1990) (citing Richards 
v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 9 (1962)). 
129. Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979). 
130. United States v. Plotts, 347 F.3d 873, 876 (10th Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v. Tagore, 
158 F.3d 1124, 1128 (10th Cir. 1998)); see Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, 458 U.S. 564, 571–72 
(1982); Comm’r v. Brown, 380 U.S. 563, 571 (1965). 
131. 21 U.S.C. § 823(f)(2). 
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It could be persuasively argued that the precision of the language employed 
by Congress in Factor Two all but precludes resort to any source beyond the 
statute itself, but even if it were not so, a review of the legislative history 
specific to this provision reveals no intention to impose limitations on the 
evidence to be considered under this Factor.  The single reservation evident in 
the legislative history was a clarification that an absence of any prior 
experience, at least in the case of a recently-graduated practitioner, should not 
be considered negatively against such a practitioner.132   
Some context regarding the Agency’s and the courts’ treatment of Factor 
Two is also helpful in navigating the Agency’s current course.  Historically, the 
Agency placed evidence of an applicant’s past experience engaging in the 
regulated activity under its Factor Two discussion, but eventually reasoned that 
a robust level of benign, or even commendable, experience could be easily 
outweighed by other evidence demonstrating that granting a registration 
application was inconsistent with the public interest.133  Even though the 
 
132. Specifically, a House of Representatives committee hearing report clarifies that Factor Two 
“shall not, of course, be construed in [any way] to hinder registration of recent graduates of professional 
schools who may have no professional experience dispensing or conducting research with controlled 
substances.”  H.R. REP. NO. 98-835, pt. 1, at 14 (1984).  This brief statement resulted from input by 
the American Pharmaceutical Association (APhA), stemming from its concern that the absence of 
experience would bar the registration of recent pharmacy school graduates.  Hearing, supra note 104, 
at 334 (statement of Maurice Q. Bectel, Interim President, American Pharmaceutical Association).  
Thus, it is clear that the Factor Two language signified to the APhA that, unless its concerns on the 
point were addressed, the draft language chosen (and ultimately adopted) by Congress would require 
the Agency to consider the applicant’s prior experience in the regulated field—or lack thereof—in 
order to gauge applicant suitability.  During the legislative hearing process, the American Veterinary 
Medical Association (AVMA) also expressed a reservation that the draft Factor Two language 
(ultimately retained by Congress) would address conduct also covered by Factor Three (conviction of 
a felony related to controlled substances) and Factor Four (compliance with laws relating to controlled 
substances), thus rendering consideration of evidence under this factor duplicative.  Id. at 425 (written 
statement of the American Veterinary Medical Association).  As discussed later in this Section, the 
interpretive evolution currently embraced by the Agency regarding the application of the Public 
Interest Factors to all evidence of record has rendered the AVMA prescient in this regard.  See 
discussion infra pp. 366–68. 
133. See, e.g., Med. Shoppe–Jonesborough, 73 Fed. Reg. 364, 386 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Jan. 2, 
2008) (acknowledging, under its discussion of Factor Two, that the respondent had 17,000 patients, 
but finding that established misconduct, which related to only a relatively small portion of the 
respondent’s patient population, outweighed any other conduct); Paul J. Caragine, Jr., 63 Fed. Reg. 
51592, 51600 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Sept. 28, 1998) (acknowledging, in its discussion of Factor Two, 
that during twenty years of practice, the respondent saw over 15,000 patients, but noting that, “even 
though the patients at issue are only a small portion of [r]espondent’s patient population, his 
prescribing of controlled substances to [the patients at issue] raises serious concerns regarding [his] 
ability to responsibly handle controlled substances in the future”); see also Ivan D. Garcia-Ramirez, 
M.D., 69 Fed. Reg. 62092, 62093 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Oct. 22, 2004) (finding Factor Two irrelevant 
CURRENT NAVIGATION POINTS IN DRUG DIVERSION LAW (DRAFT) MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW VOL. 101 
2017] CURRENT NAVIGATION POINTS IN DRUG DIVERSION LAW 359 
Agency has considered the experience of List 1 applicants134 on the issue of 
whether they possess the level of experience and subject area knowledge to 
discharge effectively the obligations of a registrant,135 it has dismissed the 
notion of applying this rationale to practitioner cases.136   
In 2006, in its discussion of Factor Two in Krishna-Iyer, M.D., the Agency 
discussed only the established transgressions, and did not mention evidence in 
the record regarding other experience or weigh the wrongdoings against such 
evidence.137  On appeal, in Krishna-Iyer v. DEA,138 the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit noted (in an unpublished per curiam decision) 
that “the DEA is required to consider the [Public Interest Factors] to determine 
if continued certification is against the public interest,”139 and criticized the 
Agency for failing to adequately consider evidence admitted to the record of 
proceedings under Factor Two.140  In its decision, the Eleventh Circuit held: 
In considering [p]etitioner’s experience in dispensing 
controlled substances under [F]actor [Two], the DEA 
identified only four visits by three undercover “patients,” who 
were all attempting to make a case against her.  The DEA failed 
to consider [p]etitioner’s experience with twelve patients 
whose medical charts were seized by the DEA, or with 
thousands of other patients.  In short, the DEA did not consider 
any of [p]etitioner’s positive experience in dispensing 
controlled substances.  This is an arbitrary and unfair analysis 
of [p]etitioner’s experience.  We vacate the order of the 
 
to public interest determination because “there is no information in the investigative file relative to 
[r]espondent’s lawful handling of controlled substances in his professional practice” where practitioner 
pled guilty to one felony count of possession with intent to import heroin). 
134. 21 U.S.C. § 823(h). 
135. See, e.g., TNT Distribs., Inc., 70 Fed. Reg. 12729, 12731 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Mar. 15, 
2005); Volusia Wholesale, 69 Fed. Reg. 69409, 69410 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Nov. 29, 2004); K & Z 
Enters., Inc., 69 Fed. Reg. 51475, 51476 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Aug. 19, 2004); Island Wholesale, Inc., 
68 Fed. Reg. 17406, 17407 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Apr. 9, 2003). 
136. See, e.g., Cynthia M. Cadet, M.D., 76 Fed. Reg. 19450, 19450 n.3 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Apr. 
7, 2011) (noting only that List 1 distributors are “a different category of registrant[s],” the Agency 
proceeded to dismiss the comparative rationale). 
137. Jayam Krishna-Iyer, M.D., 71 Fed. Reg. 52148, 52158 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Sept. 1, 2006), 
vacated, Krishna-Iyer v. DEA, 249 F. App’x 159 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam), remanded to Jayam 
Krishna-Iyer, M.D., 74 Fed. Reg. 459 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Jan. 6, 2009).  In its findings of fact, the 
Agency noted that the practitioner testified that she had around 800 to 1000 recurring patients and saw 
around 3,000 patients per year.  Id. at 52149.  It also made findings regarding her education, training, 
and experience at various hospitals.  Id. 
138. 249 F. App’x 159. 
139. Id. at 159. 
140. Id. at 160. 
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[Agency] and remand the case for reconsideration of this 
factor, where the DEA should pay particular attention to the 
entire corpus of [p]etitioner’s record in dispensing controlled 
substances, not only the experience of undercover officers.  
The five factors should accordingly be re-balanced.141 
The court’s directive to the Agency seemed clear enough: on remand, 
rebalance the evidence considered under Factor Two in light of the entire 
corpus of the prescriber’s experience, and rebalance the five factors 
accordingly.142  The Agency could have easily done what it had historically 
done: briefly discuss the evidence under Factor Two, but ultimately find that 
the established misconduct outweighed the positive or benign conduct.143  
Instead, the Agency pushed back somewhat on the Eleventh Circuit’s analysis, 
stating: 
[E]vidence that a practitioner has treated thousands of patients 
does not negate a prima facie showing that the practitioner has 
committed acts inconsistent with the public interest.  While 
such evidence may be of some weight in assessing whether a 
practitioner has credibly shown that she has reformed her 
practices, where a practitioner commits intentional acts of 
diversion and insists she did nothing wrong, such evidence is 
entitled to no weight.144 
Thus, the Agency’s reply to the Circuit Court of Appeals was essentially 
that it would obey its directive to consider positive experience, but that it would 
only do so as a matter of sanction discretion in cases where the respondent 
accepts responsibility for the transgressions alleged against it, not under Factor 
Two when determining whether the Government has met its prima facie burden 
that registration is not in the public interest.145  The Agency emphasized its 
qualified acceptance of the court’s mandate with this additional statement: 
[E]ven where the Agency’s proof establishes that a practitioner 
has committed only a few acts of diversion, this Agency will 
not grant or continue the practitioner’s registration unless he 
accepts responsibility for his misconduct.  Put another way, 
even where the Government proves only a few instances of 
illegal prescribing in the “entire corpus” of a practitioner’s 
experience, the Government has nonetheless made out a prima 
 
141. Id. 
142. See id. 
143. See Paul J. Caragine, Jr., 63 Fed. Reg. 51592 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Sept. 28, 1998). 
144. Jayam Krishna-Iyer, M.D., 74 Fed. Reg. 459, 463 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Jan. 6, 2009) (second 
emphasis added). 
145. See id. 
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facie case and thus shifted the burden to the registrant to show 
why he should be entrusted with a new registration.146 
Thus, in its second order, the Agency essentially adhered to its previous 
(pre-remand) analysis, with the additional wrinkle that, in a case where the 
Government had established acts of intentional misconduct, the Agency would 
not consider the entire corpus of a practitioner’s experience in its analysis of 
Factor Two, nor would it consider benign or positive experience at all unless 
the respondent has manifested an unconditional acceptance of responsibility.147  
While true that, if writing upon a clean slate, it may not have been unreasonable 
for the Agency to insist upon an acceptance of responsibility to render evidence 
of benign or commendable conduct more probative to a registrant’s defense that 
established misconduct was an aberration and he should be entrusted with a 
registration, the analysis is remarkable in that it risks the appearance of the 
Agency substituting its own structure of analysis for that created by Congress 
(the body that required consideration of this evidence without qualification in 
Factor Two) and for the legal interpretation set forth in the decision of the 
Eleventh Circuit.   
Inasmuch as the Agency’s second final order in Krishna-Iyer granted the 
doctor in that case a registration with conditions,148 the case was never re-
appealed to the Eleventh Circuit, and the final order was maintained as a 
recurrent bedrock of Agency precedent.149  In MacKay v. DEA, the Tenth 
Circuit upheld an Agency final order that included the Agency-created 
Krishna-Iyer analysis, but the Agency’s failure to consider experience evidence 
under Factor Two was not a significant focus of the court’s affirmance 
opinion;150 instead, the Tenth Circuit found that the Agency “considered the 
entire record” to include the hypothetical situation that the doctor “had provided 
proper medical care to all of his other patients” and found that it did not 
outweigh the evidence of negative experience.151  Likewise, in McNichol v. 
DEA152 the Eleventh Circuit found that the Agency’s decision, which had 
 
146. Id. at 464 (footnotes omitted). 
147. See id. 
148. Id. 
149. See, e.g., Wesley Pope, M.D., 82 Fed. Reg. 14944, 14982–85 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Mar. 23, 
2017); T.J. McNichol, M.D., 77 Fed. Reg. 57133, 57144–49 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Sept. 17, 2012), pet. 
for rev. denied, McNichol v. DEA, 537 F. App’x 905 (11th Cir. 2013); Beau Boshers, M.D., 76 Fed. 
Reg. 19401, 19402–13 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Apr. 7, 2011); Dewey C. MacKay, M.D., 75 Fed. Reg. 
49956, 49973–78 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Aug. 16, 2010), pet. for rev. denied, MacKay v. DEA, 664 F.3d 
808 (10th Cir. 2011). 
150. See MacKay, 664 F.3d at 819. 
151. Id. 
152. 537 F. App’x 905. 
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included the Krishna-Iyer analysis, was supported by substantial evidence and 
was not arbitrary and capricious.153  However, the Eleventh Circuit did not 
mention the Krishna-Iyer analysis, or even Factor Two specifically, in its 
unpublished decision.154 
After Krishna-Iyer, the Agency’s reliance upon its own interpretation of 
Factor Two has become increasingly restrictive, and the Agency has become 
increasingly critical of any ALJ who recommends a different analysis of it to 
the Administrator when considering the facts of a particular case.155  In JM 
Pharmacy, the Agency held that it was error for the DEA ALJ to find in a 
recommended decision that Factor Two calls for the Agency to analyze “the 
qualitative manner and the quantitative volume in which an applicant has 
engaged” in regulated activity.156  By placing italics on the “quantitative 
volume” aspect of the recommended decision, the Agency presumably signaled 
that, under Factor Two, it only wishes to receive and consider evidence 
regarding the “qualitative manner” in which regulated activity has been 
conducted, and will exclude any consideration relative to the “quantitative 
volume.”157  Based on that language, it now seems apparent that a registrant 
 
153. Id. at 906. 
154. See McNichol, 537 F. App’x 905.  In Pope, the Agency discussed another case, Lynch v. 
DEA, 480 F. App’x 946 (11th Cir. 2012), which it said also rejected an alternative view of the Agency’s 
Krishna-Iyer analysis.  Pope, 82 Fed. Reg. at 14983.  While the Agency discussed arguments raised 
by the practitioner in his briefs before the Eleventh Circuit in that case, neither the Agency’s decision 
nor the Eleventh Circuit’s unpublished decision mentions Krishna-Iyer or discusses the Agency’s 
decision to not consider evidence of positive experience under Factor Two.  See Ronald Lynch, M.D., 
75 Fed. Reg. 78745 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Dec. 16, 2010), pet. for rev. denied, Lynch v. DEA, 480 F. 
App’x 946. 
155. See, e.g., Syed Jawed Akhtar-Zaidi, M.D., 80 Fed. Reg. 42962, 42962 n.2 (Drug Enf’t 
Admin. July 20, 2015) (scolding ALJ by saying that “every Administrator and Deputy Administrator 
who has exercised [Agency authority] . . . has rejected the ALJ’s view”); Clair L. Pettinger, M.D., 78 
Fed. Reg. 61591, 61597 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Oct. 3, 2013) (describing ALJ’s reasoning as “illogical” 
for analyzing Factor Two in terms of “both the qualitative and quantitative volume of the 
[r]espondent’s experience”); McNichol, 77 Fed. Reg. at 57144 (excoriating ALJ publicly throughout 
the Agency final order for legal and factual analysis, to include the ALJ’s attempt to follow the 
directives of the Eleventh Circuit in Krishna-Iyer v. DEA, 249 Fed. App’x 159, 160 (11th Cir. 2007)), 
aff’d per curiam, T.J. McNichol v. DEA, 537 Fed.Appx. 905 (11th Cir. 2013) (lacking discussion in 
affirmance regarding Factor Two analysis); Randall L. Wolff, M.D., 77 Fed. Reg. 5106, 5121 (Drug 
Enf’t Admin. Feb. 1, 2012) (rejecting respondent’s contention that he was prejudiced by the denial of 
his ability to access his own seized medical charts to establish his experience under Factor Two in light 
of the purported irrelevance of such evidence under Krishna-Iyer); Jeri Hassman, M.D., 75 Fed. Reg. 
8194, 8235 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Feb. 23, 2010) (characterizing ALJ’s analysis as “erroneous” for 
including a comparison between the two acts of substandard prescribing with the over nine-hundred 
presumably benign prescribing events). 
156. JM Pharmacy Grp., Inc., 80 Fed. Reg. 28667, 28667 n.2 (Drug Enf’t Admin. May 19, 2015). 
157. See id. 
CURRENT NAVIGATION POINTS IN DRUG DIVERSION LAW (DRAFT) MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW VOL. 101 
2017] CURRENT NAVIGATION POINTS IN DRUG DIVERSION LAW 363 
seeking to demonstrate that the established non-compliance was an anomaly 
can no longer introduce evidence that the misconduct represented only a small 
percentage of the registrant’s body of compliant regulated activity, even though 
Congress mandated that such evidence be considered under Factor Two. 
 In Pope, the Agency vehemently rejected the suggestion that the Agency 
had narrowed Factor Two beyond its plain meaning and in contravention of 
Congress and the Eleventh Circuit’s directives.158  In doing so, the Agency cited 
multiple definitions of the word “experience” from two dictionaries159 and 
distilled no obligation to consider the quantity of benign regulated activity to 
any extent.160  Confusingly, in addressing Congress’s reservation regarding new 
registration applicants in the legislative history, the Agency posited that “if 
Factor Two’s meaning was so plain,” there would have been “no need to 
express that it should not be construed to deny registrations to newly-licensed 
practitioners, most of whom can point to no volume of dispensing other than 
by observing a physician during clinical rotations.”161  Additionally, the 
Agency bristled at the notion that it failed to follow the Eleventh Circuit’s 
direction in Krishna-Iyer, proposing instead that “the Administrator carefully 
reviewed” the additional files in evidence and assumed that the rest of the 
prescriptions the practitioner had issued were lawful, but that the additional 
files “did not negate the Government’s prima facie showing that the physician 
had knowingly diverted drugs to others.”162   
By adjusting the analysis through its adjudications, the Agency has, in 
essence, decided that its examination of a registrant’s experience under Factor 
Two will be generally limited to the Government’s established allegations 
regarding the quality of an applicant’s activities.163  Stated differently, the only 
experience to be considered will be the transgressions supported by the 
 
158. See Pope, 82 Fed. Reg. at 14982. 
159. Id. at 14982 n.54.  The definitions provided by the Agency as “those most relevant in 
assessing” the meaning of “experience” in the context of Factor Two are:  
(1) The “direct observation of or participation in events as a basis for knowledge,” 
(2) “the fact or state of having been affected by or gained knowledge through 
direct observation or participation,” (3) “practical knowledge, skill, . . . or 
participation in events or in a particular activity,” and (4) “the length of such 
participation.”   
Id. (citing Experience, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (10th ed. 1998)). 
160. See id. at 14982. 
161. Id. at 14982 n.55.  It is difficult to understand what the Agency intended to convey by this 
statement. 
162. Id. at 14982–83. 
163. See id. at 14982. 
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preponderant evidence of record.164  Further, to the extent the universe of 
experience is further constricted, Factor Two analysis, in the majority of 
Agency cases, consists largely of a reprise of adverse evidence also considered 
under Factor Four (compliance with laws pertaining to controlled 
substances),165 to wit: experience that shows proven misconduct in violation of 
state and federal laws.  The Agency’s affinity for the merging of Public Interest 
Factors Two and Four was signaled in Syed Jawed Akhtar-Zaidi, M.D., a recent 
case where the Agency held that “[p]roof that a physician knowingly diverted 
controlled substances is the best evidence for assessing his experience in 
dispensing controlled substances, although it is also relevant in assessing his 
compliance with applicable laws related to controlled substances.”166  Thus, the 
Agency’s precedent has, in effect, morphed Factor Two into a consideration 
where the only evidence to be considered is evaluated once under Factor Two, 
and then again under Factor Four.   
By framing its analysis in terms of whether the registrant or applicant can 
“negate the Government’s prima facie showing”167 with evidence of positive 
dispensing experience, the Agency has signaled that evidence of positive 
experience will not be considered in the Public Interest Factor analysis—the 
analysis which determines whether the Government has met its prima facie 
burden—but will instead be considered at some later point, after the Agency 
has shifted the burden to the respondent.168  In Pope, the Agency noted that, 
“[a]s in past cases, the parties may continue to introduce evidence as to the 
extent of both a practitioner’s lawful or unlawful dispensing activities,”169 but 
also reminded litigants that, “in past cases, [the] Agency has given no more 
than nominal weight to a practitioner’s evidence that he has dispensed 
controlled substances to thousands of patients in circumstances which did not 
involve diversion.”170  A practitioner may understandably be left to wonder 
whether to seek the introduction of evidence of positive experience at all and, 
if so, how to demonstrate the extent of such lawful dispensing to the ALJ when 
the Agency has previously declared such evidence to be essentially irrelevant.  
If, as JM Pharmacy concluded, analysis of the “quantitative volume” of benign, 
 
164. See id. 
165. 21 U.S.C. § 823(f) (2012). 
166. Syed Jawed Akhtar-Zaidi, M.D., 80 Fed. Reg. 42962, 42969 n.17 (Drug Enf’t Admin. July 
20, 2015). 
167. Pope, 82 Fed.Reg. at 14983. 
168. See id. at 14982–83. 
169. Id. at 14982. 
170. Id. 
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compliant conduct is per se irrelevant,171 then it may not be altogether clear how 
to establish admissibility for the evidence such that the Agency would be able 
to consider it in its sanction determination.  Additionally, if the volume of 
benign, compliant conduct is not relevant to the Agency’s analysis, then a 
practitioner who seeks to juxtapose several acts that fall below the applicable 
standard with evidence of an expansive otherwise-compliant history stands in 
the same position no matter whether the registrant has practiced for decades or 
for less than a month.  
While not altogether clear how the Agency intends to consider evidence of 
a history of benign conduct outside of Factor Two, the Agency has provided 
some clues.  In Roy S. Schwartz, the Agency, in discussing the issue of sanction 
in a non-hearing case, utilized language that was eerily similar to Factor Two 
analysis language and found that “the Government produced no evidence that 
the [r]egistrant has engaged in any other misconduct related to controlled 
substances during the course of his professional career, which has spanned 
more than fifty years.”172  In Pope, the Agency more explicitly stated that “in 
these proceedings, the Agency will assume, without requiring the production 
of any evidence by a respondent, that the practitioner has lawfully issued every 
prescription other than those alleged by the Government to be unlawful.”173  In 
Roberto Zayas, M.D., the Agency stated that the Public Interest Factors 
simply shape the scope of the relevant evidence in the 
proceeding, and given the nature of this inquiry, the Agency 
properly considers a respondent’s evidence of a lengthy history 
of compliance after the Government makes out its prima facie 
case, as determining what sanction is necessary to protect the 
public interest is the ultimate purpose of these provisions.174   
Thus, the Agency has signaled to the regulated community that, where the 
Government produces no evidence of other misconduct over the course of a 
lengthy career as a registrant, the Agency, in its final order, may be willing to 
assume it to be benign and may be willing to consider it as a matter of sanction 
discretion.175  Both sides of the litigation equation should thus be prepared to 
make their case for the Agency to exercise its discretion—apparently outside 
the bounds of the Public Interest Factors—in their favor. 
 
171. See JM Pharmacy Grp., Inc., 80 Fed. Reg. 28667, 28667 n.2 (Drug Enf’t Admin. May 19, 
2015). 
172. Roy S. Schwartz, 79 Fed. Reg. 34360, 34363 (Drug Enf’t Admin. June 16, 2014). 
173. Pope, 82 Fed. Reg. at 14984. 
174. Roberto Zayas, M.D., 82 Fed. Reg. 21410, 21422 n.27 (Drug Enf’t Admin. May 8, 2017). 
175. See id. 
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3. The Blurring of the Factors 
Perhaps foreshadowed by the blurring of the line between Factor Two and 
Factor Four over time,176 in Zayas, the Agency announced what many 
experienced practitioners may have quietly feared: that it does not matter to the 
Agency which factor or factors evidence is considered under, and the Agency 
believes that it has no obligation to parse out which evidence is considered 
under what factor.177  This is so, the Agency posits, because “misconduct is 
misconduct whether it is relevant under Factor Two, Factor Four, or Factor 
Five, or multiple factors,” and because “the inquiry focuses on protecting the 
public interest; what matters is the seriousness of the registrant’s or applicant’s 
misconduct.”178  Regarding the danger that, under such an interpretation, the 
Agency could consider the same evidence multiple times under multiple 
factors, the Zayas order tenders the Agency’s assurance that, because its own 
prior final orders “ha[ve] repeatedly explained that it does not mechanically 
count up the [Public Interest F]actors and determine how many favor the 
Government versus how many favor the respondent,” there is no danger to the 
regulated community that their transgressions will be given additional weight 
if considered multiple times under multiple factors.179  A representation that the 
Agency is disinclined to “mechanically count up the [Public Interest 
F]actors,”180 even if accepted at its face value, is not a phrase that is readily 
understandable in the context of a legislative format that requires the balancing 
of public interest factors.  It is challenging to perceive why this phrase would 
supply comfort to litigants and courts concerned about the risk that the same 
evidence will be or has been considered more than once under multiple factors, 
yielding results that militate in favor of the sanction sought by the enforcement 
arm of the Agency.  For example, in a hypothetical case where the same 
evidence is considered under both Factors Two and Four, and the Agency final 
order explains that both of these factors weigh in favor of a sanction, legal and 
evidentiary analysis on appeal can become obfuscated, and assurances by the 
 
176. E.g., Randall L. Wolff, M.D., 77 Fed. Reg. 5106, 5121 n.26 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Feb. 1, 
2012) (“[W]hether conduct is considered under [F]actor [T]wo—the experience factor, or [F]actor 
[F]our—the compliance factor, or both factors, is of no legal consequence because the fundamental 
question is whether the registrant ‘has committed such acts as would render [his] 
registration . . . inconsistent with the public interest.’” (final and penultimate alterations in original) 
(quoting 21 U.S.C. § 824(a)(4) (2012))). 
177. Zayas, 82 Fed. Reg. at 21420. 
178. Id. at 21422 (footnote omitted). 
179. See id. 
180. Id. 
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Agency “that it does not mechanically count up the [Public Interest F]actors”181 
or that “misconduct is misconduct”182 will bring little to the analysis. 
The Zayas analysis is potentially nettlesome in several respects.  Congress, 
obviously recognizing the potential that the term “public interest” could be 
viewed as sufficiently amorphous as to unfairly deprive the regulated 
community of fair notice, or unfairly empower the regulators with too broad a 
role in interpretation, supplied a specific definitional framework to the term as 
it is used in determining whether to register (or continue the registration of) 
practitioners under the CSA.183  At least at first blush, it is difficult to perceive 
where blurring the lines cast by Congress would be helpful in guiding either 
regulators or the regulated community in discerning the limits of acceptable 
activity conducted under the authority of a DEA registration.  There is a 
potentially huge divide between consideration of evidence in specific 
categories supplied by the statute,184 and a blanket pronouncement that 
“misconduct is misconduct”185 could conceivably authorize a level of after-the-
fact Agency discretion that well exceeds congressional intent.  Further, in terms 
of defending adjudications on appeal, a past willingness by the courts to affirm 
sanctions based on evidence considered under any one or more of the Public 
Interest Factors,186 which is the rationale tendered by the Agency in its analysis 
of why it need not specify what evidence is being considered under which 
factors,187 may not translate into a willingness by the courts to embrace a 
“misconduct is misconduct” approach to determining whether granting or 
maintaining registration status is “inconsistent with the public interest.”188  
Additionally, despite the Agency’s assurance that it does not count up the 
factors to determine which weigh in favor of or against the respondent, where 
Congress has declared that the public interest is defined by consideration of 




183. 21 U.S.C. § 823(f) (2012).  Similar frameworks are used in determining whether to register 
or sanction manufacturers, distributers of controlled substances, as well as distributors of List I 
chemicals.  See generally id. § 823.  It is not altogether clear whether the Agency would follow the 
same path that it has taken with practitioners if faced with similar cases regarding the other types of 
registrants. 
184. See Mulrooney & Hull, supra note 1, at 336–37. 
185. Zayas, 82 Fed. Reg. at 21422. 
186. See, e.g., Hoxie v. DEA, 419 F.3d 477, 482 (6th Cir. 2005); Morall v. DEA, 412 F.3d 165, 
173–74 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Trawick v. DEA, 861 F.2d 72, 76 (4th Cir. 1988). 
187. Zayas, 82 Fed. Reg. at 21422. 
188. 21 U.S.C. § 823(f). 
189. Id. (“In determining the public interest, the following factors shall be considered . . . .”). 
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weighed and balanced against each other.  The assurance that the Agency “does 
not mechanically count up the [Public Interest F]actors”190 may provide scant 
comfort to the regulated community, and even less guidance to regulators and 
the diversion bar, about how misconduct will be considered against them. 
4. The X Factor? 
While Zayas suggested that the Agency is moving away from 
differentiating between the factors when considering evidence of misconduct, 
the Pope decision also contained a statement that was brief in terms of verbiage, 
but potentially extremely consequential.  In the same footnote where the 
Agency discussed Factors One and Three, which it found to be insignificant to 
its determination that the Government satisfied its prima facie burden, the 
Administrator included the following statement: “While I have considered 
[F]actor [F]ive, I deem it unnecessary to make any findings.”191  The 
Administrator’s choice of words signals that the Agency apparently considered 
evidence under Factor Five but “deem[ed] it unnecessary”192 to explain what 
evidence was considered or in what manner it was analyzed, because it 
ultimately concluded that “the Government’s evidence with respect to Factors 
Two and Four satisfies its prima facie burden.”193  While the failure to consider 
all Public Interest Factors has not garnered negative attention from the courts 
on review,194 and the absence of any evidence offered or considered under a 
particular factor is not uncommon, the declaration that the factor was 
considered but its significance is not explained raises a potential analytical red 
flag.  The Supreme Court has made it clear that, in reviewing administrative 
determinations rendered by federal agencies, “[t]he grounds upon which an 
administrative order must be judged are those upon which the record discloses 
that its action was based,” and that review in the courts will be “confin[ed] . . . to 
a judgment upon the validity of the grounds upon which [an agency] itself based 
its action.”195  If no consideration was given to Factor Five, or if no evidence 
was offered or considered under Factor Five, then no review would be 
necessary.  But with the chosen language, it may be analytically impossible to 
determine the total body of considerations upon which the sanction was based.  
This language, or similar language that omits or obscures the bases upon which 
 
190. Zayas, 82 Fed. Reg. at 21422. 
191. Wesley Pope, M.D., 82 Fed. Reg. 14944, 14965 n.36 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Mar. 23, 2017). 
192. See id. 
193. Id. at 14965. 
194. See, e.g., Hoxie v. DEA, 419 F.3d 477, 482 (6th Cir. 2005); Morall v. DEA, 412 F.2d 165, 
173–74 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Trawick v. DEA, 861 F.2d 72, 76 (4th Cir. 1988). 
195. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 87–88 (1943). 
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an Agency sanction is based, is particularly unhelpful in reviewing its legal 
sufficiency, and renders its defense in the courts potentially unwieldy.  Stated 
differently, there is no analytical flaw in a final Agency order that determines 
that no evidence is relevant under a given Public Interest Factor, but where an 
Agency has indicated that evidence has been considered under a Factor, it must 
explain what evidence was considered and how it was analyzed under that 
Factor.196 
B. The Pharmacy’s Corresponding Responsibility and Willful Blindness 
The DEA regulations have long explained that the responsibility required 
of a pharmacy registrant in ensuring that controlled substance prescriptions are 
legitimately issued is not identical to the responsibility of prescribers, but is 
instead a “corresponding responsibility.”197  Recent final orders issued by the 
Agency have increased the quantum and nature of evidence that now must be 
demonstrated to establish a violation of a pharmacy registrant’s corresponding 
responsibility.198  In JM Pharmacy, the Agency set forth that it must establish 
“willful blindness” in order to meet its (own) burden to demonstrate a violation 
of a pharmacy’s corresponding responsibility.199  This is a higher standard than 
it required of itself in prior cases.200  The willful blindness standard requires 
that, at the time of the alleged transgression(s), the pharmacy registrant 
(generally through its pharmacists) subjectively believed that there was a high 
probability that a particular fact existed, and took “deliberate actions to avoid 
learning that fact.”201  The Agency’s adoption of the higher standard in 
administrative pharmacy enforcement cases was unexpected, particularly given 
that in Global-Tech Appliances Inc. v. SEB S.A., the single authority cited by 
the Agency to support this increased standard,202 the court dealt exclusively 
with the doctrine to be applied in civil lawsuits for induced patent infringement 
under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b),203 a statute that bears no readily-apparent relation to 
 
196. See id. 
197. 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a) (2017). 
198. See, e.g., JM Pharmacy Grp., Inc., 80 Fed. Reg. 28667, 28672 (Drug Enf’t Admin. May 19, 
2015). 
199. Id. at 28670. 
200. See, e.g., Holiday CVS, L.L.C., 77 Fed. Reg. 62316 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Oct. 12, 2012); 
see also Mulrooney & Hull, supra note 1, at 354–56 (discussing the corresponding responsibility of 
pharmacy registrants). 
201. JM Pharmacy, 80 Fed. Reg. at 28672 (citing Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 
563 U.S. 754, 769 (2011)). 
202. Id. 
203. Global-Tech, 563 U.S. at 760 (discussing 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (2012)). 
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the Controlled Substances Act204 or the corresponding responsibility 
regulation.205  In fact, the corresponding responsibility regulation and the patent 
infringement statute do not share common elements, structure, or language.206 
This was a considerable, voluntary step up from the Agency’s previous 
interpretation, which required only a demonstration that a pharmacy’s 
controlled substance dispensing fell below the standard of care for dispensing 
in the particular state.207  This higher standard may make it less burdensome for 
pharmacy registrants to defend enforcement actions brought against them, and 
harder for the Agency enforcers to bring and prevail in actions based on a 
violation of the corresponding responsibility.  Litigants representing members 
of the regulated community who are careless or sloppy (even very sloppy) with 
required paperwork obligations under the regulations will doubtless find 
comfort in JM Pharmacy and the Agency’s interpretation that it is no longer 
sufficient for the Government to merely demonstrate practice below the 
prevailing state standard, but that it instead must demonstrate willful blindness. 
1. Red Flags and Willful Indifference 
The Agency has long held that a pharmacy can violate its corresponding 
responsibility by ignoring red flags raised by prescriptions and the 
circumstances in which they are presented.208  However, in Superior Pharmacy 
I and Superior Pharmacy II, again citing Global-Tech, the Agency held that, to 
satisfy its new willful indifference standard for corresponding responsibility 
violations, it is not enough to show that a pharmacist dispensed a controlled 
substance prescription in the face of a red flag.209  This is because, according to 
the Agency, “[a]ll red flags do not have the same hue,”210 and although some 
red flags may create only a “reasonable suspicion” that a prescription lacks 
legitimate medical purpose—which is less than what is required to show willful 
blindness211—“where there are multiple red flags, none of which alone would 
 
204. Controlled Substances Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (codified at 21 U.S.C. 
§§ 801–904 (2012)). 
205. 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a) (2017). 
206. Compare 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a), with 35 U.S.C. § 271(b). 
207. See, e.g., Holiday CVS, L.L.C., 77 Fed. Reg. 62316 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Oct. 12, 2012). 
208. The Agency has defined a “red flag” to mean “a circumstance that does or should raise a 
reasonable suspicion as to the validity of a prescription.”  Superior Pharmacy I and Superior Pharmacy 
II, 81 Fed. Reg. 31310, 31335 (Drug Enf’t Admin. May 18, 2016). 
209. Superior I & II, 81 Fed. Reg. at 31335 n.5 (citing Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB 
S.A., 563 U.S. 754 (2011)). 
210. Id. 
211. Id. (“[A]s the Supreme Court’s decision in Global-Tech makes plain . . . a ‘reasonable 
suspicion’ . . . is not enough to establish that a pharmacist acted with the requisite scienter.”). 
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establish the requisite scienter, the combination of red flags may well create a 
subjective belief that there is a high probability that a prescription lacks a 
legitimate medical purpose.”212  Hills Pharmacy L.L.C., citing liberally to 
Superior I & II, likewise held that “establishing the requisite scienter for a 
violation requires more than simply showing that a [controlled substance] 
prescription presented a[n unresolved] red flag.”213  Thus, to meet the new 
requisite scienter, the Agency has decided that it will now impose upon its 
prosecutors the requirement to demonstrate more than pharmacy registrants 
were doling out controlled substances below the state standard; DEA 
prosecutors must now show that the medications were dispensed in the face of 
willful indifference on the part of the registrant.214 
2. Willful Indifference and Evidence/Absence of Red Flag Resolution 
The evidence required by the Agency regarding willful indifference is also 
undergoing some measure of evolution.  In Superior I & II, notwithstanding the 
unrefuted testimony of the Government’s expert “that, in the practice of 
pharmacy, a red flag which is resolved must be documented and that the 
documentation should be placed on the prescription itself,”215 the Agency held 
that the failure to document red flags on prescriptions is not alone sufficient to 
establish that the pharmacists failed to resolve the red flags, and thus, that they 
deliberately failed to avoid learning that the prescriptions lacked a legitimate 
medical purpose.216  The Agency stated that, “while evidence of a custom 
certainly has probative value, it is not conclusive proof,”217 and that  
[w]hile it would be reasonable to draw an adverse inference 
that a pharmacist failed to resolve a red flag (or flags) from the 
failure to document the resolution in any manner, the 
Government offered no evidence that the [investigators] even 
asked the pharmacists . . . if they documented their resolution 
of red flags, and if so, where they did so.218   
Thus, although the Government’s expert provided unmet evidence that the 
failure to document red flag resolution on the back of prescriptions meant that 
those red flags were not resolved, the Agency announced that it is incumbent 
upon Agency investigators to query pharmacy employees about where else the 
 
212. Id. 
213. Hills Pharmacy, L.L.C., 81 Fed. Reg. 49816, 49839 (Drug Enf’t Admin. July 28, 2016). 
214. See Superior I & II, 81 Fed. Reg. at 31335; Hills Pharmacy, 81 Fed. Reg. at 49839. 
215. Superior I & II, 81 Fed. Reg. at 31335. 
216. Id. 
217. Id. at 31335 n.55. 
218. Id. at 31335. 
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information could be documented, essentially calling upon them to prove the 
negative.219  No witness testified that red flag resolution was or should be 
documented elsewhere, but because the prosecution’s case did not eliminate 
other potential repositories at the pharmacy, its evidence came up short.220   
In Hills Pharmacy, the Agency held to its position that a lack of 
documentation alone is insufficient to establish that the pharmacy failed to 
fulfill its corresponding responsibility by resolving red flags, again despite the 
Government’s expert’s testimony that any resolution should have been 
documented on the prescriptions themselves.221  Unlike in Superior I & II, 
however, the Agency went on to discuss “additional evidence, which 
establishes by a preponderance of the evidence” the requisite scienter—
evidence that included a pharmacist’s testimony, which was offered by the 
respondent, and partial medical records, also supplied by the respondent.222  
The Agency acknowledged that it rejected similar allegations in Superior I & 
II, where the evidence only included absence of documentation, noting that “in 
that matter, neither party called any of the pharmacists who dispensed the 
prescriptions” and that the respondent “had the option of not putting forward 
evidence on the dispensing allegations[] . . . [but] nonetheless chose to present 
[the pharmacist’s] testimony and submit the partial medical records.”223  Thus, 
the Agency held that documents submitted as part of the respondent’s case, as 
well as the testimony of a pharmacist—put on the stand by the respondent 
pharmacy—can be used to shore up the Government’s case when it otherwise 
relies upon a lack of documentation.224   
What made the Agency’s announcement that it would use evidence 
presented in the respondent’s case in Hills Pharmacy particularly poignant, and 
particularly painful for the respondent, is that at the hearing, the respondent, in 
an exercise of caution, moved for a partial summary disposition based on its 
(ultimately vindicated) position that the Government had not established its 
case because there was no evidence that red flags had not been resolved.225  The 
ALJ denied the motion, not because it was devoid of merit, but because the ALJ 
was unable to identify a basis in the hearing regulations to grant the requested 
relief.226  Notwithstanding the cautious manner in which the respondent’s 
 
219. See id. at 31337 n.60. 
220. Id. at 31336–37. 
221. Hills Pharmacy, L.L.C., 81 Fed. Reg. 49816, 49835–36 (Drug Enf’t Admin. July 28, 2016). 
222. Id. at 49836. 
223. Id. at 49840 n.41. 
224. Id. at 49836. 
225. See id. at 49840 n.41. 
226. Id. 
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counsel proceeded, the Agency was at once unsympathetic and ambiguous as 
to the availability of a summary disposition motion in similar circumstances in 
the future.  The following analysis was set forth by the Administrator in his 
final order:  
Even if the ALJ committed error when she denied 
[r]espondent’s motion, [r]espondent had the option of not 
putting forward evidence on the dispensing allegations.  
Respondent nonetheless chose to present . . . testimony and 
submit [exhibits].  Cf. United States v. Sherod, 960 F.2d 1075, 
1076 (1992) (“It is the universal rule in the federal circuits that 
‘a criminal defendant who, after denial of a motion for 
judgment of acquittal at the close of the government’s case-in-
chief, proceeds to the presentation of his own case, waives his 
objection to the denial.” (quoting United States v. Foster, 783 
F.2d 1082, 1085 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (en banc)).  Thus, I am not 
required to ignore this evidence in adjudicating the dispensing 
allegations.227 
This analysis is of particular significance in light of the fact that the Agency, 
as already discussed, has previously created an evidentiary framework in 
enforcement cases wherein the respondent is precluded from avoiding a 
sanction if the Government has established its prima facie case and the evidence 
is not met with an acceptance of responsibility and a demonstration of remedial 
steps aimed at the avoidance of future transgressions.228  The Agency has also 
embraced the viability of adverse inferences borne of missing evidence, even 
where a respondent declines to testify based on self-incrimination concerns at 
the advice of counsel.229  Thus, the respondent faces the unpleasant specter of 
a three-option choice: (1) presenting no evidence on a given charge and having 
a prima facie case established with the assistance of an adverse inference; (2) 
presenting no evidence and having an established prima facie case stand 
unrebutted by an absence of any demonstration of acceptance of responsibility 
or remedial steps; or (3) presenting evidence, only to have it used to potentially 
shore up a deficient Government presentation.  In an environment where 
virtually all factual and legal determinations rendered by the ALJ are 
increasingly supplanted by the Agency (more fully discussed elsewhere in this 
 
227. Id.  To most fairly demonstrate the cases the Administrator relied upon, the quoted text, 
including its citations, is lifted exactly as it exists in the final order. 
228. Jeri Hassman, M.D., 75 Fed. Reg. 8194, 8236 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Feb. 23, 2010); see supra 
Section III.A.2. 
229. Joseph Baumstarck, M.D., 74 Fed. Reg. 17525, 17528 n.3 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Apr. 15, 
2009). 
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Article),230  it would seem that some measure of clairvoyance has become a 
required skill for the registrants’ bar in evaluating whether and how to meet the 
Government’s case.  Even if a conscientious respondent’s counsel were to 
procure a ruling on a timely-rendered motion for a partial summary disposition, 
there is no present guarantee that such a motion is authorized, or even that 
counsel possesses the luxury of assuming that the Agency would uphold the 
ALJ’s determination.  The only two fixed points of certainty seem to be that the 
respondent cannot prevail if the Agency finds that the Government has met its 
prima facie burden without the respondent meeting the evidence, and that the 
Agency will supplement the Government’s prima facie case with the 
respondent’s evidence if any is presented.231 
The approach for both parties to the litigation equation must shift along 
with this new Agency precedent.  For its part, the Government can no longer 
rely on an expert’s testimony regarding where the resolution of red flags should 
be documented under applicable state standards.  Instead, to prevail now, it 
must insure that its agents and investigators scour through all documentation 
that exists in a pharmacy and, if its case is based upon an absence of evidence 
of red flags—or at least those which, in combination, can establish the requisite 
scienter—the Government must be prepared to show proof that the red flags 
were not resolved and documented anywhere in the pharmacy operation, paper 
files, or computer databases.  The respondent’s counsel, on the other hand, must 
be prepared to engage in a candid discussion with his client and determine 
whether offering the testimony of any pharmacists or staff members could 
potentially backfire in support of the Government’s case.  Whether the 
availability of a motion for a summary disposition based on the Government’s 
failure to meet its burden exists in DEA administrative proceedings remains an 
open question. 
The new willful indifference standard embraced by the DEA in its 
pharmacy final orders is positive news for pharmacy registrants and those who 
represent them, but the Agency’s newly expressed willingness to shore up the 
Government’s case with evidence presented by respondents, coupled with its 
unwillingness to provide a reliable framework for summary disposition motions 
made at administrative hearings, presents new perils for the regulated 
community.  Government counsel should expect to defend the higher patent-
infringement/Global-Tech standard of willful blindness, and registrant’s 
counsel should be seeking to demonstrate that the higher burden has not been 
met—before calling its first witness. 
 
230. See infra Sections III.L–M. 
231. See Hills Pharmacy, 81 Fed. Reg. at 49818. 
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3. Verification of a Prescriber’s Registration 
In a further tightening of the standards applied to its own enforcement 
efforts, the Agency has announced that it will no longer rely on a pharmacy 
registrant’s failure to verify that a prescriber possessed a valid DEA registration 
prior to dispensing in finding a violation of the pharmacy’s corresponding 
responsibility.232 
About a decade ago, in United Prescription Services, Inc., the Agency 
called the testimony of an expert “nonsense”233 when that expert testified “that 
it was ‘probably’ not inappropriate to fill a prescription for controlled-
substances issued by a practitioner whose DEA registration had expired even if 
the pharmacy had a copy of the expired registration on file.”234  The Agency 
opined that “filling a prescription issued by a practitioner whose registration 
has recently expired might be excusable,” but admonished the pharmacy 
respondent for filling prescriptions “long after the expiration” of the 
practitioner’s registration, stating that it “clearly was not appropriate and was 
unlawful.”235  This statement, that the Agency might excuse a pharmacy’s 
failure to refuse prescriptions when a registration issue arose “recently,” but not 
“long after” it arose, suggested that the Agency expected pharmacies to verify 
registrations at least somewhat regularly. 
Shortly thereafter, in Medicine Shoppe–Jonesborough, the Agency stated 
unequivocally that “[a] pharmacy has a duty to periodically check to see that a 
practitioner retains the authority to practice medicine and dispense a controlled 
substance.”236  Four years later in Holiday CVS, without referencing Medicine 
Shoppe–Jonesborough, the Agency stated that “[i]t would be difficult to 
imagine a duty of a pharmacy registrant that is more fundamental to the law 
and spirit of the CSA than the obligation to ensure that controlled substance 
prescriptions are issued only on the authority of those empowered to prescribe 
by the DEA.”237  However, the Agency went on to explain that “the expiration 
of a COR [Certificate of Registration] is a clear red flag that a prescription 
issued pursuant to that COR is invalid,” and stated that “the question becomes 
whether the expirations of the CORs were recognized, or should have been 
 
232. See JM Pharmacy Grp., Inc., 80 Fed Reg. 28667, 28671 (Drug Enf’t Admin. May 19, 2015). 
233. United Prescription Servs., Inc., 72 Fed. Reg. 50397, 50408 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Aug. 31, 
2007). 
234. Id. at 50406. 
235. Id. at 50408–09. 
236. Med. Shoppe–Jonesborough, 73 Fed. Reg. 363, 381 n.45 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Jan. 2, 2008). 
237. Holiday CVS, L.L.C., 77 Fed. Reg. 62316, 62341 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Oct. 12, 2012). 
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recognized, by the [pharmacies].”238  After finding that the pharmacies “knew 
or should have known of the relevant registration statuses,” the Agency 
addressed the “third prong of the inquiry—resolution,” and determined that the 
pharmacies did not conclusively resolve the red flag prior to dispensing.239  
Thus, the Agency concluded that the pharmacies dispensed controlled 
substances in the face of red flags “that put them on notice that the controlled 
substance prescriptions were not issued in the usual course of a professional 
practice,” and held that “[s]uch acts are sufficient for the Government to sustain 
its burden in establishing its prima facie case for revocation.”240  The Agency’s 
statement that the “obligation to ensure that controlled substance prescriptions 
are issued only on the authority of those empowered to prescribe by the DEA” 
is “fundamental”241  seemed to contrast with its three-prong approach in 
determining whether a violation occurred, because a registrant that never 
attempted to verify a prescriber’s registration could seemingly shield itself by 
arguing that it did not know—and had no reason to know—that the registration 
had expired.  Holiday CVS therefore left the regulated pharmacy community 
with the conflicting impressions that the duty to determine that a prescriber is 
appropriately registered is “fundamental,” but that a pharmacy registrant with 
no knowledge or reason to know of a problem with the prescriber’s registration 
status can seemingly escape liability for filling prescriptions from that 
prescriber.242   
Two and a half years later, the DEA explicitly stated in JM Pharmacy that 
“a pharmacist is not obligated to verify whether every prescription he fills has 
been issued by a practitioner who holds a valid DEA registration.”243  The JM 
Pharmacy decision specifically acknowledged the Agency’s statement in 
Medicine Shoppe–Jonesborough requiring pharmacy registrants to 
“periodically check” the dispensing authority of prescribing practitioners,244 
and even held that a failure to verify a controlled substance prescriber’s 
registration at any time during a three-year period (where the prescriber’s 
prescriptions were dispensed pursuant thereto) is a breach of that duty,245 but 
rejected the Government’s allegations that such failure constituted a violation 
 
238. Id. at 62342. 
239. Id. 
240. Id. (citing 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a) (2017)). 
241. Id. at 62341. 
242. See id. 
243. JM Pharmacy Grp., Inc., 80 Fed Reg. 28667, 28671 (Drug Enf’t Admin. May 19, 2015). 
244. Id. at 28671 n.18 (quoting Med. Shoppe–Jonesborough, 73 Fed. Reg. 363, 381 n.45 (Drug 
Enf’t Admin. Jan. 2, 2008)). 
245. Id. at 28673. 
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of federal law or regulations.246  In coming to that conclusion, the Agency stated 
that, just because there is no duty to verify the prescriber’s status on every 
prescription, the pharmacy still must meet its corresponding responsibility 
obligation to fill only those prescriptions that conform to the requirements of 
the CSA and DEA regulations, including the requirement that the prescribing 
practitioner be appropriately registered,247 but faulted the Government’s case 
because it “did not prove that [the pharmacy’s] misconduct was intentional or 
knowing.”248  In discussing the duty to verify a prescriber’s registration, the 
Agency stated that it would “place only nominal weight on this aspect of [the 
pharmacy’s] misconduct” in part because “the lack of specific guidance as to 
what steps are necessary to comply with this duty diminishe[d] its 
egregiousness to some degree.”249  It then lectured (itself) that, “if the Agency 
intends to enforce this duty in other cases, it must provide the regulated 
community with guidance as to its scope,” but declined to offer any guidance 
in the decision.250 
In Farmacia Yani, a decision released the day after JM Pharmacy, the 
Agency reemphasized that “no Agency regulation requires that a pharmacist 
ascertain that each prescription presented to [him or her] has been issued by a 
practitioner who possesses a valid DEA registration,”251 and again noted that 
the Agency has not “published any guidance to the regulated community setting 
forth the parameters of [the] duty.”252  The Agency then explicitly stated that 
“the corresponding responsibility does not impose strict liability on pharmacists 
but rather requires proof that a pharmacist filled a controlled-substance 
prescription either knowing that it was unlawful or with willful blindness or 
deliberate ignorance of the fact that the prescription was unlawful.”253  It also 
noted, in a footnote, that liability may potentially arise if the pharmacy acted 
outside its usual course of professional practice in failing to verify a prescriber’s 
 
246. Id. 
247. Id. at 28671. 
248. Id. at 28673. 
249. Id. 
250. Id. 
251. Farmacia Yani, 80 Fed. Reg. 29053, 29063 (Drug Enf’t Admin. May 20, 2015). 
252. Id. at 29063 n.26. 
253. Id. at 29063.  It then rejected the Government’s allegations that a pharmacy that filled more 
than two hundred controlled substance prescriptions issued by a practitioner whose registration had 
been expired for more than seven months violated its corresponding responsibility because there was 
no evidence that the pharmacist who filled the prescriptions “either knew or was willfully blind to the 
fact that [the prescriber] was no longer registered.”  Id. 
CURRENT NAVIGATION POINTS IN DRUG DIVERSION LAW (DRAFT) MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW VOL. 101 
378 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [101:333 
registration, but dismissed that possibility because the Government did not rely 
on that theory.254 
Inasmuch as the Agency has not yet published a standard for the intervals 
at which prescribing authority must be checked, actual knowledge (or willful 
blindness) appears to be the applicable standard for demonstrating a breach of 
corresponding responsibility based on dispensing controlled substances on a 
prescription signed by a prescriber who is no longer authorized to prescribe.255  
The Agency’s suggestion in Farmacia Yani that failure to verify the 
prescriber’s registration might potentially render dispensing “outside of ‘the 
usual course of professional practice,’”256 leaves some opportunity for the 
Government to rely on that theory, but it will need to establish, likely through 
expert testimony, that there is an applicable standard for how often a 
prescriber’s registration must be verified.  In light of the Agency’s intriguing 
pronouncement in JM Pharmacy that “while [prescriber license check 
frequency] guidance can be announced in an adjudicatory proceeding, the 
process of adjudication is not well suited for doing so,”257 it appears that the 
enforcement of this issue must wait for duly promulgated regulations following 
APA notice and comment proceedings.258  Until then, Government counsel 
should come prepared to argue the patent unreasonableness of long periods of 
unlicensed conduct or other factors that show that a pharmacy’s pharmacists 
knew or were willfully blind to a prescriber’s registration issue.  Pharmacy 
 
254. Id. at 29063 n.26. 
255. In Jones Total Health Care Pharmacy, L.L.C., the Agency offered the following 
observation:  
While it is true that in Holiday CVS, the Agency found that pharmacies 
knowingly filled prescriptions issued by two physicians who were no longer 
registered and did so well after the pharmacies should have known that the 
physicians were no longer registered, that was only a small part of the case.  
Jones Total Health Care Pharmacy, L.L.C., 81 Fed. Reg. 79188, 79198 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Nov. 10, 
2016) (referencing Holiday CVS, L.L.C., 77 Fed. Reg. 62316, 62316–17 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Oct. 12, 
2012)).  Interestingly, it would be challenging to tease that nuance from the actual language in the cited 
portion of the Holiday CVS decision, which states that “[i]t is manifest that [r]espondents’ conduct in 
filling prescriptions issued by a practitioner whose registration had been revoked undermines the 
Congressional scheme;” the scheme being a “comprehensive and closed system for regulating the 
distribution of . . . controlled substances.”  Holiday CVS, 77 Fed. Reg. at 62317. 
256. Farmacia Yani, 80 Fed. Reg. at 29063 n.26 (quoting 21 C.F.R. § 1306.06 (2014)). 
257. JM Pharmacy Grp., Inc., 80 Fed. Reg. 28667, 28673 (Drug Enf’t Admin. May 19, 2015). 
258. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012).  While it is likely that such 
parameters likely could have been correctly issued through an adjudication with appropriate facts, the 
Agency’s determination that regulations must precede enforcement would seem to foreclose 
adjudication as an appropriate vehicle.  At the very least, notwithstanding the arguably cumbersome 
APA rulemaking process, in light of the strident manner in which the Agency addressed the issue in 
JM Pharmacy, sorting out the issue through an adjudication would, at the very least, be confusing. 
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registrant counsel should come equipped with a copy of JM Pharmacy and a 
motion to exclude evidence of dispensing on prescriptions issued by prescribers 
with expired registrations.  
4. Can Prescriber’s Actions Immunize Pharmacy Registrants? 
In continuing the torrent of seemingly heartening news for the pharmacy 
bar, in Hills Pharmacy, the Agency’s final order contained the declaration that 
“it is true that a pharmacist [sic] cannot violate his corresponding responsibility 
if a [controlled substance] prescription was nonetheless issued for a legitimate 
medical purpose.”259  This seemingly unequivocal proposition runs contrary to 
one of the central tenets that all parts of diversion regulation and litigation had 
understood: a pharmacy registrant’s actions are judged by what he or she knew 
or should have known at the time a controlled substance was dispensed.260  
Because the training and execution of the duties of the pharmacist have 
historically controlled the question of whether the pharmacy registrant has 
complied with his or her obligations,261 it was theoretically possible for a 
pharmacy registrant who dispensed a prescription issued by a doctor in good 
faith to be non-compliant by not identifying, addressing, resolving, and 
documenting red flags.  Contrariwise, if all red flags encountered were resolved 
within the parameters of state standards, and a pharmacist otherwise complied 
with his or her obligations, even a bad prescription that was issued by a non-
compliant prescriber should not result in a sanction on a pharmacy registrant.  
Prior to the Hills Pharmacy final order, the touchstone for assessing whether 
the regulatory corresponding responsibility262 had been satisfied had always 
been an objective analysis of whether the pharmacy registrant (through 
pharmacists and other key employees) had acted within the standard of care 
based on the indicia presented or available.263  Now, unless the Agency issues 
a clarification of the language it utilized in Hills Pharmacy, it appears that even 
a patently non-compliant, reckless pharmacy registrant could potentially be 
immunized by a validly-issued prescription, irrespective of what was done or 
 
259. Hills Pharmacy, L.L.C., 81 Fed. Reg. 49816, 49836–37 n.33 (Drug Enf’t Admin. July 28, 
2016).  The DEA issues registrations to practitioners, which include pharmacies, not pharmacists.  21 
U.S.C. §§ 802(21), 823(f) (2012). 
260. JM Pharmacy, 80 Fed. Reg. at 28681. 
261. Id. at 28673 n.24. 
262. 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a) (2017). 
263. Holiday CVS, L.L.C., 77 Fed. Reg. 62316, 62322 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Oct. 12, 2012) (“[I]t 
is clear that if the red flags presented by a prescription could not be resolved, then the Government 
satisfied the third element of its prima facie burden.”). 
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not done prior to or at the moment controlled substances are dispensed.264  In 
other words: if the prescriber issued a good prescription, dispensing it can bring 
no liability on the pharmacy registrant. 
This sea change comes with a potentially powerful procedural ramification.  
It is currently routine practice for ALJs to deny sometimes copious subpoena 
requests for prescribing physicians and their patients.265  Under the 
longstanding theory that it is the knowledge available to the pharmacy at the 
time of dispensing that controls the assessment of whether its corresponding 
responsibility has been breached, testimony regarding the actual medical 
purpose and legitimacy of a prescription was irrelevant, and patients are 
incompetent to offer opinions about whether dispensing was compliant with 
applicable regulations and standards.266  However, this new language in Hills 
Pharmacy calls the current approach into serious question.  If it is true that a 
pharmacy cannot, as a matter of law, violate its corresponding responsibility 
obligations whenever a controlled substance prescription was, in fact, issued 
for a legitimate medical purpose—no matter how illegitimate it appears to be 
at the time of dispensing—then the irrelevancy argument long-utilized by ALJs 
to eschew the issuance of en masse subpoena requests to compel the attendance 
of every prescriber and every patient whose prescriptions are at issue in the 
hearing by compulsory process to establish the legitimacy of those 
prescriptions is substantially undermined.  If a witness can support a potential 
defense raised by a party in the proceeding, and the testimony is likely to elicit 
evidence that is “competent, relevant, material and not unduly repetitious,” it 
would be manifest error to deny the subpoena request.267  This may mean that 
in a post-Hills Pharmacy world, dozens or even hundreds of prescribers and 
patients are potentially subject to compulsory process.268  Inasmuch as the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) affords every respondent at a hearing the 
right “to present his case or defense,”269 it may be difficult for ALJs to justify 
denying registrants the ability to present the defense, suggested by the Agency 
 
264. See Hills Pharmacy, 81 Fed. Reg. at 49836–37, 49836 n.33. 
265. See, e.g., id. at 49817; Superior Pharmacy I and Superior Pharmacy II, 81 Fed. Reg. 31310, 
31312–13, 31317 (Drug Enf’t Admin. May 18, 2016); see also Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 
§ 555(d) (2012). 
266. See generally 21 C.F.R. § 1316.59(a)–(b). 
267. Humphreys v. DEA, 96 F.3d 658, 663 (3d Cir. 1996); see also 21 C.F.R. § 1316.59(a); 5 
U.S.C. § 555(d). 
268. For example, in Hills Pharmacy, the respondent proposed calling 1,461 patients whose 
prescriptions had been seized by the DEA as witnesses, along with more than 130 doctors.  Hills 
Pharmacy, 81 Fed. Reg. at 49817.  The respondent “estimated that it would require [forty-five] to 
[sixty] days to present its” case-in-chief.  Id. 
269. 5 U.S.C. § 556(d). 
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for the first time in Hills Pharmacy, that all of the prescriptions under scrutiny 
were, in fact, legitimately issued. 
Government counsel should be prepared to distinguish Hills Pharmacy, or 
minimize its exposure by bearing down on those aspects of the hearing 
regulations that limit “unduly repetitious” evidence,270 and be prepared to 
persuade the assigned ALJ to exercise his authority to “regulate the course of 
the hearing.”271  Respondent’s counsel should spend their pre-hearing hours 
tracking down the names and addresses of all prescribers and patients that 
pertain to the allegations, and determining whether those otherwise-uninvolved 
persons might be able to supply a defense for the pharmacy client.  The ALJs 
should prepare for longer hearings and an increased level of subpoena litigation. 
C. Medical Practice Standards 
More than a decade ago, in Gonzales v. Oregon,272 the Supreme Court 
categorically dictated that Congress and the CSA do not regulate the practice 
of medicine generally, noting the following:  
The [Controlled Substances Act] and our case law amply 
support the conclusion that Congress regulates medical 
practice insofar as it bars doctors from using their prescription-
writing powers as a means to engage in illicit drug dealing and 
trafficking as conventionally understood.  Beyond this, 
however, the statute manifests no intent to regulate the practice 
of medicine generally.  The silence is understandable given the 
structure and limitations of federalism, which allow the [s]tates 
“[]great latitude under their police powers to legislate as to the 
protection of the lives, limbs, health, comfort, and quiet of all 
persons.[]”273 
Thus, in regulating its registrants, the DEA is required to apply medical 
practice standards that emanate from the states as part of their police powers.274  
This division of regulatory power is particularly important when the Agency 
seeks to rely on an allegation that a registrant or applicant fell below a state 
medical standard in its administrative enforcement proceedings.275 
 
270. 21 C.F.R. § 1316.59(a). 
271. 5 U.S.C. § 556(c)(5). 
272. 546 U.S. 243 (2006). 
273. Id. at 269–70 (citations omitted). 
274. Id. at 270 (“The structure and operation of the CSA presume and rely upon a functioning 
medical profession regulated under the [s]tates’ police powers.”). 
275. See 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a) (“A prescription for a controlled substance to be effective must 
be issued for a legitimate medical purpose by an individual practitioner acting in the usual course of 
his professional practice.” (emphasis added)). 
CURRENT NAVIGATION POINTS IN DRUG DIVERSION LAW (DRAFT) MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW VOL. 101 
382 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [101:333 
Where a sanction is sought by DEA’s regulators based on a failure to 
comply with an applicable state standard, it is incumbent upon the Government 
to demonstrate both what the state standard is and that a registrant has 
committed acts or practiced in a manner that falls short of that standard.276  This 
is typically, but not always, accomplished through the use of expert 
testimony.277  However, expert testimony is not always required, and in Jack A. 
Danton, D.O., the Agency outlined the other ways in which cases without 
expert testimony can be proved: 
[W]here the Government fails to provide expert testimony to 
support a finding that a practitioner acted outside of the usual 
course of professional practice and lacked a legitimate medical 
purpose, it can nonetheless prove a violation by: (1) 
[p]roviding evidence that a practitioner committed a violation 
of a state medical practice standard which is sufficiently tied 
to a state law finding of illegitimacy to support a similar 
finding under federal law[;] (2) providing evidence showing 
that [a registrant] knowingly diverted drugs[;] . . . [or, (3) 
providing evidence that a registrant] violat[ed] . . . a state 
medical practice standard which has a substantial relationship 
to the CSA’s purpose of preventing substance abuse and 
diversion.278 
In Lawrence E. Stewart, M.D., the Agency recently reaffirmed that expert 
testimony is “typically necessary” to establish that a physician fell below the 
standard for writing controlled substance prescriptions when the physician 
made “some attempt to comply with various state medical practice standards 
and the adequacy of those efforts is at issue,” but that “the facts and 
circumstances surrounding the issuance of the prescription” established on the 
record in that case could also support such a charge.279  As discussed below, 
other recent Agency cases have added additional nuances to the area of medical 
practice standards in DEA proceedings that both sides should be aware of. 
 
276. T.J. McNichol, M.D., 77 Fed. Reg. 57133, 57147–48 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Sept. 17, 2012). 
277. Id. at 57147 (“‘[W]here a physician makes some attempt to comply with various state 
medical practice standards and the adequacy of those efforts is at issue,’ expert testimony is typically 
necessary to establish that a physician violated 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a) . . . .” (quoting Jack A. Danton, 
D.O., 76 Fed. Reg. 60900, 60904 & n.13 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Sept. 30, 2011))). 
278. Danton, 76 Fed. Reg. at 60901; see also Joe W. Morgan, D.O., 78 Fed. Reg. 61961, 61978 
(Drug Enf’t Admin. Oct. 8, 2013) (reaffirming Danton). 
279. Lawrence E. Stewart, M.D., 81 Fed. Reg. 54822, 54824 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Aug. 17, 2016) 
(quoting McNichol, 77 Fed. Reg. at 57147–48). 
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1. Investigators as Experts? 
In Jones Total Health Care Pharmacy, L.L.C., the Government’s expert 
testified regarding payment in cash as an indicator of diversion, specifically 
testifying that it is indicative of diversion when a patient asks the pharmacy not 
to bill his or her insurance and instead requests to pay cash.280  Based on that 
testimony, the ALJ found that paying cash was a red flag, but the respondent 
pharmacy challenged that finding because there was no evidence that patients 
requested that the pharmacy not bill their insurance—a seemingly essential 
component of what the expert testified constitutes a red flag.281  In the Agency’s 
final order, with no apparent prior warning to the respondent, the Agency held 
that a diversion investigator, who, at the hearing, also “testified that ‘paying 
cash’ is a ‘red flag[] of diversion,’”282 possessed sufficient expert knowledge to 
supplement the expert’s opinion in order to find that when a pharmacy customer 
pays cash it constitutes a red flag of diversion that should have been 
acknowledged and acted upon by the pharmacy registrant.283  While the 
diversion investigator’s testimony was used to bolster the expert’s opinion,284 
the decision suggests that the Agency may be amenable to finding that its 
investigators possess sufficient knowledge and experience such that they may 
offer expert testimony on certain subjects in future cases.  This is something for 
both sides of the litigation equation to consider as they prepare their cases. 
2. When “Should” Means “Must” 
While the Agency disagreed with the Government’s expert and the findings 
of the ALJ that certain documentation should exist in a certain location in 
Superior Pharmacy I & Superior Pharmacy II,285 in Wesley Pope, M.D., the 
 
280. Jones Total Health Care Pharmacy, L.L.C., 81 Fed. Reg. 79188, 79191 (Drug Enf’t Admin. 
Nov. 10, 2016). 
281. Id. 
282. Id. (alteration in original). 
283. See id. 
284. Id. 
285. As discussed, in Superior I & II, the Agency discounted the unchallenged testimony of the 
Government’s expert witness (the only expert witness to testify at the hearing) that a pharmacy 
encountering circumstances that raise suspicion about the validity of a prescription must be resolved 
prior to dispensing, and that such resolution would customarily be documented on the prescription 
itself.  See Superior Pharmacy I & Superior Pharmacy II, 81 Fed. Reg. 31310, 31335 & n.55 (Drug 
Enf’t Admin. May 18, 2016); Section III.B.2.  The Agency, while not outright rejecting the testimony, 
emphasized that the expert did not (and conceded that he could not) point to any statute or regulation 
requiring such documentation in any particular location, and held that just because documenting 
resolution of a red flag on the prescription is “customary in the profession . . . does not make it improper 
to document the resolution someplace else.”  Superior I & II, 81 Fed. Reg. at 31335 n.55. 
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Agency was willing to agree with the Government’s expert—over the ALJ’s 
findings—that certain documentation that state code provisions provided 
should exist was, in fact, mandatory.286  In Pope, the Government’s expert 
testified that the practitioner’s documentation deficiencies placed him outside 
of the standard of care, as that standard is described in certain provisions of the 
Oklahoma Administrative Code.287  The Oklahoma provisions at issue directed 
that “[a] medical history and physical examination must be obtained, evaluated 
and documented in the medical record,” and went on to list specific areas that 
the “medical record should document,”288 and further directed that “[r]ecords 
should remain current” and that “[t]he physician should keep accurate and 
complete records.”289  The Government’s expert testified that all of the 
documentation requirements listed in the code provision are mandatory (and 
that such documentation was missing from the prescriber’s records), despite the 
fact that the code provisions used the word “should,” rather than “shall” or 
“must,” in describing numerous aspects of the documentation to be kept.290  
While finding the expert credible, the ALJ declined to give weight to certain 
aspects of the expert’s testimony interpreting the code provisions, instead 
finding that his testimony was based upon a mistaken understanding of the 
Oklahoma Board’s documentation and recordkeeping standards in finding that 
“should” was mandatory, not permissive.291   
The Agency disagreed with the ALJ’s interpretation of the Oklahoma 
provisions, and held that “should” does not really mean “should,” at least in 
those provisions, but actually means “must,” and connoted a mandatory 
obligation in the context of the provisions at issue.292  The Agency based its 
decision on its interpretation of cases from the Seventh Circuit, the D.C. Circuit, 
a federal district court in Florida, and a dictionary definition of “should,” as 
well as an analysis of the Oklahoma Medical Practice Act and a Policy 
Statement.293  Interestingly, a Tenth Circuit (which includes Oklahoma) case 
which held that “‘should’ indicates a recommended course of action, but does 
not itself imply the obligation associated with ‘shall,’” received no mention in 
 
286. Wesley Pope, M.D., 82 Fed. Reg. 14944, 14945 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Mar. 23, 2017). 
287. Id. 
288. Id. (quoting Okla. Admin. Code § 435:10-7-11(1) (2016)). 
289. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Okla. Admin. Code § 435:10-7-11(6)). 
290. Id. 
291. Id. at 14946. 
292. Id. 
293. Id. at 14945–46. 
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the Agency’s decision in Pope.294  Thus, contrary to the Agency’s view, the 
pertinent Circuit Court of Appeals holds the view that the most reasonable 
interpretation of the word “should” is really “should”—a discretionary term.295  
The Agency did not discuss the fact that there is some level of conflict in the 
circuit courts about whether to treat “should” as mandatory or permissive,296 
but the Agency has apparently taken the position that, if the state law supplying 
the practice standard in a DEA case uses the word “should,” the Agency is 
likely to read that word as “must,” irrespective of federal circuit law on the 
issue.297  
While Pope dealt with codified evidence of a standard which dictated that 
certain information “should” be documented and Superior I & II dealt with 
testimonial evidence of a standard which dictated that certain information 
“should” be documented in a certain location, the Agency found that one 
standard was mandatory, while the other was permissive.298  On that backdrop, 
if the Government’s theory of a case is grounded in the absence of certain 
documentation, both parties will need to dedicate substantial energy to a 
thorough examination of the codified standards to determine what aspects are 
mandatory or merely permissive, and both parties will need to narrowly focus 
their expert witnesses—or the other party’s expert witnesses on cross 
examination—to the full extent of any given standard.  
3. “General” Practice Standards? 
Although, as previously discussed, the Supreme Court has unambiguously 
clarified that the authority to set medical standards rests exclusively with the 
states, and is nowhere within the purview of the DEA,299 some recent Agency 
final orders have embraced the application of what the Agency has termed 
“general-practice standards” in ascertaining whether a practitioner has acted in 
 
294. Qwest Corp. v. FCC, 258 F.3d 1191, 1200 (10th Cir. 2001).  In Qwest, the Tenth Circuit 
considered an FCC statute which, like the Oklahoma Administrative Code provisions at issue in Pope, 
began with an overarching “shall,” a mandatory instruction, followed by a subset of items that “should” 
be considered under that “shall” provision.  Id. at 1199–1200. 
295. See id. at 1200. 
296. E.g., United States v. Maria, 186 F.3d 65, 72–73 (2d Cir. 1999) (discussing circuit split and 
declining to follow decisions of the First, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits, which found that the use of the 
word “shall” in a sentencing guideline imposed a mandatory requirement). 
297. Pope, 82 Fed. Reg. at 14945. 
298. Id.; Superior Pharmacy I and Superior Pharmacy II, 81 Fed. Reg. 31310 (Drug Enf’t Admin. 
May 18, 2016). 
299. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 274 (2006). 
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the course of a professional practice.300  In one such case, Fiaz Afzal, M.D., the 
Agency accepted the findings and legal conclusions of a state medical board, 
which, in a decision that occurred after the close of the DEA administrative 
hearing, suspended the respondent’s state medical privileges.301  In the course 
of its reliance on the state board, citing its own prior final orders and a criminal 
diversion case,302 the Agency held that: 
[T]he prescribing of a controlled substance (and the continued 
prescribing of a controlled substance) under the following 
circumstances establishes that a physician lacked a legitimate 
medical purpose and acted outside of the usual course of 
professional practice and therefore violated the CSA: 
• [w]ithout performing an appropriate physical 
examination, 
• without utilizing appropriate diagnostic testing, 
• failing to devise and document a written treatment plan, 
• failing to periodically reassess the effectiveness of the 
treatment, 
• continuing to prescribe controlled substances without 
pursuing alternative therapies, 
• repeatedly and continually prescribing without referring 
the patient to appropriate specialists, and 
• failing to keep and maintain records which contain 
adequate findings to support a diagnosis and the need to 
prescribe one or more medications.303 
The Agency has also indicated a willingness to use its own prior final orders 
to establish that registrants should know that particular circumstances are 
suspicious, particularly in the area of establishing a pharmacy’s corresponding 
responsibility in filling prescriptions with “red flags” of diversion.  In Jones 
Total Health Care Pharmacy, L.L.C., the Agency found that it was unnecessary 
to determine whether anyone had discussed with the pharmacists their duties 
and obligations under the Agency’s corresponding responsibility rule, declaring 
that “the Agency’s corresponding responsibility rule has been in force for 
 
300. E.g., Grider Drug #1 & Grider Drug #2, 77 Fed. Reg. 44070, 44093 n.73 (Drug Enf’t 
Admin. July 26, 2012); Bienvenido Tan, M.D., 76 Fed. Reg. 17673, 17681 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Mar. 
30, 2011). 
301. Fiaz Afzal, M.D., 79 Fed. Reg. 61651, 61652 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Oct. 14, 2014).  The 
Government filed notice of the state board’s action with the Administrator’s office after the conclusion 
of hearing procedures before the Agency ALJ, and it was considered over the objection of the 
respondent.  Id. 
302. Id. at 61653 (citing United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 122, 135, 142–43 (1975)). 
303. Id. at 61654. 
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decades and numerous decisions of both the courts and the Agency have 
provided ample guidance as to the scope of a pharmacists duty under the 
rule.”304  Also, in Jones Total Health, the Agency, seemingly separate from 
those “red flags” outlined by the Government’s expert,305 found “[a]dditional 
[i]ndicators of [d]iversion,”306 including a finding that “high prices and copious 
dispensing of controlled substances can be an indicator of possible diversion 
because it elucidates a customer base willing to pay exorbitant prices for a drug 
the customer could otherwise purchase at a nearby pharmacy for much less,” 
based on “federal court precedent” evidently cited by the Government in its 
brief.307  In Hills Pharmacy, the Agency rejected testimony by a pharmacist that 
he was unfamiliar with the concept and significance of a “drug cocktail,” citing 
prior Agency orders where the “DEA had identified this combination of 
drugs . . . as being highly abused” before the pharmacist filled the prescriptions 
at issue.308 
In Pope, the Agency further tested the limits of the Supreme Court’s 
holding in Gonzales309 with the inclusion of the following language: 
[W]hile [s]tates have the primary responsibility for the 
regulation of the medical profession, many of the profession’s 
norms were created by the profession itself.  Thus, on such 
issues as the adequacy of a clinical evaluation for a particular 
pain complaint and the necessary documentation to support the 
prescribing of controlled substances, the standard of medical 
practice would not seem to vary to any material degree 
between [s]tates, especially between [s]tates that border each 
other.310 
Read broadly, these cases may provide an indication that the Agency, 
Gonzales notwithstanding, is willing to draw from its own body of prior final 
orders and court precedents to establish “general practice standards” applicable 
to all DEA registrants.  Pope is not a case where comparison of multiple state 
standards was in issue and litigated, but a case where the Agency drew a general 
conclusion, with no evidentiary support in the record of the pertinent 
proceeding, and included it as a sort of rumination.  To the extent the Agency 
 
304. Jones Total Health Care Pharmacy, L.L.C., 81 Fed. Reg. 79188, 79190 (Drug Enf’t Admin. 
Nov. 10, 2016) (citations omitted). 
305. Id. at 79218–19 (discussing expert’s testimony regarding “red flags”). 
306. Id. at 79219. 
307. Id. at 79219 & n.67. 
308. Hills Pharmacy, L.L.C., 81 Fed. Reg. 49816, 49837 (Drug Enf’t Admin. July 28, 2016). 
309. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 269–70, 274–275 (2006). 
310. Wesley Pope, M.D., 82 Fed. Reg. 14944, 14976 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Mar. 23, 2017). 
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continues to test the waters of establishing a set of the DEA’s own medical 
standards, it risks confusion where its standards conflict with those of the states 
where misconduct is alleged to have occurred.  While it is a safe bet that the 
courts will follow Gonzales and apply the state standard where it conflicts with 
any general practice standards created by the DEA,311 not every case will make 
it to the courts, and litigants on both sides of the aisle will need to stay vigilant 
in discerning which standards are argued and supported by record evidence.  If 
there is a take away from the recent Agency decisions regarding state medical 
practice standards, it probably is that where state standards are in issue, both 
sides would be prudent to support their relative positions with identifiable state 
medical standards expressed in statute, regulation, and state board opinions, and 
to secure competent expert testimony.  
D. When “Legitimate Medical Purpose” Means “Outside the Usual Course 
of Professional Practice” and Vice Versa 
Under longstanding regulations drafted by the Agency, “[a] prescription for 
a controlled substance to be effective must be issued for a legitimate medical 
purpose by an individual practitioner acting in the usual course of his 
professional practice.”312  Among the more striking of the Agency’s recent final 
orders is its pronouncement in Pope,313 that “legitimate medical purpose” and 
“usual course of professional practice,” two terms listed separately as 
requirements under the regulations, and thus forming a conjunctive requirement 
in order for a prescription to be “effective,”314 have the same meaning—not 
similar meanings, but the same meaning315—rendering them interchangeable 
and indistinct.  
The dichotomy present in the regulatory definition of an “effective” 
controlled substance prescription is reasonably rooted in the reality that 
controlled-substance prescribing accomplished outside a prescriber’s 
professional practice is as potentially dangerous as controlled-substance 
prescribing accomplished within a prescriber’s professional practice where 
there is no legitimate purpose for the medication.  While both features are 
 
311. See Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 269–70. 
312. 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a) (2017). 
313. Pope, 82 Fed. Reg. at 14967 n.38. 
314. United States v. Nelson, 383 F.3d 1227, 1233 (10th Cir. 2004) (“[A] practitioner is 
authorized to dispense controlled substances only if he acts with a legitimate medical purpose and in 
the usual course of professional practice.  Conversely, a practitioner would be unauthorized to dispense 
a controlled substance if he acts without a legitimate medical purpose or outside the usual course of 
professional practice.”). 
315. See Pope, 82 Fed. Reg. at 14967 n.38. 
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required to render a prescription legitimate,316 the components are distinct and 
are separately delineated for good reason.  By way of example, a practitioner 
registrant who prescribes an opioid to someone who demonstrates an etiology 
consistent with a need for pain treatment (e.g., a broken back, recent surgery, 
intractable pain) may have prescribed the medication for a legitimate medical 
purpose, but when it is done without the establishment of a bona fide doctor-
patient relationship, without the creation of a chart, or without the requisite 
documentation, it is likely to have been issued outside the course of a 
professional practice.  Conversely, a practitioner who has a bona fide doctor-
patient relationship with a patient and who keeps meticulous and detailed notes 
about controlled pain medications that the practitioner prescribes where there 
is no apparent organic pain source, the potency and frequency of the medication 
are unwarranted, or the patient has manifested objective indications of 
addiction, may well be prescribing in the usual course of a professional practice, 
but not for a legitimate medical purpose.  The two bases may be (and frequently 
are) co-morbidly present, but that does not support the proposition that the 
phrases are interchangeable.  
In Pope, the Government noticed its case exclusively on the theory that the 
prescriptions in issue were issued outside the “usual course of professional 
practice.”317  No allegation was tendered that the prescriptions were not “for a 
legitimate medical purpose.”318  In essentially rolling over any notice issue, the 
Agency held that “there is no material difference between the phrases ‘usual 
course of a professional practice’ and ‘legitimate medical purpose,’”319  relying 
on criminal cases where, it said, “the courts have sustained convictions for 
violating the regulation . . . notwithstanding that an indictment charged the 
defendant” with violating only one of the two elements, “as well as where the 
jury instructions only referenced” one of the two elements.320  Ignoring the 
Tenth Circuit’s statement that it was “hesitant to say that [the distinction 
between the two phrases] never could make a difference,”321 as well as the fact 
that the court in that case considered the argument rather than rejecting it 
outright and holding that the phrases mean the same thing,322 the Agency quoted 
only the court’s statement that “[i]t is difficult to imagine circumstances in 
which a practitioner could have prescribed controlled substances” in violation 
 
316. See 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a). 
317. Pope, 82 Fed. Reg. at 14967 n.38. 
318. Id. 
319. Id. 
320. Id. (citing United States v. Fuchs, 467 F.3d 889, 898–901 (5th Cir. 2006)). 
321. United States v. Nelson, 383 F.3d 1227, 1231 (10th Cir. 2004). 
322. Id. at 1231–33. 
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of one element, but not the other.323  However, the cited cases may not reach as 
broadly as the Agency suggests, and importantly, the cited cases are not cases 
where the Government alleged only one theory, to the exclusion of the other, 
as was the situation in Pope.324  The cases stand only for the irrefutable 
proposition that evidence under either theory will suffice to prove a violation 
of 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a).   
Both elements—that a prescription was issued in a usual course of 
professional practice and for a legitimate medical purpose—are required for a 
prescription to be “effective.”325  It is true that the Government only needs to 
prove that one of the elements was missing in order to support its prima facie 
case that the prescription was not “effective,”326 but this is not the same as 
holding (as the Agency did) that a respondent had sufficient notice as to both 
theories if the Government only relies on one theory in its charging document 
and prehearing filings.327  Courts have not been willing to extend Chevron328 
deference to the Agency’s view that certain words in phrases used in the CSA 
constitute mere surplusage,329 but if the Agency’s interpretation of its 
prescription regulation is challenged, it will be interesting to see if the courts 
are more inclined to extend regulatory deference to the DEA in this regard 
under Skidmore v. Swift & Co.330 
In view of the frequency with which both aspects of illegitimate 
prescriptions are alleged and established in practice, as a practical matter, there 
 
323. Pope, 82 Fed. Reg. at 14967 n.38 (alteration in original) (quoting Nelson, 383 F.3d at 1231). 
324. See id. (citing the ALJ’s recommended decision, which provided that “the Government 
noticed a theory based in the issuance of prescriptions outside the course of a professional 
practice . . . not that any prescriptions were not issued for a legitimate medical purpose,” wherein the 
ALJ held that a violation under the unnoticed theory, which was alleged for the first time in the 
Government’s post hearing brief, was unavailable to support a sanction). 
325. Nelson, 383 F.3d at 1233 (“[A] practitioner is authorized to dispense controlled substances 
only if he acts with a legitimate medical purpose and in the usual course of professional practice.” 
(analyzing 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a) (2017))). 
326. Id. (“[A] practitioner would be unauthorized to dispense a controlled substance if he acts 
without a legitimate medical purpose or outside the usual course of professional practice.” (analyzing 
21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a))). 
327. Pope, 82 Fed. Reg. at 14947. 
328. See Chevron v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
329. In Novelty, Inc. v. DEA, a majority of the D.C. Circuit was unwilling to extend Chevron 
deference so far as to assume that “principal,” as used by Congress in the phrase “principal place of 
business” in 21 U.S.C. § 822(e), constituted surplusage.  571 F.3d 1176, 1187–88 (D.C. Cir. 2009) 
(Tatel, J., concurring). 
330. 323 U.S. 134 (1944) (“[T]he rulings, interpretations, and opinions of [an agency head], 
while not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, do consititute a body of experience 
and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance.”). 
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may be little risk to the Agency in electing to merge the terms—and using one 
phrase interchangeably to actually mean both phrases—even in the face of a 
clearly-drafted regulation which requires both elements to be present for a 
prescription to be legitimate.  In terms of the practicing bar, both sides would 
do well to prepare theories in support of and against each aspect of the 
legitimate prescription equation.  A practitioner whose prescriptions are only 
alleged to have been issued without a legitimate medical purpose may wish to 
defend himself quite differently than a practitioner whose prescriptions are only 
alleged to have been issued outside the usual course of professional practice, 
but Pope should serve as a warning for respondents’ counsel to prepare a 
defense to both theories, even if only one is charged.  For the time being, the 
Agency has indicated its willingness to treat the dual components as an 
amalgam and support a sanction based on either, irrespective of which is 
alleged in the OSC.331  But if the Government intends to proceed on a theory 
that a particular practitioner violated both or either of the elements, it may want 
to consider charging the elements in the disjunctive, in the event that its 
evidence only supports one of the theories.  
E. DEA-222s and the Absence of Delivery/Receipt Evidence 
To track the movement of schedule I and II controlled substances within 
the closed regulatory system, the DEA requires the use of a Controlled 
Substance Order Form (hereinafter DEA-222).332  In keeping with its trend of 
requiring additional evidence to sustain allegations against pharmacy 
registrants regarding the exercise of their corresponding responsibility, the 
Agency has also recently imposed heightened requirements on its prosecutors 
for allegations relating to DEA-222s.333 
 
331. Pope, 82 Fed. Reg. at 14967 n.38. 
332. 21 C.F.R. §§ 1305.03, 1305.12 (2017). 
333. Upon request by an authorized registrant-purchaser, the DEA sends the registrant-purchaser 
DEA-222 forms with the purchaser’s name, address, registration number, and authorized activity and 
schedule information pre-printed.  Id. § 1305.11.  Each individually-numbered order form comes in a 
three-copy stack—a brown copy (Copy 1), a green copy (Copy 2), and a blue copy (Copy 3)—with 
interleaved carbon sheets so that anything written on the top copy (Copy 1) transfers to the lower two 
copies.  Id. §§ 1305.11, 1305.12; DEA, U.S. OFFICIAL ORDER FORMS—SCHEDULES I & II, FORM-222 
(May 2008) (form can be found at 
https://www.research.uky.edu/ori/human/DEA%20presentation.pdf) [hereinafter DEA-222].  Aside 
from their color and copy number, Copies 1 and 2 are identical.  See id.  Each of them contains two 
sections, one “to be filled in by purchaser” and another “to be filled in by supplier.”  Id.  The 
information “to be filled in by supplier” on Copies 1 and 2 includes the supplier’s DEA registration 
number, the National Drug Code, and “Packages Shipped” and “Date Shipped” information for each 
item that the supplier sends to the purchaser.  Id.  The purchaser’s copy, Copy 3, does not have an area 
CURRENT NAVIGATION POINTS IN DRUG DIVERSION LAW (DRAFT) MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW VOL. 101 
392 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [101:333 
A long and established body of Agency final orders held that evidence of 
DEA-222s maintained in a purchaser’s files that were not completed in 
accordance with the regulations could constitute a basis for a registration 
sanction.334  However, in Superior Pharmacy I & Superior Pharmacy II, the 
Agency added an apparently new element to the mix.  Reading the plain 
language of the regulation, the Agency divined that incomplete forms alone 
could not prove a regulatory violation; instead, it required additional proof that 
the purchaser actually had an obligation, triggered by the receipt of the ordered 
drugs, to complete the forms, but that it did not do so.335  This interpretation 
was reaffirmed by the Agency in Hills Pharmacy.336  
In Superior I & II, the Government presented evidence demonstrating that 
several DEA-222s on file at the pharmacies were missing information 
regarding the number of packages received and the date on which they were 
received.337  There, the Agency declared the Government’s case infirm because 
“the Government offered no evidence that any portion of the two orders listed 
 
“to be filled in by supplier.”  Instead, in that section of the form where Copies 1 and 2 reflect that they 
are “to be filled in by supplier,” Copy 3 contains correspondingly-located National Drug Code, 
packages, and date columns, but on Copy 3, the packages and date columns, entitled “No. of Packages 
Received” and “Date Received,” indicate that they are “to be filled in by purchaser.”  Id.  To order 
controlled substances, the purchaser fills in all portions of the form except the area designated “to be 
filled in by supplier” on Copy 1 and signs and dates the form.  See 21 C.F.R. §§ 1305.12, 1305.13; 
DEA-222, supra.  Because of the interleaved carbon sheets, all of the information written by the 
purchaser in those designated areas is also reflected on Copies 2 and 3.  Pursuant to DEA regulations, 
the purchaser then separates the bottom copy, Copy 3, from the stack; retains that copy in the 
purchaser’s files; and sends Copies 1 and 2 to the supplier, with the carbon sheets intact.  See 21 C.F.R. 
§ 1305.13(a).  When the supplier fills the order, it annotates both of its copies with details of the 
controlled substances that it shipped and the date on which each was shipped.  Id. § 1305.12(b).  The 
supplier then retains Copy 1 for its records and sends Copy 2 to the DEA.  Id. § 1305.13(d).  When the 
purchaser receives the shipment from the supplier, the purchaser is required to record the number of 
packages received and the date the packages were received on its copy, Copy 3, which was retained at 
the time of the order.  See id. § 1305.13(e).  When viewed together, the various copies should reflect 
that each package shipped by the supplier was received by the purchaser, which creates a record 
reflecting which controlled substances each registrant is accountable for. 
334. See, e.g., Med. Shoppe, 79 Fed. Reg. 59504, 59516 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Oct. 2, 2014); 
Alexander Drug Co., Inc., 66 Fed. Reg. 18299, 18303 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Apr. 6, 2001); D-Tek 
Enters., 56 Fed. Reg. 28926, 28926 (Drug Enf’t Admin. June 25, 1991); Wayne Nichols, D.V.M., 54 
Fed. Reg. 37167, 37167–68 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Sept. 7, 1989); York Pharmacy, Inc., 41 Fed. Reg. 
10933, 10933 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Mar. 15, 1976); David M. Higgins, 39 Fed. Reg. 26758, 26759 
(Drug Enf’t Admin. July 23, 1974). 
335. Superior Pharmacy I and Superior Pharmacy II, 81 Fed. Reg. 31310, 31335, 31338 (Drug 
Enf’t Admin. May 18, 2016). 
336. Hills Pharmacy, L.L.C., 81 Fed. Reg. 49816, 49842–43 (Drug Enf’t Admin. July 28, 2016). 
337. Superior I & II, 81 Fed. Reg. at 31338. 
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on the form were filled.”338  The Agency was unpersuaded by the testimony 
presented by the Government that an absence of a shipment should have yielded 
an entry on the form of “a zero and the date they put the zero[] on the form” to 
indicate that nothing ever arrived; the Agency simply noted that the regulations 
do not require that step.339  Thus, because the Government “did not identify a 
single instance in which a line item had actually been shipped to [the 
r]espondent and the entry had not been made,” the Agency found that the 
Government had not proven that the forms were incorrectly filled out such that 
they would warrant a sanction.340 
Shortly after Superior I & II was issued, the Agency issued its decision in 
Hills Pharmacy, reaffirming the requirement of additional proof that an order 
was actually filled, shipped, and received in order to sustain a finding that an 
incomplete DEA-222 was in violation of the regulations’ requirements.341  In 
Hills Pharmacy, the Agency again rejected a diversion investigator’s testimony 
that, if the registrant did not “‘receive a drug,’ it was required ‘to write a zero’ 
in the column for the number of packages received.”342  Like in its decision in 
Superior I & II, the Agency did not sustain the allegations regarding all of the 
DEA-222s in evidence which contained no entries whatsoever in the “No. of 
Packages Received” or “Date Received” columns.343  However, unlike in 
Superior I & II, two of the DEA-222s in evidence in Hills Pharmacy contained 
a number in the “No. of Packages Received” column, but did not contain an 
entry for the date that the package(s) were received.344  The Agency sustained 
those allegations, apparently accepting the registrant’s notations in the “No. of 
Packages Received” column as sufficient evidence that the registrant actually 
received the drugs and, therefore, that it had the obligation to fill out the DEA-
222s completely.345  Thus, under the Agency’s current interpretation of its 
 
338. Id.  Interestingly, there is no indication that the potential that the orders were not filled was 
even raised by the respondent in that case.  See Superior I & II, 81 Fed. Reg. 31310. 
339. Id. at 31338 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
340. Id. 
341. Hills Pharmacy, 81 Fed. Reg. at 49843.  The Agency’s decision in Hills Pharmacy does 
not cite the Superior I & II decision for its requirement that additional evidence be provided to show 
that the registrant “had actually received any of the drugs listed in the line items which were left blank.” 
Id. at 49843 n.49.  Instead, it references only the language of the regulation, 21 C.F.R. § 1305.13(e).  
Id. at 49843. 
342. Id. 
343. Id. at 49843 & n.49. 
344. Id. at 49843. 
345. See id.  Although the Agency found that the two forms violated the regulations, it noted 
that they (along with one violation of the requirement that the registrant keep the original DEA-222 
Copy 3, not a copy) were “of minor consequence.”  Id.  It is unclear whether that statement, which 
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regulations, the existence of an entirely incomplete form is superfluous in the 
absence of evidence that the controlled substance order was actually filled and 
shipped to the purchaser, while a partially complete DEA-222 may be sufficient 
to support the Government’s allegation regarding the same. 
The Agency’s own precedent in Superior I & II and Hills Pharmacy 
presents at least the potential for something of an evidentiary conundrum for 
the Government.  Although the burden imposed by Superior I & II is couched 
in terms of whether the order was “filled”346 or “shipped,”347 the purchaser’s 
obligation to complete the form only arises when it receives the order, as 
recognized in Hills Pharmacy.348  While, in theory, the Government could 
provide the copy of the DEA-222 sent to it by the supplier that shows when the 
controlled substances order was filled,349 that would not demonstrate when or 
whether controlled substances were received by the pharmacy, but only that the 
vendor shipped them.  The best logical evidence for the Government to meet 
its burden under Superior I & II would be the purchaser’s copy of the DEA-
222.350  However, when all of the receipt information is missing from the 
purchaser’s forms, it will still remain incumbent upon the Government to 
present reliable evidence that the controlled substances described in the DEA-
222 were actually received by the respondent pharmacy.351  Under Superior I 
& II, where the only repository for product receipt information is the 
incomplete DEA-222, establishing a prima facie case for a violation of this 
 
arguably stands in some tension to its prior precedent regarding the importance of accurate 
recordkeeping, see, e.g., Satinder Dang, M.D., 76 Fed. Reg. 51424, 51429 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Aug. 
18, 2011); Paul H. Volkman, 73 Fed. Reg. 30630, 30644 (Drug Enf’t Admin. May 28, 2008), reflects 
a determination on the part of the Agency that multiple violations of like nature are “of minor 
consequence” or that this type of violation of the DEA-222 recordkeeping requirement is “of minor 
consequence.” 
346. Superior Pharmacy I and Superior Pharmacy II, 81 Fed. Reg. 31310, 31338 (Drug Enf’t 
Admin. May 18, 2016) (“[T]he Government points to no provision which requires, where no portion 
of a line entry has been filled[,] . . . the purchaser to notate on the form that no portion of that entry 
was received.”). 
347. Id. (“[The investigator] did not identify a single instance in which a line item had actually 
been shipped to [the r]espondent and the entry had not been made.”). 
348. Hills Pharmacy, 81 Fed. Reg. at 49843 n.49 (“The Government put forward no 
evidence . . . that [r]espondent had actually received any of the drugs listed in the line items which 
were left blank.” (emphasis added)). 
349. 21 C.F.R. § 1305.13(b) (2017) (“A supplier . . . must record on Copies 1 and 2 the number 
of commercial or bulk containers furnished on each item and the date on which the containers are 
shipped to the purchaser.”); id. § 1305.13(d) (“The supplier must . . . forward Copy 2 to the Special 
Agent in Charge of the Drug Enforcement Administration in the area in which the supplier is located.”). 
350. See id. § 1305.13(e). 
351. Hills Pharmacy, 81 Fed. Reg. at 49843. 
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obligation will not be without its challenges when the registrant leaves the 
forms entirely blank.  The Agency’s precedent could cynically be read to create 
something of a potential disincentive to fully complete the DEA-222 form, 
particularly where no other available paperwork maintained by a pharmacy 
registrant (or at least no paperwork shared with or available to the DEA) 
establishes the receipt of the controlled medication ordered on the DEA-222.  
If a pharmacy registrant declines to present testimony and presents no 
paperwork demonstrating delivery of the controlled substances, it creates the 
potential for a virtual absolution of culpability related to incomplete paperwork.  
Contrariwise, the same purchaser who makes an inadvertent mistake on a DEA-
222 (such as recording the “No. of Packages Received,” but leaving off the 
“Date Received”) but otherwise keeps meticulous records (such as a separate 
inventory document that reflects all controlled substances received and the date 
on which they were received) is arguably rendered more vulnerable to a 
potential sanction because the incomplete entries will facilitate the 
Government’s ability to demonstrate receipt.352  In the first scenario, there is 
simply no way to determine whether the substances have stayed within the 
closed regulatory system; in the latter, at least the (albeit technically non-
compliant) records can be put together to determine whether or not there is a 
leak in the system.   
F. The Rebirth of Community Impact Evidence 
Agency pharmacy precedent took another fascinating turn in Perry County 
Food & Drug, where the Agency’s final order held that long-disfavored 
community impact evidence can potentially be used by a pharmacy registrant 
to defend against a sanction proposed by the Agency.353  By way of background, 
the Agency was once willing to consider evidence of community impact in 
determining whether the public interest would best be served by revoking or 
maintaining a registration.354  In 1999, in Pettigrew Rexall Drugs, the Agency 
 
352. See Hills Pharmacy, 81 Fed. Reg. at 49843 (“Two of the order forms contain a notation that 
a number of packages were received but no entry for the date the package was received . . . thus 
violat[ing] 21 C.F.R. [§] 1305.13(e) by failing to notate the date these two packages were received.”); 
Alexander Drug Co., Inc., 66 Fed. Reg. 18299, 18303 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Apr. 6, 2001) (finding a 
violation of the regulations because, although the respondent kept records which “arguably detailed 
sufficient information to determine that the controlled substances were not diverted to an illicit 
purpose,” it did not properly execute its DEA-222s). 
353. Perry County Food & Drug, 80 Fed. Reg. 70084, 70091–92 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Nov. 12, 
2015). 
354. Marta I. Blesa, M.D., 60 Fed. Reg. 53434, 53436 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Oct. 13, 1995) 
(“[T]estimony given which described the medical services provided by the [r]espondent to her 
community impacts upon the need for her continued medical contributions to that community.”). 
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considered the pharmacy’s value to an underserved area to the registrant’s 
benefit.355  Over time, however, the Agency developed a body of final orders 
that have consistently declined to consider community impact evidence offered 
by practitioners.356  In Gregory D. Owens, D.D.S., the Agency compellingly 
justified its decision to abandon the practice of considering community impact 
evidence.357  The Agency set forth its rationale this way: 
The diversion of prescription drugs has become an 
increasingly serious societal problem, which is particularly 
significant in poorer communities whether they are located in 
rural or urban areas. . . . The residents of this Nation’s poorer 
areas are as deserving of protection from diverters as are the 
citizens of its wealthier communities, and there is no legitimate 
reason why practitioners should be treated any differently 
because of where they practice or the socioeconomic status of 
their patients.358 
Significantly, the CSA definition of “practitioners” includes both 
prescribers (such as physicians, dentists, veterinarians) and pharmacies,359 and 
the justification for the abandonment of community impact evidence referenced 
practitioners.360  It thus appeared that the Agency was no longer willing to 
consider community impact evidence when adjudicating any practitioner cases. 
Two years after Owens, in Linda Sue Cheek, M.D., the Agency reaffirmed 
its position that “community impact evidence is not relevant in determining 
whether to grant [or revoke] a prescribing practitioner’s” registration, and held 
that, “to the extent . . . any . . . case involving a prescribing practitioner[] 
suggests otherwise, it is overruled.”361  In that decision, the Agency noted that 
“there are no workable standards for determining whether other doctors are 
reasonably available” and that it is “unworkable” to determine “what 
constitutes a patient with a limited income or finances and how many patients 
 
355. Pettigrew Rexall Drugs, 64 Fed. Reg. 8855, 8859–60 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Feb. 23, 1999) 
(ameliorating a sanction based upon a finding by the Agency that the respondent pharmacy was one of 
only two pharmacies “serving a poor, medically underserved population”). 
356. E.g., Kwan Bo Jin, M.D., 77 Fed. Reg. 35021, 35021 (Drug Enf’t Admin. June 12, 2012); 
Linda Sue Cheek, M.D., 76 Fed. Reg. 66972, 66972–73 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Oct. 28, 2011); Gregory 
D. Owens, D.D.S., 74 Fed. Reg. 36751, 36757 (Drug Enf’t Admin. July 24, 2009). 
357. Owens, 74 Fed. Reg. at 36757. 
358. Id. (citations omitted). 
359. 21 U.S.C. § 802(21) (2012). 
360. Owens, 74 Fed. Reg. at 36757. 
361. Cheek, 76 Fed. Reg. at 66972–73. 
CURRENT NAVIGATION POINTS IN DRUG DIVERSION LAW (DRAFT) MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW VOL. 101 
2017] CURRENT NAVIGATION POINTS IN DRUG DIVERSION LAW 397 
(or what percentage of patients) a [prescribing] practitioner must have to claim” 
an impact.362 
Cheek neither stated that Pettigrew was being specifically overruled, nor 
carved out an exception for pharmacy registrants.363  It just said that community 
impact evidence would no longer be considered on behalf of prescribing 
practitioners.364  However, Physicians Pharmacy, L.L.C., a pharmacy case 
published one year after Cheek, suggested that the Agency would not consider 
community impact relating to pharmacy registrants, for the same reasons 
provided in Cheek and Owens.365  In that case, the Government urged the 
Agency to consider the “nature and amount of diversion of controlled 
substances in a geographical area . . . when determining whether an applicant 
should be granted a DEA registration,” but the Agency held that such evidence 
“is simply the other side of the community impact coin,” evidence of which the 
“DEA has held . . . is not relevant to any of the public interest factors 
and . . . [consideration of which] is completely unworkable.”366  While the 
signals from the Agency were admittedly mixed, Physician’s Pharmacy 
provided a none-too-subtle signal that the Agency was no longer interested in 
considering community impact evidence to meet a registration sanction sought 
by the Government against any practitioners. 
Given this background, the Agency’s recent decision re-embracing 
community impact for pharmacy practitioners is surprising.  In Perry County 
Food & Drug, the Agency acknowledged that it had, “in multiple cases[,] 
rejected the contention that community impact is a relevant consideration” in 
prescriber practitioner cases, and noted that “the reasoning of these decisions 
calls into question the continuing vitality of [Pettigrew] even as applied to a 
pharmacy,” but emphasized that, contrary to the ALJ’s conclusion, the Agency 
“has not formally overruled the case.”367  The Agency, referring to its 
discussion of community impact in Physicians Pharmacy as dicta, points out 
that no reference was made to Pettigrew in that decision, and thus it “cannot be 
read as overruling” Pettigrew.368  The Agency then explicitly stated that “the 
 
362. Id. at 66973 n.4. 
363. See Cheek, 76 Fed. Reg. 66972. 
364. Id. at 66973. 
365. Physicians Pharmacy, L.L.C., 77 Fed. Reg. 47096, 47096 n.2 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Aug. 7, 
2012). 
366. Id. (first citing Cheek, 76 Fed. Reg. at 66973 n.4; then citing Gregory D. Owens, D.D.S., 
74 Fed. Reg. 36751, 36757 & n.22 (Drug Enf’t Admin. July 24, 2009)). 
367. Perry County Food & Drug, 80 Fed. Reg. 70084, 70091 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Nov. 12, 2015). 
368. Id. at 70091 n.20.  The Agency added, in another footnote, that while it “decline[d] to 
overrule” Pettigrew, it found the reasoning in that decision to be “problematic” due to the weight given 
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Agency’s reasons for rejecting consideration of community impact evidence in 
cases involving prescribing practitioners apply with equal force to 
pharmacies,”369 and also discussed Owens, but faulted the Government for not 
addressing whether Pettigrew “remains viable as precedent,” and ultimately 
considered the evidence but found it unpersuasive.370   
The obvious contention between its statements that the reasons for rejecting 
consideration of community impact in prescribing practitioner cases “apply 
with equal force to pharmacies,”371 but that Pettigrew still “remains viable as 
precedent,”372 leaves significant ambiguity as to how community impact 
evidence will be considered by the Agency in future cases.  Analytically, the 
Agency now appears to be sending the message that underserved communities 
are not better served by prescriber practitioners who commit acts inconsistent 
with the public interest, but are still benefitted by pharmacy practitioners who 
commit acts inconsistent with the public interest.  If an inherent danger 
associated with all practitioners who commit acts that are inconsistent with the 
public interest is the potential for controlled substance diversion, it is 
challenging to distinguish why dangerous and powerful narcotics diverted due 
to pharmacies’ conduct are somehow more beneficial to underserved 
communities than those same drugs diverted due to prescribing doctors’ 
conduct.  Counsel on both sides of pharmacy litigation (and, perhaps, litigation 
involving manufactures or distributors) should remain prepared to provide and 
address community impact evidence.  By specifically declining to overrule 
Pettigrew, the Agency has left open the ability of pharmacy registrants to 
introduce community impact evidence and arguments, and conscientious 
Government counsel must now once again introduce evidence that the 
community impact of revoking (or not granting) registration is nominal when 
juxtaposed against the potential risks.  In addition to affecting pharmacy 
litigation, Perry County has potentially reopened the door for counsel on both 
sides of prescriber-registrant cases as well.  Counsel for prescribers should have 
their equal protection arguments at the ready, because the view that underserved 
communities are no more benefitted by drug-diverter-prescribers than those 
more affluent neighborhoods would seem to apply with equal analytical force 
 
to the community impact evidence, particularly given other evolving Agency case law since that 
decision was issued, including the addition of the requirement that the registrant/applicant 
acknowledge misconduct to rebut the Government’s prima facie case, as well as the Agency’s 
emphasis on candor.  Id. at 70092 n.23. 
371. Id. at 70091. 
370. Id. at 70092. 
371. Id. at 70091. 
372. Id. at 70092. 
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to drug-diverter-pharmacies, and the Government should be prepared to defend 
the continuing vitality of Owens and its progeny in the face of Perry County.   
G. The Sins of Our Relatives 
In Cove Inc., the Agency re-affirmed its longstanding willingness to 
negatively consider CSA violations committed by relatives in denying an 
application for registration.373  In Cove, the Agency denied a registration 
application because the applicant’s husband had previously “violated his [sic] 
corresponding responsibility and the CSA,” while employed by a formerly-
registered pharmacy.374  Interestingly, Cove represents another installment in 
an increasingly-expanding complement of cases where, notwithstanding the 
absence of exceptions filed by either side to the ALJ’s recommended decision, 
the Agency issued its own, contrary factual findings and legal conclusions.375  
In its final order, the Administrator “reject[ed] the ALJ’s conclusion that the 
links between the applicant and [her former registrant-employed husband] are 
sufficiently attenuated to conclude that he will exercise no influence or control 
over [r]espondent.”376   
This area of familial imputation basis for sanction remains available to 
Agency prosecutors contemplating the opposition of registration applications, 
and is an important concept for the bar to consider when providing advice to 
prospective registration holders. 
H. Ninety-Day Prescription Rule Narrowed? 
In Wesley Pope, M.D., the Agency addressed an argument made under one 
of its regulations that allows multiple controlled substance prescriptions to be 
issued simultaneously, and potentially narrowed the availability of that 
regulation as a defense for unwitting prescriber registrants.377  Under 
 
373. Cove Inc., 80 Fed. Reg. 29037, 29043 (Drug Enf’t Admin. May 20, 2015); see, e.g., City 
Drug Co., 64 Fed. Reg. 59212, 59214 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Nov. 2, 1999); Carriage Apothecary, Inc., 
52 Fed. Reg. 27599, 27599 (Drug Enf’t Admin. July 22, 1987); Monk’s Pharmacy, 52 Fed. Reg. 8988, 
8989 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Mar. 20, 1987); Unarex of Plymouth Road, 50 Fed. Reg. 6077, 6079 (Drug 
Enf’t Admin. Feb. 13, 1985); Lawson & Sons Pharmacy, 48 Fed. Reg. 16140, 16141 (Drug Enf’t 
Admin. Apr. 14, 1983); see also Terese, Inc., 76 Fed. Reg. 46843, 46845–47  (Drug Enf’t Admin. Aug. 
3, 2011) (showing that the Agency emphasized that the only reason it did not revoke based on the 
misconduct of the applicant’s husband was that the record did not adequately support violations of the 
CSA or state controlled substance laws on his part). 
374. Cove, 80 Fed. Reg. at 29041.  It is the pharmacy that is registered with the DEA, not the 
pharmacist.  21 U.S.C. §§ 802(21), 823(f) (2012).   
375. See id. at 29043. 
376. Id. 
377. Wesley Pope, M.D., 82 Fed. Reg. 14944, 14973 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Mar. 23, 2017). 
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longstanding DEA regulations, a prescriber registrant may issue multiple 
controlled substance prescriptions at one time that will provide controlled 
substances for up to a ninety-day period, provided that five conditions are 
met378: (1) “[e]ach separate prescription [must be] issued for a legitimate 
medical purpose by an individual practitioner acting in the usual course of 
professional practice;” (2) the prescriber must provide written instructions on 
each prescription to indicate the earliest date on which a pharmacy may fill each 
prescription; (3) the prescriber must conclude that providing multiple 
prescriptions “does not create an undue risk of diversion or abuse;” (4) state 
law must allow “[t]he issuance of multiple prescriptions as described” within 
the regulations; and (5) the prescriber must “compl[y] fully with all other 
applicable requirements” under the CSA, the regulations, and state law.379  
In Pope, a prescriber registrant took over care of a patient in a practice and 
saw the patient for three visits, each about two weeks apart,380 before the 
prescriber decided that the patient could “go into the three-month” schedule for 
his prescriptions.381  For the two months following that visit,382 the patient 
would request a new prescription when his prior thirty-day-supply ran out, a 
prescription monitoring program report would be obtained, the patient’s file 
would be pulled, and the prescription would be issued by the prescriber and left 
for the patient to pick up.383  The prescriber registrant argued that, under the 
regulation, he did not need to see the patient every month, and he could issue 
up to a 90-day-supply based on the visit at the beginning of the three months 
(and those visits that occurred prior).384  
 The Agency held that the ninety-day-supply regulation “does not provide 
a safe harbor”385 for the registrant, in part because the provision “contemplates 
the issuance of multiple prescriptions at one time,”386 so “it is not directly 
applicable” to the registrant’s situation,387 and in part because the 
Administrator, contrary to the ALJ’s findings, concluded that all of “the 
prescriptions [r]espondent issued at the three previous office visits were issued 
 
378. 21 C.F.R. § 1306.12(b) (2017). 
379. Id. § 1306.12(b)(i)–(v). 
380. Pope, 82 Fed. Reg. at 14954 (September 22, 2011 visit), 14956 (October 6, 2011 visit), 
14957 (October 20, 2011 visit). 
381. Id. at 14973 (quoting the prescriber’s testimony). 
382. Id. (November and December, 2011). 
383. Id.  
384. Id. 
385. Id. 
386. Id. at 14973 n.44. 
387. Id. 
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outside of the usual course of professional practice and lacked a legitimate 
medical purpose.”388  Thus, the Agency found that the regulation’s first 
condition—that “[e]ach separate prescription is issued for a legitimate medical 
purpose” by a prescriber “acting in the usual course of professional 
practice”389—was not met because the prescriber “acted outside of the usual 
course of professional practice and lacked a legitimate medical purpose in 
issuing the [controlled substance] prescriptions without requiring an office 
visit.”390  The Agency faulted the prescriber for not insisting upon an office 
visit, and for not considering two aberrant drug screens from several months 
prior to the prescriptions issued without an office visit, which the Agency said 
constituted a “fail[ure] to determine whether issuing the prescriptions created 
an undue risk of diversion.”391 
During a subsequent ninety-day time period, the prescriber registrant again 
saw the patient on day one of the ninety-day period, issued a thirty-day supply, 
and then issued new thirty-day-supply prescriptions for the two months that 
followed, without additional office visits.392  The Agency again held that there 
should have been an office visit each month and faulted the prescriber for not 
considering the same aberrant drug screens from over six months prior, also 
crediting the Government’s expert testimony that the prescriber “needed to 
obtain a consultation with a specialist in addiction.”393  In addition to the 
conduct that it deemed deficient to establish legitimate medical purpose at the 
visit on day one, the Agency also noted that, by the two later dates where the 
respondent wrote new prescriptions without an office visit—based on the idea 
that the first visit justified the subsequent ninety days of prescribing—the 
prescriber “likely had the results” of a drug screen obtained at the first visit, 
which it found to be aberrant.394  Had the prescriber issued all of the controlled 
substance prescriptions simultaneously at the initial visit, labeled appropriately 
to designate the earliest date on which each could be filled, and not seen the 
patient again for ninety days, the evidence of the aberrant drug screen that was 
used against him in regards to the two subsequent dates would not have been 
available to the Government to support a sanction. 
The implications for attorneys advising prescriber clients are not yet 
altogether clear, and Pope may signal potential adverse consequences to a 
 
388. Id. at 14973. 
389. 21 C.F.R. § 1306.12(b)(i) (2017). 
390. Pope, 82 Fed. Reg. at 14973. 
391. Id. 
392. Id. at 14958 (January 19, 2012 visit and prescriptions), 14960 (February 13, 2012 
prescriptions), 14961 (March 13, 2012 prescriptions). 
393. Id. at 14977. 
394. Id. at 14976. 
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prescriber registrant regardless of the prescriber’s choice of how to proceed.  
One choice is for the prescriber to issue all three prescriptions at a single visit, 
as the Agency says 21 C.F.R. § 1306.12(b) contemplates, in which case only 
that visit (and presumably only the circumstances known to the prescriber on 
that visit date) would be properly considered when evaluating the legality of all 
three prescriptions covering the subsequent ninety-day period.  While this 
choice seemingly insulates a prescriber from having negative circumstances 
that arise after the visit considered against him, if the Agency finds the first 
visit to be deficient then it will undoubtedly find all three prescriptions to be 
deficient.  Another choice is for the prescriber to issue only one prescription at 
the first visit, then issue two additional prescriptions at thirty-day intervals, 
without seeing the patient again.  But as the prescriber in Pope discovered, the 
Agency may find that an office visit should have occurred during the two latter 
months and will consider the lack of an office visit and any circumstances that 
arise between prescription issuances against the registrant.395  The third choice 
is for the prescriber to simply not avail himself of the ninety-day prescription 
option and write one prescription per visit per thirty days.  His patients may not 
appreciate having to return (and pay for a visit) so frequently, but he may be 
better situated to justify prescribing with records that correspond with each 
prescribing event date, unless, of course, those records are found to be 
insufficient.  If the prescriber chooses the last option and sees his patients every 
thirty days, it is unclear based on Pope whether the Agency might be amenable 
to his notes from visit day one potentially serving as a safety net for the 
subsequent two visits—such that the latter two visits are considered in the 
aggregate with visit one—since he could have issued all three prescriptions at 
visit one, anyway.  Clients will likely be asking whether seeing their patients 
and issuing prescriptions more frequently than once every ninety days 
demonstrates attention to their responsibilities, or whether it merely creates an 
enhanced source of adverse evidence available to the Government in 
enforcement proceedings, and they will almost certainly be asking why the 
DEA is in a superior position to dictate how frequently an office visit is required 
in connection with prescribing controlled substances.  
I. To Stay or Not to Stay 
Judson J. Somerville, M.D., a case involving no more than the relatively 
routine adjudication of a matter where the registrant lost his state authority,396 
 
395. See id. 
396. Judson J. Somerville, M.D., 82 Fed. Reg. 21408, 21409 & n.3 (Drug Enf’t Admin. May 8, 
2017). 
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morphed into another interesting final order.  In Somerville, the Agency re-
clarified its prior statement from Grider Drug #1 & Grider Drug #2, where the 
Agency had indicated that “a stay in administrative enforcement proceedings is 
‘unlikely ever to be justified’ due to ancillary proceedings involving the 
[r]espondent,”397 and sought to distinguish its prior precedent in Odette L. 
Campbell, M.D., wherein it granted lengthy stays of proceedings based on an 
ancillary criminal matter and an ancillary state board matter involving the 
respondent. 398   
The respondent in Somerville sought a stay of DEA administrative 
proceedings because state board proceedings—which had resulted in the 
summary suspension of his state controlled substance privileges and, in turn, 
the commencement of the DEA revocation action—were ongoing.399  The ALJ 
denied the respondent’s request for a stay of proceedings, citing the Agency’s 
prior statement in Grider #1 & #2 that stays are “‘unlikely to ever be justified’ 
due to ancillary proceedings,”400 but also citing Campbell as contrary 
authority.401 
The Agency did not dispute that it issued a lengthy stay for state 
administrative proceedings and federal criminal proceedings in Campbell, but 
explained that three features about the Campbell case made it “the rare case 
where withholding the issuance of a final decision was warranted”: (1) the 
Campbell case involved a DEA registration that had expired shortly after the 
evidentiary hearing, so it was an application case, rather than a revocation case; 
(2) the state criminal charges, which were brought shortly before the 
evidentiary hearing, could have resulted in an additional basis for sanction if 
the respondent had been convicted; and (3) the state administrative proceedings 
 
397. Somerville, 82 Fed. Reg. at 21409 n.3 (quoting Grider Drug #1 & Grider Drug #2, 77 Fed. 
Reg. 44070, 44104 n.97 (Drug Enf’t Admin. July 26, 2012)); see also Lawrence E. Stewart, M.D., 81 
Fed. Reg. 54822, 54827 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Aug. 17, 2016). 
398. Odette L. Campbell, M.D., 80 Fed. Reg. 41062, 41064 (Drug Enf’t Admin. July 14, 2015).  
While the Grider final order contains no specific dates or other indications as to when the 
Administrator issued specific stays or abeyance orders in the proceedings, it is worthy of note that the 
ALJ’s (second) recommended decision was issued on October 26, 2010 and the final order was issued 
nearly five years later, on July 14, 2015.  Id. at 41062.  The only dates referenced in the final order are 
an August 27, 2010 date where the state medical board initiated administrative proceedings, a “new 
formal complaint against [r]espondent” filed by the state medical board on September 19, 2014, and a 
March 27, 2013 pre-trial diversion agreement relating to the pending criminal matter.  Id. at 41063–
64. 
399. Somerville, 82 Fed. Reg. at 21408. 
400. Id. at 21409 n.3 (quoting Grider #1 & #2, 77 Fed. Reg. at 44014 n.97) (discussing ALJ 
decision). 
401. Id. (citing Campbell, 80 Fed. Reg. at 41062). 
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could have resulted in suspension or denial of her state license, and “denial of 
her application would have been required under the CSA.”402   
However, upon objective, comparative analysis of Campbell and 
Somerville, it is challenging to reconcile the sua sponte granting of the lengthy 
stay by the Administrator in Campbell from the denial of the stay sought in 
Somerville.  Under the Agency’s analysis in Grider #1 & #2, there is nothing 
facially apparent about proceedings that involve only an application, as 
opposed to a revocation, that would render a long stay more appealing, 
particularly when a registrant is effectively unable to conduct any regulated 
activity under the registrant’s existing DEA registration due to limitations on 
practice imposed at the state level.403  Similarly, the fact that the ancillary 
proceedings in Campbell could conceivably have raised additional grounds for 
sanction that had not been noticed in the present DEA proceedings, a potential 
that was not discussed but was also potentially present in Somerville and other 
cases where ancillary proceedings are ongoing, bears no readily apparent 
logical relationship to the wisdom of granting or denying a stay of proceedings.  
If the Agency can revoke based upon the grounds existing before a stay is 
requested, any additional grounds that ultimately arise will be superfluous; and 
alternatively, if additional grounds ultimately arise out of the ancillary matters, 
they can be charged against a respondent in future proceedings brought to 
revoke a registration or deny an application, if necessary.  While Somerville’s 
discussion of Campbell provided little clarity as to the Agency’s reasoning for 
granting stays in that case, it remains apparent that the Agency disfavors stays 
and is unlikely to grant lengthy stays as a matter of course. 
J. Summary Disposition and State Due Process 
In addition to the discussion regarding the imposition of a stay, another key 
aspect of Campbell also reared its head in the Somerville case.  In Campbell, 
the ALJ initially granted summary disposition, but the Agency remanded the 
matter back to the ALJ because “[o]n review, the Administrator noted that it 
appeared that under Texas law and regulations, [r]espondent was not entitled to 
a hearing before [the state board that suspended her controlled substance 
privileges] to challenge [the board’s] suspension or the denial of her application 
 
402. Id. (discussing Campbell, 80 Fed. Reg. at 41063). 
403. See Grider #1 & #2, 77 Fed. Reg. at 44104 n.97.  In Campbell, the Agency had issued an 
Immediate Suspension Order, so the practitioner could not have continued regulated activity during 
the pendency of administrative proceedings, even before her registration expired.  See Campbell, 80 
Fed. Reg. at 41063 n.3.  Thus, it cannot be that the Agency is worried about lengthy delays where the 
registrant maintains the ability to conduct authorized activity pursuant to his DEA registration. 
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for a new [state] registration.”404  Under Texas state law, Dr. Campbell was 
unequivocally deprived of the state authority required to handle controlled 
substances, but the lack of state authority was due to the issuance of the DEA 
immediate suspension order,405 creating an apparent circular problem for the 
Agency.  The Agency sent the case back to the ALJ for a determination as to 
whether the state “would provide [the respondent] with a hearing on the 
allegations,” and ruled that she would only be subject to summary disposition 
based on her lack of state authority if the state afforded her the ability to 
challenge the state board action (of suspending her based on the DEA ISO) at 
a state board hearing.406  Thus, the Administrator remanded the matter back to 
the ALJ to essentially conduct a due process analysis regarding Texas state 
law.407 
In Somerville, in contrast, although the respondent made the argument that 
the state board was acting in violation of Texas law by failing to provide him 
with an informal settlement conference or formal administrative proceedings 
within the time frame required under Texas law, the Agency adopted the ALJ’s 
summary disposition recommendation and cited another previously-issued final 
order,408 stating that the DEA “accepts as valid and lawful the actions of a state 
regulatory board unless that action is overturned by a state court . . . pursuant 
to state law.”409  Thus, while the Agency has indicated that it will not generally 
entertain a respondent’s allegations related to purported infirmities in state law 
and board proceedings as bases to withhold summary disposition,410 it has also 
signaled that, where the Agency believes that state proceedings do not measure 
up to some undefined DEA standard of due process, no summary disposition 
based on an absence of state authority will issue.411 
Given the limited authority of the Agency in enforcement adjudications,412 
litigators on both sides of the aisle can likely assume that the Agency will not 
lightly re-travel into adjudications which evaluate the legality of state licensing 
schemes, but both sides should be vigilant to brief the issue where there is a 
 




408. Judson J. Somerville, M.D., 82 Fed. Reg. 21408, 21409–10 (Drug Enf’t Admin. May 8, 
2017). 
409. Somerville, 82 Fed. Reg. at 21409–10 (alteration in original) (quoting Kamal Tiwari, M.D., 
76 Fed. Reg. 71604, 71607 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Nov. 18, 2011)). 
410. See id. at 21408–09. 
411. Id. 
412. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 274 (2006). 
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possibility that state due process does not measure up to the DEA’s standards 
with state law features similar to those Texas provisions that the DEA found 
violative of due process. 
K. Notice This, Consent to That 
The issue of notice and the related issue of litigation by consent have 
received some level of attention in recent Agency final orders, but still exist in 
some level of flux.  Admittedly, the Agency’s handling of notice under the APA 
in the past has not been marked with unwavering consistency,413 but more 
recent Agency precedent on the issue of notice bears a marked level of new 
potential dangers for practitioners on both sides of the litigation aisle.   
1. Notice Requirements 
The level and specificity of notice that the Agency is required to furnish 
those it seeks to sanction has been the subject of a fair amount of recent 
attention in Agency final orders.414  Inasmuch as the current state of what notice 
is required in DEA administrative proceedings is not entirely clear, a proper 
analysis is best commenced with an examination of the bedrock sources of 
authority that underpin the requirements.  The notice requirements that 
Congress placed on agency administrative practice under the APA are 
relatively modest.415  APA notice in this context requires only that “[p]ersons 
entitled to notice of an agency hearing shall be timely informed of—(1) the 
time, place, and nature of the hearing; (2) the legal authority and jurisdiction 
under which the hearing is to be held; and (3) the matters of fact and law 
asserted.”416  The Attorney General’s Manual on the APA provides that the 
APA notice requirement in this provision “is not required to set forth 
evidentiary facts or legal argument.  All that is necessary is to advise the parties 
of the legal and factual issues involved.”417 
 
413. Compare, e.g., Jose Raul S. Villavicencio, M.D., 80 Fed. Reg. 3624, 3630 (Drug Enf’t 
Admin. Jan. 23, 2015) (showing loss of state authority considered without notice), and Fiaz Afzal, 79 
Fed. Reg. 61651, 61655 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Oct. 14, 2014) (same), with Ideal Pharmacy Care, Inc., 
76 Fed. Reg. 51415, 51416 n.1 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Aug. 18, 2011) (showing loss of state authority 
not considered due to lack of Government notice). 
414. See, e.g., Farmacia Yani, 80 Fed. Reg. 29053, 29059 (Drug Enf’t Admin. May 20, 2015); 
Jana Marjenhoff, D.O., 80 Fed. Reg. 29067, 29068 (Drug Enf’t Admin. May 20, 2015). 
415. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 554(b) (2012). 
416. Id. 
417. TOM CLARK, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT (1947) § 5(a)(3), at 47 [hereinafter ATTORNEY GENERAL’S 
MANUAL]. 
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The notice requirements included in the DEA’s longstanding implementing 
regulations are similarly modest, providing only that “[t]he [OSC] 
shall . . . contain a statement of the legal basis for such hearing and for the 
denial, revocation, or suspension of registration and a summary of the matters 
of fact and law asserted.”418  In evaluating its obligations under the APA and 
its own regulations, the Agency, in some of its more vintage precedent, has long 
held that in DEA administrative proceedings, “the parameters of the hearing are 
determined by the prehearing statements.”419  While the Agency has previously 
embraced the principle that “[p]leadings in administrative proceedings are not 
judged by the standards applied to an indictment at common law,”420 and “[t]he 
rules governing DEA hearings do not require the formality of amending a show 
cause order to comply with the evidence,”421 some newer Agency precedent 
imposed what appears to be significantly tighter notice requirements on the 
Government.422   
In Farmacia Yani, for example, the Agency scolded its prosecutors because 
the charging document and prehearing statement did not include a citation to a 
particular regulation subsection, and the Agency addressed the issue by parsing 
each subsection, finding that no evidence was put forth under one subsection, 
and that another subsection did not apply to the facts of the case.423  The Agency 
then found that the conduct alleged violated an entirely different regulatory 
section, leaving the reader to ponder the purpose for the scolding.424  In another 
final order, Jana Marjenhoff, D.O., the Agency refused to allow the 
Government to rely on certain noticed conduct,425 which it found was “clearly 
 
418. 21 C.F.R. § 1301.37(c) (2017) (emphasis added). 
419. CBS Wholesale Distribs., 74 Fed. Reg. 36746, 36750 (Drug Enf’t Admin. July 24, 2009) 
(quoting Darrell Risner, D.M.D., P.S.C., 61 Fed. Reg. 728, 730 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Jan. 10, 1996)). 
420. Clair L. Pettinger, M.D., 78 Fed. Reg. 61591, 61596 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Oct. 3, 2013) 
(quoting Aloha Airlines, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 598 F.2d 250, 262 (D.C. Cir. 1979)). 
421. Id.; Roy E. Berkowitz, M.D., 74 Fed. Reg. 36758, 36759–60 (Drug Enf’t Admin. July 24, 
2009). 
422. Farmacia Yani, 80 Fed. Reg. 29053, 29053 n.1 (Drug Enf’t Admin. May 20, 2015). 
423. Id. at 29064 & n.28.  To the extent that the Agency found that the evidence supported a 
successful Government theory under any subsection, the message to the parties from the Agency 
appears to be that an allegation that does not specify the specific subsection will be rejected based on 
lack of adequate notice.  Discounting the improbable possibility that this aspect of the decision 
reflected some manner of gratuitous grousing at its prosecutors, where the Agency has determined that 
no subsection can be sustained as a factual matter, pointing out the absence of a specified subsection 
in the OSC would have little other utility in the final order. 
424. Id. 
425. Jana Marjenhoff, D.O., 80 Fed. Reg. 29067, 29068–69 (Drug Enf’t. Admin. May 20, 2015).  
The Agency found that the “[r]espondent clearly had notice that her conduct . . . would be at issue in 
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probative of [an] allegation [set forth in the OSC] that [the r]espondent engaged 
in obtaining controlled substances through fraud,”426 because it failed to specify 
that the conduct would be specifically considered under Factor Five.427  This 
was a somewhat eyebrow-raising development in view of Clair L. Pettinger, 
M.D., a final order issued two years earlier, wherein the Agency had indicated 
that the Government was not required to specify which Public Interest Factor 
noticed misconduct was to be considered under.428  Thus, without specifically 
saying as much, it appeared that the Agency was indicating either that it is not 
necessary to specify the public interest factor relied upon, unless it sought to 
rely on Factor Five, or saying (also without saying) that it was now increasing 
the notice requirements imposed on its prosecutors in administrative 
proceedings in general.  
Although it appeared after Marjenhoff that evidence to be considered under 
Factor Five, if not the other factors also, required particularly detailed notice, 
the Agency then issued Roberto Zayas, M.D.  In Zayas, upon its review of the 
respondent’s hearing testimony, the Agency determined that the respondent 
gave “false testimony” at his hearing in support of his actions (i.e., in presenting 
his defense) and held that “his provision of false testimony . . . constitutes 
actionable misconduct under Factor Five.”429  No notice, no problem.  So it thus 
appears that, under the Agency’s current precedent when considered as a whole, 
Factor Five allegations may require enhanced notice even when the conduct 
itself is alleged to be against the public interest generally, unless the 
Administrator decides, during the preparation of the final order, that the Agency 
does not believe the respondent’s explanation for his or her conduct, in which 
case the testimony—the provision of the respondent’s defense itself—will be 
deemed adverse conduct held against the respondent under Factor Five with no 
opportunity to respond at all beyond petition to the courts.430  Further 
confounding the issue, in Peter F. Kelly, D.P.M., the Agency considered 
conduct under Factor Five that was not noticed by the Government, based on 
 
the proceeding” because the Government provided the respondent with notice in its prehearing 
statement that it would elicit testimony from the pharmacist regarding the conduct.  Id. 
426. Id. at 29068. 
427. Id. at 29068–69. 
428. Clair L. Pettinger, M.D., 78 Fed. Reg. 61591, 61596 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Oct. 3, 2013). 
429. Roberto Zayas, M.D., 82 Fed. Reg. 21410, 21428 (Drug Enf’t Admin. May 8, 2017). 
430. While the ALJ’s recommended decision regarding the same testimony concluded that “it is 
clear that he made it up” and the respondent could have filed exceptions relating to that finding, the 
ALJ only considered the respondent’s testimony incredible, not as actionable misconduct, and 
therefore the respondent had no notice that his testimony would be considered against him under Factor 
Five.  See id. (discussing the ALJ’s characterization of the respondent’s testimony). 
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its assessment that “[n]otwithstanding that the Government did not cite Factor 
Five with reference to this allegation, [r]espondent clearly knew that his 
conduct . . . was at issue.”431  So the rule presently appears to be that notice of 
the specific factor the evidence is to be offered under is not important—unless 
the evidence is offered under Factor Five—unless the Agency says notice is not 
important there either.432 
Perhaps lending support to the old wisdom that continuously sawing off 
pieces of chair legs seldom leads to a more balanced chair, the Agency issued 
a lengthy final order in Wesley Pope M.D., in which it sought, inter alia, to 
clarify its position on both the administrative notice requirements and, 
relatedly, litigation by consent.433  In Pope, the Agency insisted that it has not 
tightened notice requirements, that it has not changed its litigation-by-consent 
requirements, and that any claims to the contrary are the unfortunate product of 
misreading its precedents.434  With regards to its view of notice, the Agency 
focused on Farmacia Yani and Marjenhoff, declaring that “[a] review of these 
[two] decisions shows . . . that the Agency has not ‘imposed an increased 
standard of notice’ but simply applied the extensive body of judicial precedent 
that addresses the adequacy of notice in administrative adjudication.”435  The 
presented explanation—that it has not increased notice standards, but has 
chosen to now apply what it describes as an “extensive body of judicial 
precedent”436 on the issue of notice—presents at least a risk of some level of 
 
431. Peter F. Kelly, D.P.M., 82 Fed. Reg. 28676, 28687 n.30 (Drug Enf’t Admin. June 23, 2017). 
432. See id. 
433. Wesley Pope, M.D., 82 Fed. Reg. 14944, 14946–48 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Mar. 23, 2017). 
434. Id. at 14946–47. 
435. Id. (footnote omitted). 
436. In NLRB v. I.W.G., Inc., one of the two cases that comprise the Agency’s “extensive body 
of judicial precedent,” the Tenth Circuit, in discussing the bounds of acceptable notice and whether 
one of the parties could be sanctioned where an administrative charging document was at variance with 
the findings, reaffirmed its long-held view that, “variation between an unfair labor practice charged in 
the complaint and one found by the [NLRB] does not deprive a respondent of due process where it is 
clear that the respondent ‘understood the issue and was afforded full opportunity to justify [its 
actions].’” 144 F.3d 685, 687 (10th Cir. 1998) (final alteration in original) (citations omitted).  The 
court clarified that, “[t]he introduction of evidence relevant to an issue already in the case may not be 
used to show consent to trial of a new issue absent a clear indication that the party who introduced the 
evidence was attempting to raise a new issue.”  Id. at 688 (quoting Conair Corp. v. NLRB, 721 F.2d 
1355, 1372 (D.C.Cir. 1983)).  In Pergament United Sales, Inc. v. NLRB, the other half of the “extensive 
body of judicial precedent” relied upon by the Agency, the court sustained NLRB’s charge, 
notwithstanding a variation that it characterized as “a minor distinction without significant legal 
consequences on the facts of th[e] case.”  920 F.2d 130, 135 (2d Cir. 1990).  Interestingly, the 
Pergament court focused on the second prong of the litigation-by-consent principle, to wit, whether 
the case had been fully and fairly litigated based on a review of the record.  The court instructed that 
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confusion.  It could potentially be viewed as incongruous to maintain that 
Agency notice requirements were indeed remaining static, while 
simultaneously announcing a sudden reliance on a body of judicial precedent 
(extensive or otherwise) to justify them.  Further, in contravention of the 
longstanding principle that “[t]he grounds upon which an administrative order 
must be judged are those upon which the record discloses that its action was 
based,”437 the Pope final order cites internal procedural filings by the parties in 
those cases that the bar and regulated community have no reasonable ability to 
review.438  Unavailable references cited in defense of otherwise-unexplainable 
shifts in Agency precedent risk the perception that the Agency is telling the 
practicing bar: ‘Move along, folks, nothing to see here.’ 
As already mentioned in greater detail,439 the Zayas final order, which came 
after Pope, held that “misconduct is misconduct” and that because “the inquiry 
focuses on protecting the public interest[,] what matters is the seriousness of 
the registrant’s or applicant’s misconduct.”440  Thus, it is unclear whether Yani, 
Marjenhoff, Pope, or some combination thereof currently represents the 
Agency’s view of required notice, as the Agency now appears to be of the view 
that it does not matter whether misconduct is considered under any, some, or 
all of the Public Interest Factors.  If specificity is vital as to all Public Interest 
Factors, to only Factor Five, or to none of the Public Interest Factors because 
“misconduct is misconduct,”441 it will be difficult to divine what the applicable 
notice requirements are in any reliable way.  Even with the help of a scorecard, 
managing litigation under this evolving notice standard will likely present 
challenges on both sides of the litigation aisle, and it is difficult to know 
whether another Agency order seeking to “clarify” this issue will help or saw a 
little more off another chair leg.  
Reliability in legal interpretation helps representatives on both sides of the 
aisle in providing advice and planning strategy.  The very real risk of the 
Agency’s current approach to notice is the inadvertent creation of a perception 
that the Agency may retroactively choose which Public Interest Factor(s) 
require increased notice scrutiny well after proceedings are completed.  The 
 
“whether a charge has been fully and fairly litigated is so peculiarly fact-bound as to make every case 
unique; a determination of whether there has been full and fair litigation must therefore be made on 
the record in each case.”  Id. at 136. 
437. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 87 (1943). 
438. Pope, 82 Fed. Reg. at 14946 n.4 (citing to hearing briefs in final order filed by the parties 
before the ALJ). 
439. See supra Section III.A.3. 
440. Roberto Zayas, M.D., 82 Fed. Reg. 21410, 21422 (Drug Enf’t Admin. May 8, 2017). 
441. Id. 
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absence of a consistently articulated approach carries the potential of 
complicating the business of formulating a coherent litigation strategy for both 
sides of the litigation equation.  Further, the Agency’s determination that a 
registrant’s testimony that is not found credible by the Administrator will 
constitute adverse conduct considered under Factor Five,442 bears potentially 
serious consequences for members of the bar advising clients about the wisdom 
of testifying, and also for the Government in assessing the investment 
appropriately devoted to cross examination.  Both sides of the litigation 
equation must be cognizant of these precedents in crafting hearing strategy, 
challenging and defending notice sufficiency, and presenting arguments in 
post-hearing submissions.  The status of the level of notice required in DEA 
administrative enforcement proceedings will likely be the subject of litigation, 
adjustment, and additional clarification in the future.   
2. Litigation by Consent 
The notice-related issue of litigation by consent also saw some attention in 
recent Agency precedent.  It has long been the case under Agency practice that 
a failure on the part of the Government to disclose an allegation in the OSC can 
be rectified if it discloses such allegation in its prehearing statements or 
“otherwise timely notifies a [r]espondent of its intent to litigate the issue.”443  
Moving a step further, the Agency explicitly embraced the concept of litigation 
by consent in its own administrative enforcement proceedings a few years ago 
in Grider Drug #1 & Grider Drug #2.444  There, the Agency announced that 
where the Government has failed to adequately notice its intent to litigate an 
issue, “the parties, in the absence of objection, can be deemed to have litigated” 
an unnoticed basis for sanction “by consent where they fully litigate the 
issue.”445  Thus, the two basic elements required for the application of the 
concept are: (1) lack of objection to insufficiently noticed misconduct; and (2) 
a full litigation of the issue in question.446   
In further refinement of its litigation-by-consent adoption, the Agency 
issued Cove Inc., a case where the ALJ recommended that certain evidence be 
considered against the respondent as a materially false statement.447  
 
442. Id. at 21428. 
443. E.g., CBS Wholesale Distribs., 74 Fed. Reg. 36746, 36750 (Drug Enf’t Admin. July 24, 
2009). 
444. Grider Drug #1 & Grider Drug #2, 77 Fed. Reg. 44070, 44077 n.23 (Drug Enf’t Admin. 
July 26, 2012). 
445. Id. 
446. See id. 
447. Cove Inc., 80 Fed. Reg. 29037, 29039 (Drug Enf’t Admin. May 20, 2015). 
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Notwithstanding the absence of any objection by the respondent to either the 
introduction of the evidence at the hearing or the ALJ’s consideration of it as a 
materially false statement in his recommended decision, the Agency rejected 
the ALJ’s recommendation, citing inadequate notice of the allegation, and 
further held that a litigation-by-consent theory was unavailable to the 
Government because it did not pursue that position in its closing brief or its 
exceptions to the ALJ’s decision.448  Shortly thereafter, in Odette L. Campbell, 
M.D., the ALJ declined to consider certain evidence because the Government 
did not provide notice of the evidence.449  Even though, once again, there was 
no corresponding respondent objection to the ALJ’s analysis of the evidence in 
Campbell, the Agency again held that the Government waived its ability to rely 
on litigation by consent because it did not raise the theory in exceptions to the 
ALJ’s decision.450  The Agency recently sought to clarify Campbell in Pope, 
noting that, in Pope, the day was saved for the Government by raising litigation 
by consent, not before the ALJ, but in its exceptions.451   
Cove and Campbell were particularly remarkable notice cases in that the 
respondents in those cases did not interpose a claim of unfair surprise regarding 
the issues the Agency ultimately refused to consider based on lack of adequate 
notice.452  Even where neither side interposed any objection or raised issues 
regarding surprise, prejudice, or even a mistake, the Agency took it upon itself 
to issue lengthy final orders in those cases, addressing self-identified legal 
topics453—a sort of law review article within an adjudication.  These were cases 
where the Agency decided to hold the Government’s level of notice to be 
inadequate, noted its own prior willingness to embrace litigation by consent, 
and then ruled out litigation by consent because the Government (who never 
had the opportunity to field a notice objection from the respondents at the 
hearing) did not seek to pursue this theory (which it could not have known it 
 
448. Id. 
449. Odette L. Campbell, M.D., 80 Fed. Reg. 41062, 41062 n.2 (Drug Enf’t Admin. July 14, 
2015). 
450. Id. 
451. Wesley Pope, M.D., 82 Fed. Reg. 14944, 14947 n.5 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Mar. 23, 2017). 
Interestingly, as a procedural matter, where both parties have filed exceptions and one side raises 
litigation by consent for the first time in filed exceptions, no means exist under the regulations for the 
opposing party to object or argue contrary law.  21 C.F.R. § 1316.66(c) (2017) (“[E]ach party shall be 
entitled to only one filing . . . [;] that is, either a set of exceptions or a response thereto.”). 
452. Campbell, 80 Fed. Reg. at 41063 (showing that only the Government filed an exception to 
the recommended decision); Cove, 80 Fed. Reg. at 29037 (showing that neither side filed any 
exceptions to the recommended decision). 
453. See Campbell, 80 Fed. Reg. 41062; Cove, 80 Fed. Reg. 29037. 
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would have needed) in its closing brief or exceptions.454  Pursuit of unraised 
issues by the Agency is at some variance with the adjudicative approach 
embraced by the courts.  While in reviewing trial court proceedings, the federal 
circuit courts of appeal are precluded, in the absence of plain and prejudicial 
error, from considering errors and defects,455 the Agency’s current approach to 
litigation by consent and other issues has expanded its reach to expound upon 
unraised issues of legal interest on a sua sponte basis. 
Theoretically, escalation of notice requirements, coupled with a more 
robust application of litigation by consent, could result in something of a wash, 
although it does carry the prospect of some level of confusion for those engaged 
in the Agency’s administrative litigation.  It could be argued that the Agency’s 
current approach places the primary analytical emphasis in litigation by consent 
cases on the absence of objection and mere introduction of evidence, rather than 
whether the record makes it “clear that the respondent ‘understood the issue 
and was afforded full opportunity to justify [its actions]’”456 and whether there 
was “a clear indication that the party who introduced the evidence was 
attempting to raise a new issue.”457  If subsequent final orders maintain the same 
trajectory, this approach could prove unwieldy to both sides of the litigation 
equation, and may be challenging for the Agency to defend on appeal. 
3. Notice and Lack of State Authority 
Supporters and detractors of the current Agency view on the issue likely 
found much to be surprised about regarding the Agency’s handling of notice as 
it applies (or does not apply) to cases where a registrant lacks state controlled 
substance authority.  All other Agency analysis tendered on the issue of notice 
metaphorically goes out the window with lack of state authority cases.  Previous 
precedents of the Agency have sometimes considered lack of state authority 
against a registrant without prior notice,458 and at other times have declined to 
consider lack of state authority due to lack of notice.459  It is on this backdrop 
 
454. While the Government might have been able to pursue the litigation-by-consent theory in 
Campbell because the ALJ declined to consider the evidence, it would not have known of the need for 
a litigation-by-consent theory in Cove until after the Agency’s final order. 
455. Fed. R. Crim. P. 52; Fed R. Civ. P. 61; see O’Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 441 (1995) 
(suggesting that the civil and criminal harmless error standards are the same). 
456. NLRB v. I.W.G., Inc., 144 F.3d 685, 687 (10th Cir. 1998) (alteration in original) 
(citations omitted). 
457. Id. at 688 (citations omitted). 
458. E.g., Jose Raul S. Villavicencio, M.D., 80 Fed. Reg. 3624, 3630 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Jan. 
23, 2015); Fiaz Afzal, 79 Fed. Reg. 61651, 61655 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Oct. 14, 2014). 
459. Ideal Pharmacy Care, Inc., 76 Fed. Reg. 51415, 51416 n.1 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Aug. 18, 
2011). 
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that the Agency issued Hatem Ataya, M.D., wherein, over Government 
objection based on lack of notice to the registrant,460 the Agency definitively 
announced that “[b]ecause the possession of state authority is a prerequisite for 
obtaining a registration and for maintaining a registration, the issue [of no state 
authority] can be raised sua sponte even [during the preparation of the Agency 
final order].”461  Thus, the Agency unequivocally declared that, not only did it 
possess the authority to issue conclusive findings and issue sanctions based on 
lack of state authority without any prior notice to either party, but it can also 
(and presumably will continue to) do so on its own motion.462   
The Agency’s approach in Ataya creates an intriguing dynamic and an 
engaging ethical decision point for Agency prosecutors.  If an Agency 
prosecutor is aware that a respondent no longer possesses the state authority 
required to maintain a registration, but intentionally declines to include that 
ground among the bases for sanction charged in the OSC, the respondent will 
have no ability to challenge, meet, or even address that ground at a due process 
hearing.  Thus, it now ironically stands as a basis for sanction that can 
theoretically be insulated from challenge by declining to charge it.  ALJs’ 
authority in enforcement matters extends only to matters charged by the 
Agency that are the subject of a timely request for hearing,463 and so, in cases 
where the Government has not alleged or introduced evidence on the issue of 
lack of state authority, evidence offered by the respondent regarding that issue 
at an administrative hearing could correctly be viewed as beyond the scope of 
the hearing, notwithstanding its conclusive post-hearing impact when the 
Agency renders its final order.  Inasmuch as the Agency has indicated its 
amenability to taking up the matter sua sponte,464 and, as discussed in greater 
detail below,465 has increasingly engaged in the process of having the 
Administrator’s adjudication staff check state board websites to determine state 
 
460. Hatem M. Ataya, M.D., 81 Fed. Reg. 8221, 8244 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Feb. 18, 2016).  In 
its order, the Agency specifically criticizes the DEA prosecutor’s notice position as being 
“fundamentally inconsistent with the position [the Government] ha[d] taken in numerous cases” where 
OSCs had been issued.  Id.  The final order acknowledges that Agency prosecutors had argued that 
considering lack of state authority where it had not been noticed “could arguably upend basic 
protections afforded to DEA registrants and would surely diminish the perceived fairness of 
the . . . administrative process.”  Id. (alteration in original).  The Administrator was unconvinced by 
the due process arguments the prosecutor advanced on behalf of this respondent in particular and the 
regulated community in general.  See id.   
461. Id. 
462. See id. 
463. 21 C.F.R. §§ 1301.42–43, 1316.47(a), 1301.52 (2017). 
464. Ataya, 81 Fed. Reg. at 8244 n.55. 
465. See supra Section III.L.6. 
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licensure status,466 from a purely tactical standpoint, there is little advantage for 
Government counsel to raise the issue during the respondent’s due process 
administrative hearing.  To the extent that the Agency increasingly relies on 
state board websites, the nuances of which Agency staff may not be familiar 
with, respondents lose the ability to defend against the legal and factual call 
that state authority has been compromised, or completely abrogated.467  Thus, 
the Agency, through its precedent, has arguably created a situation that 
precludes a respondent who has timely requested a hearing from defending 
against a ground of sanction that the Agency has determined to be conclusive. 
The litigation takeaway here is that, where lack of state authority is raised 
by the facts within their knowledge, Government prosecutors must decide 
whether, as a matter of fairness, to charge lack of state authority in the OSC.  
Where it is alleged as a basis for sanction, the respondent can challenge the law 
and evidence to defend against the charge.  Even where it is not alleged as a 
basis for sanction, respondent’s counsel may wish to introduce evidence on the 
matter if the status of a client’s state authority is at all questionable, because the 
Agency has made it clear that its adjudicative staff will search applicable state 
websites, and accept post-hearing filings regarding a lack of state authority.   
Beyond state authority, both parties should closely examine both noticed 
and unnoticed evidence at the conclusion of a hearing for possible use in pursuit 
of a sanction, and both counsel should evaluate multiple permutations of 
evidence (particularly those which were the subject of defective notice) for a 
potential post-hearing Government litigation-by-consent request.  The failure 
to do so could well result in a surprise in the Agency’s final order,468 though it 
could be a welcome or unwelcome surprise, depending on where counsel sits 
in the ligation equation.  Even in the absence of a hearing objection, assignment 
of error in a post-hearing brief, or in the absence of exceptions filed by either 
side, both parties need to consider whether the Agency will potentially preclude 
admitted evidence or findings during the preparation of the final order.  
Contrariwise, if a registrant or applicant stands at any risk of an interruption of 
state controlled substance authority, the parties’ election to brief or ignore 
evidence may have little impact on the outcome. 
L. Proceedings 
While much of the discussion regarding changes in Agency precedent has 
focused on the law to be applied by the ALJ and, ultimately, the Agency in its 
 
466. See, e.g., Steven Bernhard, D.O., 82 Fed. Reg. 23298, 23299 (Drug Enf’t Admin. May 22, 
2017); David D. Moon, D.O., 82 Fed. Reg. 19385, 19387 n.5 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Apr. 27, 2017). 
467. See supra Section III.L.6. 
468. See, e.g., Ataya, 81 Fed. Reg. 8221. 
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final orders, there have also been a host of developments related to the hearing 
proceedings themselves.   
1. Regulation by Adjudication 
The fact that the Agency’s rudimentary hearing regulations exist today 
substantially as they did when first promulgated over four decades ago tends to 
magnify the significance of the increasingly ubiquitous procedural edicts that 
the Agency disseminates through adjudication final orders.  To be sure, the 
concept of creating procedural and substantive rules through adjudication, in 
lieu of notice and comment regulation promulgation under the APA,469 can 
present a dubious strategy where the regulated community, the bar, and the 
public are deprived of the ability to supply input.  But even more 
fundamentally, the APA’s adjudication apparatus was not designed by 
Congress to replace promulgated regulations, is not well suited for doing so, 
and carries the very real dangers of inconsistency and confusion.  Adjudications 
are designed to resolve conflicts between two parties, not set policy and 
procedure for an agency and an enormous regulated community.  Beyond the 
tension created between the Agency’s practice in this regard and the APA, there 
are powerful practical considerations that militate against this approach.   
It is well settled that “‘when Congress has not specified the level of 
specificity expected of [an] agency’ . . . ‘the agency is entitled to broad 
deference in picking the suitable level.’”470  The APA “does not require that all 
the specific applications of a rule evolve by further, more precise rules rather 
than by adjudication.”471  Federal agencies are “‘not precluded from 
announcing new principles in an adjudication proceeding’ . . . .  Rather, ‘the 
choice between rulemaking and adjudication lies in the first instance within the 
[agency’s] discretion.’”472  That said, an agency’s authority to issue principles 
through rulemaking is by no means absolute.  An action that results in a 
substantive change to (or abandonment of) an existing rule must proceed 
through the APA’s notice and comment procedure.473  While agencies are not 
 
469. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012). 
470. Shays v. FEC, 528 F.3d 914, 930 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting Cement Kiln Recycling Coal. 
v. EPA, 493 F.3d 207, 217 (D.C. Cir. 2007)). 
471. Shalala v. Guernsey Mem’l Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 96 (1995). 
472. Cassell v. FCC, 154 F.3d 478, 486 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (alterations in original) (quoting NLRB 
v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 294 (1974)); see also Kansas Gas & Elec. Co. v. FERC, 758 F.2d 
713, 719 (D.C. Cir 1985) (“[I]t is . . . beyond dispute that an agency may articulate its general policy 
in a particular proceeding . . . rather than in a rulemaking.”). 
473. U.S. Telecom Ass’n. v. FCC, 400 F.3d 29, 34 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Appalachian Power Co. v. 
EPA, 208 F.3d 1015, 1028 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
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permitted to “slip by the notice and comment rule-making requirements needed 
to amend a rule by merely adopting a de facto amendment to its regulation 
through adjudication,” where a genuine ambiguity exists, the courts will permit 
the resolution of the issue through an adjudication.474  However, unless and 
until an existing regulation (irrespective of its value) is amended or repealed, it 
continues to carry the force of law, and may not be modified by an agency 
adjudication.475  A critical factor in ascertaining whether an existing regulation 
binds the agency’s action will be whether the subsequent principle in question 
that has been delivered by the Agency “spells out a duty fairly encompassed 
within the regulation that the interpretation purports to construe.”476  Thus, it is 
beyond argument that where a regulation contains some level of ambiguity or 
flexibility, the courts will endure some level of agency clarification of its legal 
interpretation through an adjudication where warranted.477   
In Peter F. Kelly, D.P.M., the Agency blatantly announced that it was 
creating several new duties upon prescribing registrants under very specific 
circumstances with precise obligations.478  The language chosen by the Agency 
in its final order left no reasonable doubt that the intent was to create new duties 
upon registrants and anticipated sanctions for those who run afoul of those 
requirements in the future.  In his final order, the Administrator stated: 
I now hold that where a registrant is provided with credible 
information that his state prescribing authority is being used to 
divert a state-controlled (but not federally-controlled) drug, 
such information triggers the duty to investigate whether his 
DEA registration is also being used to divert federally 
controlled substances.  However, as this is a new and 
additional duty beyond that which was announced in [a 
previous final order], which applies only to a practitioner’s 
receipt of information that his DEA registration is being 
misused, I conclude that it cannot be retroactively imposed on 
[r]espondent.479 
Regarding the Agency’s intention to impose a new, actionable standard 
upon the regulated community, the Administrator’s language that “this is a new 
 
474. Marseilles Land and Water Co. v. FERC, 345 F.3d 916, 920 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
475. Tunik v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 407 F.3d 1326, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing United States 
v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 695–96 (1974)); see also Nat’l Family Planning and Reprod. Health Ass’n v. 
Sullivan, 979 F.2d 227, 234 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (to same effect). 
476. Air Transp. Ass’n of Am. v. FAA, 291 F.3d 49, 55–56 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (quoting Paralyzed 
Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena, L.P., 117 F.3d 579, 588 (D.C. Cir. 1997)). 
477. See Marseilles Land and Water Co., 345 F.3d at 920. 
478. Peter F. Kelly, D.P.M., 82 Fed. Reg. 28676, 28685–86 (Drug Enf’t Admin. June 23, 2017). 
479. Id. at 28686 (emphasis added). 
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and additional duty”480 leaves precious little to the imagination.  The Agency 
“now hold[s]” that it has created this new duty, and concedes (as it must) that 
based on the fact that this “new and additional duty”481 has been spawned in an 
adjudication, due process precludes a sanction in the same case.482   
The Kelly final order also creates other new obligations on the part of 
registrants, wherein the Administrator rendered the following announcement: 
[W]here a practitioner receives credible information that 
fraudulent prescriptions under his name are being presented for 
state but not federally-controlled drugs, and the state 
[prescription monitoring program] permits a practitioner to 
obtain information as to his controlled substance prescribings 
[sic], that practitioner has a duty to obtain that information and 
to determine whether unlawful prescriptions for federally 
controlled substances are also being dispensed under his 
registration.  Moreover, even if state law does not authorize a 
practitioner to obtain a [prescription monitoring program] 
report of the dispensings [sic] which have been attributed to 
him, a practitioner is obligated to obtain that information from 
a pharmacy that reports a fraudulent prescription to him.  If 
information obtained from either the [prescription monitoring 
program] or a pharmacy shows that one’s registration is being 
misused, a registrant must report that information to the DEA 
(as well as local law enforcement authorities) even if the 
practitioner concludes that no employee or agent is involved in 
the misuse of his registration.  A practitioner is not excused 
from this duty because others, who also have responsibilities 
to investigate, such as law enforcement officers and 
pharmacists, failed to carry out those responsibilities.483 
By dropping new duties unceremoniously in the midst of an adjudication, 
the Agency is spared the laborious tasks of publishing its now-established new 
registrant duties in the Federal Register, explaining and defending its actions in 
annotated commentary, and having to address potentially disquieting comments 
from the public, including the regulated community.  Likewise, the Agency is 
spared the arduous internal approval process attendant upon promulgation, 
including review of those in the executive branch charged with evaluating the 
possbility for potential responsive congressional action.  Under this approach, 
those arduous undertakings are supplanted by the more efficient act of placing 





483. Id. (footnote with an additional new duty omitted). 
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Although this streamlined approach to rulemaking may present obvious 
time and effort dividends for the Agency, it is likely that the view from the 
regulated community may not be as supportive.  Even accepting the Agency’s 
oft-quoted position that controlled substance registrants operate in a highly-
regulated activity,484 it strains credulity and every reasonable common-sense-
based expectation to assume that busy practitioners will be regularly pouring 
over obscure (and increasingly lengthy and esoteric) Agency final orders to 
divine the latest outpouring of extra-regulatory obligations upon which 
continuation of their registration (and often their livelihood) depends.  Busy 
practitioners possess neither the legal acumen to understand the Agency’s 
increasingly legalistic and nuanced final orders, nor the resources to maintain a 
specialized cadre of regulatory attorneys devoted to perpetually scouring the 
Federal Register to locate and explain new duties conjured up by the latest 
Agency adjudication(s).  To require knowledge of, and compliance with, the 
applicable regulations should be enough.  Regulations require publication, 
notice, and comment from the public,485 which is often a messy process.  That 
said, there have arguably been more procedural and substantive developments 
effected by DEA final orders through adjudications in the last few years than at 
any other time during the Agency’s existence.   
These concerns notwithstanding, in Masters Pharmaceutical, Inc. v. DEA,  
the court was unpersuaded by the distributor respondent’s contention that the 
Agency’s imposition of a high volume of new duties imposed on distributors 
through adjudication was impermissible, holding that the extensive list of extra-
regulatory obligations were not new duties at all, but merely an “expla[nation 
of] what a distributor in [the respondent’s] position must do” when it elects to 
fill an order instead of declining to do so and filing a suspicious order report 
with the DEA.486  The explicit nature in which the Agency unambiguously 
explained the creation of numerous new obligations in Kelly provides an 
enlightening window into the Agency’s actual objectives in this approach and 
arguably stands in some tension with the Masters holding. 
2. Representations by Counsel 
From the very outset of the most rudimentary litigation at common law, 
conventions have developed between the litigants that have given rise to 
expectations and the orderly development of issues in virtually every manner 
of forum where issues are contested.  One of the most basic tenets of any 
 
484. E.g., Keith Ky Ly, D.O., 80 Fed. Reg. 29025, 29037 n.36 (Drug Enf’t Admin. May 20, 
2015). 
485. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2012). 
486. Masters Pharm., Inc. v. DEA, 861 F. 3d 206, 222 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
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litigation is the right of a party on either side to rely on the representations made 
by opposing counsel.  The courts have long recognized the principle that the 
representatives of a party can render binding admissions in a forum.  The 
principle has been succinctly articulated as follows: 
 A judicial admission is usually treated as absolutely 
binding, but such admissions go to matters of fact which, 
otherwise, would require evidentiary proof.  They serve a 
highly useful purpose in dispensing with proof of formal 
matters and of facts about which there is no real dispute.  Once 
made, the subject matter ought not to be reopened in the 
absence of a showing of exceptional circumstances, but a 
court, unquestionably, has the right to relieve a party of his 
judicial admission if it appears that the admitted fact is clearly 
untrue and that the party was laboring under a mistake when 
he made the admission.487 
Despite the history and practice of both sides relying on concessions of 
counsel in contested litigation, the Agency recently indicated its unwillingness 
to find itself bound by the concessions of its own prosecutors.  In Perry County 
Food & Drug, Government counsel conceded the timeliness of the respondent’s 
registration renewal application, but the Administrator, in the Agency’s final 
order, and without substantive analysis, disregarded that concession with the 
dismissive explanation, in a footnote, that “[i]n this matter, I am not bound by 
the Government’s agreement not to contest the timeliness of [r]espondent’s 
renewal application.”488  The impact of this sua sponte ruling is magnified even 
further by the fact that at no time did the Government even ask to be relieved 
of its concession,489 and at no time prior to the issuance of the final order did 
the respondent have any inkling that the once-settled factual issue was not only 
in play, but would be summarily decided to its detriment at a level where it had 
no notice or opportunity for input.490  Irrespective of the relative merits of the 
Agency’s apparent disregard of the time-honored litigation convention of 
honoring concessions made by the representatives of the parties, it is presently 
unclear whether any concession or stipulation tendered by DEA counsel can be 
afforded any weight by conscientious opposing counsel.  The effect of this 
potentially significant procedural sea change is yet to be determined, but 
Government counsel must consider whether and to what extent they are 
authorized to concede any point, and respondents’ counsel must be wary of 
 
487. New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Waller, 323 F.2d 20, 24 (4th Cir. 1963). 
488. Perry County Food & Drug, 80 Fed. Reg. 70084, 70089 n.17 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Nov. 12, 
2015). 
489. Id. 
490. See id. 
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accepting any proposed concession stipulation offered by Agency counsel, lest 
the agreement be disregarded and found against their clients on review by the 
Administrator. 
3. Requested Hearings, Subsequent Waivers, and Statements of Position 
Among the more remarkable procedural cases recently issued by the 
Agency is Edge Pharmacy.491  In Edge, the respondent pharmacy timely 
requested a hearing through counsel, but subsequent counsel agreed to waive a 
hearing so long as his client was afforded the ability to submit a statement of 
position.492  As designed, everyone associated with the litigation equation 
appeared to benefit.  By electing to proceed in that manner, the expenses 
associated with conducting a contested hearing could be avoided, the Agency 
would avoid the risks inherent in contested litigation and could seek a favorable 
final order based on evidence virtually impervious to objection, and the 
pharmacy would secure the modest ability to file its position on paper.  While 
it may have appeared to even an experienced observer that nothing could 
possibly go wrong, what actually resulted was continued and protracted 
litigation, which was managed, not by the ALJ, but by the Administrator and 
his staff.  In the course of its review, the Agency reversed the ALJ’s 
discretionary decision to allow the pharmacy respondent to file a statement of 
position along with its waiver of the hearing that it had previously requested.493   
In Edge, the respondent pharmacy’s counsel sought,494 and the ALJ 
granted, additional time to file a statement of position that was to accompany 
his client’s hearing waiver.495  While the ALJ found that there was good cause 
to extend the respondent’s ability to respond to the OSC and accepted the 
statement on behalf of the Agency (along with the hearing waiver), the 
Agency’s final order held that the demonstration of good cause by the 
respondent’s counsel was insufficient.496  Thus, the only part of the equation 
that the Agency deemed worthy of keeping intact was the waiver of the 
 
491. Edge Pharmacy, 81 Fed. Reg. 72092 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Oct. 19, 2016). 
492. Id. at 72094. 
493. Id. at 72098–99, 72098 n.10 (noting that the respondent could have, but did not, seek an 
extension of time under 21 C.F.R. § 1316.47(b)).  But see 21 C.F.R. §§ 1309.53(b), 1316.47(b) (2017).  
494. While the Agency’s order states that the respondent “never requested an extension of time 
to file its written statement,” Edge Pharmacy, 81 Fed. Reg. at 72098, it also acknowledges that the 
respondent “filed a pleading in which [it] waived its right to a hearing while seeking leave to file a 
written statement.”  Id. at 72094. 
495. Id. at 72098. 
496. Id. at 72097–98. 
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respondent-pharmacy’s hearing rights.497  The Agency went further, and held 
that on these facts, notwithstanding the fact that the pharmacy was permitted 
by the ALJ to submit a statement of position, it had (contrary to what it believed 
it had agreed) “waived its right to submit any evidence in refutation of the 
Government’s case.”498  The practical result here was that the respondent’s 
counsel (and perforce the hapless pharmacy respondent) was, in effect, the 
victim of a bait and switch; the respondent’s tactical decision to waive a hearing 
was no doubt informed by the ALJ’s ruling that its position would be contained 
in a statement of position available to the Agency to review in making its final 
determination,499 and only after it had done so was it informed that its position 
statement would not, in fact, be considered.500  But the waiver of the pharmacy’s 
hearing rights stood firm.501 
The Agency’s narrow reading502 of the amount of discretion afforded to the 
ALJ in permitting the untimely filed position statement under the regulations503 
thus resulted in the Agency essentially refusing to engage in the arguably 
modest exercise of merely considering the respondent’s position in the 
preparation of the final order.504  So, the respondent was at once without the 
ability to have affirmatively raised any and all issues,505 and at the same time it 
made a bona fides tender of its legal analysis to the Agency so that the final 
order could address any potential bases for appeal raised therein;506 essentially 
a legal double whammy.  To make matters worse, lending credibility to the old 
adage that “no good deed shall go unpunished,” this legal double whammy was 
 
497. See id. at 72108. 
498. Id. at 72098. 
499. Id. at 72094. 
500. Id. at 72113. 
501. Id. at 72098. 
502. Interestingly, the Agency’s restrictive interpretation of the ALJ’s authority under 21 C.F.R. 
§ 1316.47(b) in this case arguably stands in some level of tension with a more broad interpretation of 
the ALJ’s authority in its recent holding in John P. Moore, III, M.D., 82 Fed. Reg. 10398 (Drug Enf’t 
Admin. Feb. 10, 2017).  In Moore, the Agency held that “where an ALJ receives an untimely hearing 
request it is within [the ALJ’s] authority to conduct such proceedings as are necessary to determine 
whether the respondent has established good cause[]” and that this authority (nowhere set forth in the 
text of the regulation) continues until “the Government submits a request for final agency action to 
[the Administrator.]”  Id. at 10399 n.2 (first alteration in original) (citation omitted).  Thus, at this 
juncture, it would be difficult to prognosticate whether the Agency is moving toward a more broad or 
more restrictive interpretation of the ALJ’s authority under § 1316.41(b). 
503. 21 C.F.R. § 1316.47(b). 
504. See Edge Pharmacy, 81 Fed. Reg. at 72113–14. 
505. Id. at 72099. 
506. Id. at 72097. 
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inflicted upon the respondent based on its offer to save the Agency the expense 
and risks associated with proving its allegations at a hearing.507 
In an unprecedented procedural environment, the Agency, after refusing to 
consider the respondent pharmacy’s statement of position, issued a series of 
orders directing briefings on various legal issues, including “whether . . . the 
ALJ had authority to admit [the pharmacy’s] [s]tatement of [p]osition[,]”508 and 
whether the Agency should allow the pharmacy to withdraw its renewal 
application;509 both of which were (predictably) answered in the negative.510  
To put this in context, the registrant’s counsel, who conveyed his client’s 
hearing waiver, was directed to brief the issue of whether the condition that was 
accepted by the Agency’s own ALJ was lawful, and whether his client should 
be permitted to withdraw the renewal application it submitted as part of its 
hearing request on the revocation action.511 
4. Administrator’s Staff as Pseudo-ALJs 
The procedural dynamic in an increasing number of Agency final orders 
merits particular attention.  The structure Congress crafted into the APA, 
coupled with the complimentary structure laced into the DEA’s own 
regulations, provides a dichotomy of functions created to ensure a just result 
and an appearance of fairness.512  The APA provides federal agencies with the 
authority to hire and assign cases to ALJs, but places unalterable duties and 
bright-line restrictions on the individuals who hold those positions.513   
The APA provides ALJs presiding at hearings with the authority and 
responsibility over specified enumerated powers, to wit:  
(1) [to] administer oaths and affirmations;  
(2) [to] issue subp[o]enas authorized by law;  
(3) [to] rule on offers of proof and receive relevant evidence; 
(4) [to] take depositions or have depositions taken when the 
ends of justice would be served;  
(5) [to] regulate the course of the hearing;  
(6) [to] hold conferences for the settlement or simplification of 
the issues by consent of the parties or by the use of alternative 
 
507. Id. at 72094. 
508. Id. at 72095. 
509. Id. at 72102. 
510. See id. at 72095, 72102. 
511. See id. at 72095. 
512. Compare Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 556 (2012), with 21 C.F.R. § 1316.52 
(2017). 
513. 5 U.S.C. §§ 556, 3105. 
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means of dispute resolution . . . ;  
(7) [to] inform the parties as the to the availability of one or 
more alternative means of dispute resolution, and encourage 
the use of such methods;  
(8) [to] require the attendance at any conference held . . . ;  
(9) [to] dispose of procedural requests or similar matters;  
(10) [to] make or recommend decisions . . . ;  
(11) [to] take other action authorized by agency rule consistent 
with [the APA].514   
A federal “agency is without power to withhold such powers from its 
[ALJ]s.”515 
The DEA regulations unequivocally direct that DEA ALJs “shall have the 
duty to conduct a fair hearing, to take all necessary action to avoid delay, and 
to maintain order.”516  The Agency regulations also supply DEA ALJs with 
their own set of exclusively-held, enumerated powers, some of which overlap 
with those of the APA.517  The regulations provide that DEA ALJs 
shall have all powers necessary to . . . [avoid delay and 
maintain order], including (but not limited to) the power to:  
 (a) Arrange and change the date, time, and place of 
hearings . . . .  
(b) Hold conferences to settle, simplify, or determine the 
issues in a hearing, or to consider other matters that may 
aid in the expeditious disposition of the hearing. 
(c) Require parties to state their position in writing with 
respect to the various issues in the hearing and to exchange 
such statements with all other parties. 
(d) Sign and issue subpoenas to compel the attendance of 
witnesses and the production of documents and materials 
to the extent necessary to conduct administrative hearings 
pending before him. 
(e) Examine witnesses and direct witnesses to testify.  
(f) Receive, rule on, exclude, or limit evidence. 
(g) Rule on procedural items pending before him.  
(h) Take any action permitted to the [ALJ] as authorized 
by [the DEA regulations] or by the provisions of the 
 
514. Id. § 556. 
515. ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL, supra note 417, § 7(b) at 74. 
516. 21 C.F.R. § 1316.52. 
517. Compare 5 U.S.C. § 556, with 21 C.F.R § 1316.52. 
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[APA].518 
To protect their decisional independence, ALJs enjoy lifetime 
appointments and are only subject to removal for good cause.519  ALJs “may 
not perform duties inconsistent with their duties and responsibilities as 
[ALJ]s,”520 may not be arbitrarily replaced in the midst of commenced 
litigation,521 are not subject to probation522 or performance reviews by the 
agencies that employ them,523 may not consider extra-record524 or ex parte 
communications,525 are statutorily ineligible to preside over any case where 
they have participated in any way in the investigative or prosecuting functions 
of the case,526 and may disqualify themselves where appropriate.527   
In providing a defined structure of adjudicatory duties and insulation, 
Congress provided litigants with a built-in assurance that, whatever the ultimate 
outcome of an enforcement action might be, the evidence will be amassed and 
evaluated by an impartial judge who has the freedom to operate without fear of 
reprisal, and, of equal importance, without undue interference by the agency.528  
The DEA regulations provide that, at the conclusion of hearing proceedings, 
the ALJ is required to assemble a record of proceedings and a recommended 
decision to the DEA Administrator, who is charged with the responsibility to, 
“[a]s soon as practicable,” prepare a “final order in the proceeding, which shall 
set forth the final rule and the findings of fact and conclusions of law upon 
which the rule is based.”529   
It is thus beyond serious argument that both the APA and the DEA 
regulations have placed the control of the procedural aspects of administrative 
hearings within the exclusive control of the Agency ALJ presiding at the 
hearing, and charged the Agency with responsibility for the ultimate 
decision.530  In an agency such as the DEA, where there is no formal board 
 
518. 21 C.F.R. § 1316.52. 
519. 5 U.S.C. § 7521. 
520. Id. § 3105. 
521. See id. § 554(d). 
522. 5 C.F.R. § 930.204(a). 
523. 5 U.S.C. § 554(d)(2). 
524. Id. § 556(e). 
525. Id. § 557(d); see also 21 C.F.R. § 1316.51(c) (2017). 
526. 5 U.S.C. § 554(d)(2). 
527. Id. § 556(b). 
528. See generally 21 C.F.R. § 1316. 
529. Id. § 1316.67. 
530. Even the standard of proof between the two functions is distinguishable.  While the standard 
of proof at the hearing before the ALJ is a preponderance of the evidence, Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 
91, 100–01 (1981), the standard of review of the final agency action is whether the decision is 
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tasked with rendering the final Agency determination, the overwhelming 
likelihood is that orders are being managed, prepared, and issued at the final 
order level not by the agency head, who bears a myriad of other responsibilities, 
but by employees under the agency head’s supervision, who are unknown to 
the registrants and the practicing bar.  Such agency employees assisting in the 
review and preparation of decisions for an agency head enjoy none of the 
protections, preclusions, or obligations enjoyed by and levied on its ALJs.   
Despite the defined structure and delineated responsibilities described 
previously, with increasing frequency in final orders issued by the Agency, 
every credibility, evidentiary, and procedural ruling, is being re-weighed, re-
evaluated, and frequently reversed on final order review.531  Additionally, the 
Agency has demonstrated an increasing proclivity for conducting active 
litigation outside the reach of the ALJ; it has become increasingly frequent 
practice for the Administrator’s staff to direct the parties to submit evidence 
and brief legal issues that were not raised in front of the DEA ALJ.  In so 
directing, the anonymous staff members step into the role of pseudo-ALJs and 
manage contested litigation—without offering any of the protections that the 
ALJ structure affords to litigants. 
The DEA regulations provide no legal mechanism for administrative 
litigation to be managed by the Administrator or his staff.  The Administrator’s 
duties regarding adjudication are specifically enumerated in the regulations,532 
and are restricted to issuing an Agency final order “set[ting] forth the final rule 
and the findings of fact and conclusions of law upon which the rule is based,” 
publishing the final order in the Federal Register, and accomplishing these 
modest tasks “[a]s soon as practicable.”533  In the APA, Congress has 
categorically limited the ability to conduct hearings534 “in every case of [an] 
adjudication required by statute to be determined on the record after 
opportunity for an agency hearing,”535 which specifically include DEA 
 
“supported by and in accordance with the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence.”  5 U.S.C. 
§ 556(d). 
531. See, e.g., Wesley Pope, M.D., 82 Fed. Reg. 14944, 14946–48 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Mar. 23, 
2017) (re-weighing, in the Agency final order, every credibility finding rendered by the hearing ALJ, 
including the testimony of the Government’s expert witness); Superior Pharmacy I and Superior 
Pharmacy II, 81 Fed. Reg. 31310, 31320–25, 31332 (Drug Enf’t Admin. May 18, 2016) (showing 
virtually every ruling on every objection ruled upon by the hearing ALJ scrutinized in detail and re-
weighed and re-ruled upon in the final order without any perceptible deference). 
532. 21 C.F.R. §§ 1301.46, 1316.67. 
533. Id. § 1316.67. 
534. See 5 U.S.C. § 556(c). 
535. Id. § 554(a). 
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administrative hearings,536 to administrative law judges.537  When the 
Administrator or his staff “preside” over contested administrative proceedings 
where the statute mandates on-the-record proceedings with an opportunity to 
request an agency hearing, the Agency risks a determination that the 
“proceedings” were ultra vires and per se violative of due process.  The 
Administrator could no more delegate the enumerated powers in the APA to an 
Agency investigator or prosecutor than he could retain them to himself or task 
a legal advisor, special agent, or contract security guard, to act in the role of an 
ALJ.538   
In Edge, the parties were directed to file briefs as part of the final order 
process,539 which is ultra vires under both the APA and the Agency’s 
regulations,540 and has little to commend it as a matter of trial practice or even 
common sense.  Further, the manner in which the practice of conducting 
litigation at the final order level has expanded highlights some of the stronger 
arguments for expeditiously abandoning the illegal process.  An ALJ “shall 
have the duty to conduct a fair hearing,”541 but this is an obligation that is not 
imposed on other employees of the Agency.  Lest it seem to be an unfounded 
concern that one party may have an advantage when litigation is conducted by 
those who think of themselves as pseudo-ALJs, the Agency’s order in Edge 
provides a striking example of the dangers that lurk in such a situation.  In Edge, 
in vacating the ALJ’s finding of good cause for accepting an untimely statement 
of position, the Agency applied the rigorous “excusable neglect” standard 
against the registrant’s counsel.542  But that was not the standard applied to both 
sides of the litigation equation.  In its review of the Government’s submitted 
evidence, the Agency discovered that one of the declarations submitted by the 
Government was unsigned.543  The Government was afforded the opportunity 
to resubmit a signed version, which was received into the record (apparently by 
the non-ALJ employee in his capacity as pseudo-ALJ) over the respondent’s 
objection.544  The rigorous excusable neglect standard that had been wielded 
against the registrant was supplanted—for the Government only—by the 
 
536. 21 U.S.C. § 824(c) (2012). 
537. 5 U.S.C. § 554(a)(2). 
538. See id. § 554(d). 
539. Edge Pharmacy, 81 Fed. Reg. 72092, 72095 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Oct. 19, 2016). 
540. See 5 U.S.C § 556(e); 21 C.F.R. § 1316.52 (2017). 
541. 21 C.F.R. § 1316.52. 
542. Edge Pharmacy, 81 Fed. Reg. at 72097–98. 
543. Id. at 72100–101. 
544. Id. at 72101. 
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gentler “simple inadvertence” standard,545 and the evidence was successfully 
resubmitted by the Government and used against the respondent.546   
Another example of treatment that risks the perception of being preferential 
to the Government can be seen in Robert Clark Maiocco, M.D., wherein, during 
the final order preparation process, the Agency sua sponte acted to correct the 
Government’s errant reliance on the wrong statutory provision in its charging 
document, without even a corresponding request to do so by the Government, 
with no more than a passing reference in a footnote.547  Yet one week earlier, 
in William H. Wyttenbach, M.D., the Agency had entirely declined to consider 
a motion to reconsider a summary disposition order because it was filed beyond 
the authorized regulatory deadline for filing exceptions.548  Indeed, at a time 
when the Agency has been more actively engaged in creating an active 
litigation environment at the final order level, it has concomitantly 
demonstrated a markedly more aggressive posture in applying technical bases 
to disregard issues raised in exceptions filed by respondents.549   
However well intentioned, even copious, highly-nuanced legal verbiage 
carefully set out in a final order could do little in dissipating the appearance that 
the potential for disparate treatment is exacerbated where evidentiary 
determinations and briefings are conducted by those not charged, qualified, or 
even permitted under the law to preside over litigation.  While this Article has 
striven to examine both sides of the issues raised by recent shifts in Agency 




547. Robert Clark Maiocco, M.D., 82 Fed. Reg. 19383, 19383 n.1 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Apr. 27, 
2017). 
548. William H. Wyttenbach, M.D., 82 Fed. Reg. 18777, 18777 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Apr. 21, 
2017).  See generally 21 C.F.R. § 1316.66(a) (2017). 
549. See, e.g., Jones Total Health Care Pharmacy, L.L.C., 81 Fed. Reg. 79188, 79189 & n.5 
(Drug Enf’t Admin Nov. 10, 2016) (ruling that the legal issue in timely-filed exceptions was 
disregarded for failure to include “specific and complete citations of the pages of the transcript and 
exhibits” requirement in 21 C.F.R. § 1316.66(a)); Superior Pharmacy I and Superior Pharmacy II, 81 
Fed. Reg. 31310, 31319 (Drug Enf’t Admin. May 18, 2016) (ruling filed exceptions be disregarded 
because they were received two days after transmission of the record to the Administrator and thus 
beyond the regulatory twenty-day time limit in 21 C.F.R. § 1316.66(a), even though the final order 
was not issued until one year later); Perry County Food & Drug, 80 Fed. Reg. 70084, 70084 (Drug 
Enf’t Admin. Nov. 12, 2015) (ruling that filed exceptions received four months prior to the Agency 
final order were disregarded because they were filed beyond the regulatory twenty-day time limit in 
21 C.F.R. § 1316.66(a)).  But see Mark William Andrew Holder, M.D., 80 Fed. Reg. 71618, 71618 
(Drug Enf’t Admin. Nov. 16, 2015) (permitting respondent’s counsel to file a corrected copy of 
previously-filed exceptions where, based on a family emergency and a word processing system 
breakdown, she had secured prior leave to move to do so by the assigned ALJ). 
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litigation management and expecting such employees to properly execute 
responsibilities where an ALJ is mandated.  When acting in its role as neutral 
adjudicator, it is imperative for the Agency to be as mindful of optics as it is 
the ultimate adjudication.  While not always as unambiguous as the disparate 
standards imposed on the parties’ mistakes in Edge, the taking of sua sponte 
actions at the final order stage of adjudication always enhances the risk of 
appearing to favor one side—generally, at least in these cases, the enforcement 
side—of the litigation.  
5. Excluded by the ALJ Means Excluded 
In the APA, Congress was unambiguous in extending to a party the right 
“to present his case or defense by oral or documentary evidence, to submit 
rebuttal evidence, and to conduct such cross-examination as may be required 
for a full and true disclosure of the facts.”550  Simply stated, a respondent in 
APA proceedings must be afforded the opportunity to meet the evidence 
offered by the Government as a precondition to the Agency’s ability to use that 
evidence in support of a sanction.  In Lawrence E. Stewart, M.D., the Agency 
reversed its ALJ’s evidentiary ruling which had excluded a Food and Drug 
Administration package insert.551  Once the package insert had been excluded, 
the respondent had no need to challenge it or present evidence to contradict the 
document.552  The Agency disregarded the ALJ’s exclusion of the document 
and considered it in support of the sanction ultimately imposed.553 
A similar practice was met with disapproval by the court in Masters 
Pharmaceutical, Inc. v. DEA, wherein the court found that the DEA committed 
error when, in issuing its final order, it considered evidence that had been 
excluded by the ALJ at the hearing.554  The Masters court ultimately found the 
error harmless in light of the strength of other admitted evidence and the 
representation in the final order that the Administrator did not base his ruling 
on the re-included evidence, but the court, in no uncertain terms, held that the 
practice of holding ALJ-excluded evidence against a respondent in support of 
a sanction constitutes error.555  The court acknowledged that the Agency had 
the authority to overrule the ALJ’s evidentiary ruling, but held that 
the Administrator could not proceed to rely on the excluded 
 
550. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (2012). 
551. Lawrence E. Stewart, M.D., 81 Fed. Reg. 54822, 54822–23 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Aug. 17, 
2016). 
552. Id. 
553. Id. at 54823. 
554. Masters Pharm., Inc. v. DEA, 861 F. 3d 206, 229 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
555. Id. 
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evidence of [the respondent’s] misconduct . . . [because] 
[d]oing so would be in derogation of [the respondent’s] right 
to respond to it.  Because the ALJ had excluded the evidence, 
however, [the respondent] had no need or opportunity during 
the administrative trial to exercise its right to respond.556 
As discussed elsewhere in this Article, the revisiting and refashioning of 
even the most pedestrian of procedural rulings by the impartial ALJ presents 
obvious risks to the perception of fairness that litigants can attach to the due 
process actually afforded by the DEA under the APA.557  The concept that 
evidence excluded by the ALJ could only be available to the Agency for 
consideration following a remand where the respondent is afforded an 
opportunity to respond strikes as self-evident, but to the extent that judicial 
precedent was necessary to confirm this principle, it now exists. 
6. Official Notice in Final Agency Orders 
Similar dangers lurk for both sides of the litigation equation due to the 
Agency’s ever-increasing enamor for the prolific use of official notice.  The 
taking of official notice (like judicial notice in courts of record) is authorized 
by the APA558 and the DEA regulations.559  In its explanatory commentary, the 
Attorney General’s Manual explains that the Agency can take official notice in 
its final orders, and that official notice is designed to be broader than “the 
traditional matters of judicial notice [and] extends properly to all matters as to 
which the agency by reason of its functions is presumed to be expert, such as 
technical or scientific facts within its specialized knowledge.”560  However, the 
manner in which official notice has been utilized in recent DEA final orders 
may be arguably broader than seemingly anticipated by that language, 
encompassing an ever-widening scope of matters, and, perhaps more 
significantly, it has been exclusively used for the benefit of the Government, 
and respondents are often not afforded a real opportunity to contest the facts 
before the Agency’s final decision is published in the Federal Register. 
On the more benign side of the spectrum, the Agency regularly takes 
official notice of its own records regarding a registrant’s registration status.  For 
example, the Agency has taken official notice of its own records to determine 
 
556. Id. 
557. See supra Section III.K.1. 
558. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 556(e) (2012). 
559. 21 C.F.R. § 1316.59(e) (2017). 
560. ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL, supra note 417, § 7(d), at 80. 
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a registration’s expiration date.561  In cases where a respondent’s registration 
expired by its terms while a case was pending and no renewal application or 
application for a new registration had been filed by the time the Agency decided 
the matter, the Agency has taken official notice of a registration’s expiration 
date in Agency databases.562  Similarly, in cases where a respondent’s license 
expired during the proceedings but he filed an application to renew the license, 
the Agency has taken official notice of its own database records to determine 
whether the renewal application was timely filed, thus extending the existing 
registration,563 or whether it was untimely, in which case only the pending 
 
561. E.g., Christina B. Paylan, M.D., 80 Fed. Reg. 69979, 69979 n.1 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Nov. 
12, 2015); Devra Hamilton, N.P., 80 Fed. Reg. 50034, 50034 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Aug. 18, 2015); 
Pedro E. Lopez, M.D., 80 Fed. Reg. 46324, 46324 n.1 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Aug. 4, 2015); Adeline 
Davies Essien, M.D., 80 Fed. Reg. 46322, 46322 n.1 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Aug. 4, 2015); Karen S. 
Dunning, N.P., 80 Fed. Reg. 28640, 28641 n.1 (Drug Enf’t Admin. May 19, 2015).  But see Robert 
Clark Maiocco, M.D., 82 Fed. Reg. 19383, 19384–85, 19385 n.4 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Apr. 27, 2017) 
(taking official notice of the respondent’s registration record with the Agency, but noting that the 
Government has the burden of providing evidence establishing the Agency’s jurisdiction as part of its 
motion and the ALJ is obligated to make findings as to the Agency’s jurisdiction); James Alvin 
Chaney, M.D., 80 Fed. Reg. 57391, 57391 n.1 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Sept. 23, 2015) (taking official 
notice of the respondent’s registration record with the Agency to find that his registration was not 
expired, but noting that “in the future, where a recommended decision lacks the requisite finding” the 
Agency has jurisdiction to act because the registration is valid, and the Agency “will remand the 
matter” for the purpose of determining that the respondent “retains an active registration or has 
submitted an application for registration”).  
562. E.g., Patricia A. Newton, M.D., 82 Fed. Reg. 26516, 26516 (Drug Enf’t Admin. June 7, 
2017); Geoffrey D. Peterson, N.P., 81 Fed. Reg. 49266, 49266 n.1 (Drug Enf’t Admin. July 27, 2016); 
Rezik A. Saqer, M.D., 81 Fed. Reg. 22122, 22123 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Apr. 14, 2016); Victor B. 
Williams, M.D., 80 Fed. Reg. 50029 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Aug. 18, 2015); Tin T. Win, M.D., 78 Fed. 
Reg. 52802, 52803 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Aug. 26, 2013); Donald Brooks Reece II, M.D., 77 Fed. Reg. 
35054, 35054–55 (Drug Enf’t Admin. June 12, 2012); James Edgar Lundeen, Sr., M.D., 77 Fed. Reg. 
29696, 29696 (Drug Enf’t Admin. May 18, 2012); Lousiana All Snax, Inc., 76 Fed. Reg. 20034, 20034 
(Drug Enf’t Admin. Apr. 11, 2011); Kermit B. Gosnell, M.D., 76 Fed. Reg. 4938, 4938 (Drug Enf’t 
Admin. Jan. 27, 2011); Sylvester A. Nathan, 74 Fed. Reg. 17516, 17516–17 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Apr. 
15, 2009); Elmer P. Manalo, M.D., 73 Fed. Reg. 50353, 50353 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Aug. 26, 2008); 
William W. Nucklos, M.D., 73 Fed. Reg. 34330, 34330 (Drug Enf’t Admin. June 17, 2008); Benjamin 
Levine, M.D., 73 Fed. Reg. 34329, 34329–30, 34329 n.1 (Drug Enf’t Admin. June 17, 2008); David 
L. Wood, M.D., 72 Fed. Reg. 54936, 54937 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Sept. 27, 2007). 
563. See 21 C.F.R. § 1301.36(i) (“In the event that an applicant for reregistration (who is doing 
business under a registration previously granted and not revoked or suspended) has applied for 
reregistration at least 45 days before the date on which the existing registration is due to expire, and 
the Administrator has issued no order on the application on the date on which the existing registration 
is due to expire, the existing registration of the applicant shall automatically be extended and continue 
in effect until the date on which the Administrator so issues his/her order.”). 
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application remained before the Agency for determination.564  The Agency has 
also taken official notice of its own records to determine that the Agency was 
not in possession of other documents that could be relevant to the issues, such 
as a power of attorney.565 
On the other side of the spectrum, the Agency has shown an increasing 
willingness to widen the scope of facts that it is willing to find through the 
taking of official notice at the final, post-hearing stage, where it makes its final 
determination regarding a respondent’s registration.566  One prevalent example 
is the Agency’s increasingly prolific use of state medical board websites to 
determine, through official notice, a registrant’s current state licensure status.567  
This practice is of particular concern in view of the fact that there is no 
guarantee that the information contained on the various state board websites is 
accurate or current, and no transparent ability on the part of the regulated 
community to ascertain which DEA employee is making the queries and 
whether that employee is correctly interpreting the website entries.  
Additionally, even on the best of the state board websites, the information may 
be modified or deleted at any moment, making it all but impossible for a 
registrant (and, even more importantly, a reviewing court) to determine what 
the Agency decision-maker was looking at when he or she took official notice 
 
564. E.g., Jones Total Health Care Pharmacy, L.L.C., 81 Fed. Reg. 79188, 79188 n.3 (Drug Enf’t 
Admin. Nov. 10, 2016); Perry County Food & Drug, 80 Fed. Reg. 70084, 70089 n.17 (Drug Enf’t 
Admin. Nov. 12, 2015); Sharad C. Patel, M.D., 80 Fed. Reg. 28693, 28694 (Drug Enf’t Admin. May 
19, 2015); Ralph J. Chambers, M.D., 79 Fed. Reg. 4962, 4962 n.2 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Jan. 30, 2014). 
565. Glenn R. Unger, D.D.S., 79 Fed. Reg. 49339, 49340 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Aug. 20, 2014) 
(taking official notice of the Agency’s registration records to determine that the registrant had not 
submitted a power of attorney allowing any person other than himself to sign an application for a 
registration and consequently finding that the registration granted pursuant to an application signed by 
someone else was void ab initio). 
566. See Steven Bernhard, D.O., 82 Fed. Reg. 23298 (Drug Enf’t Admin. May 22, 2017); David 
D. Moon, D.O., 82 Fed. Reg. 19385, 19387 n.5 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Apr. 27, 2017); William H. 
Wyttenbach, M.D., 82 Fed. Reg. 18777, 18778 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Apr. 21, 2017). 
567. E.g., Bernhard, 82 Fed. Reg. at 23298; Moon, 82 Fed. Reg. at 19387 n.5; Wyttenbach, 82 
Fed. Reg. at 18778; Robert Markman, M.D., 82 Fed. Reg. 11369, 11370 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Feb. 22, 
2017); Frank D. Li, M.D., 82 Fed. Reg. 11238, 11239 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Feb. 21, 2017); Paul E. 
Pilgram, M.D., 82 Fed. Reg. 11058, 11059 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Feb. 17, 2017); John P. Moore, III, 
M.D., 82 Fed. Reg. 10398, 10400 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Feb. 10, 2017); Thomas Horiagon, M.D., 81 
Fed. Reg. 79051, 79052 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Nov. 10, 2016); Nicholas J. Nardacci, M.D., 81 Fed. Reg. 
47409, 47410 (Drug Enf’t Admin. July 21, 2016); Ibem R. Borges, M.D., 81 Fed. Reg. 23521, 23522 
(Drug Enf’t Admin. Apr. 21, 2016); William Mikaitis, M.D., 80 Fed. Reg. 73833, 73834 (Drug Enf’t 
Admin. Nov. 25, 2015); Chambers, 79 Fed. Reg. at 4963 n.7; Kamal Tiwari, M.D., 76 Fed. Reg. 71604, 
71606 (Drug Enf’t Admin.  Nov. 18, 2011); Hicham K. Riba, D.D.S., 73 Fed. Reg. 75773, 75773 
(Drug Enf’t Admin. Dec. 12, 2008); Piyush V. Patel, M.D., 72 Fed. Reg. 18274, 18275 (Drug Enf’t 
Admin. Apr. 11, 2007). 
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and whether the “fact” was accurate and interpreted correctly.  The problem 
here is that, even assuming benign intention, in conducting a search to find a 
state board website, crafting and entering a query to the website, and 
interpreting the results reflected on the website in order to drop “facts” into a 
final order, some unnamed employee568 is simultaneously conducting an 
investigatory function and participating and advising in the Agency 
adjudication.569  When an Agency employee embarks upon an internet search 
to identify state board websites for inclusion of his or her interpretation of that 
search into an Agency final order, it would take a highly-tortured definition to 
place that activity outside the realm of conducting an investigatory function.  
The Attorney General’s Manual addresses the utilization of agency employees 
for the drafting of final orders as follows: 
Nothing in the [APA] is intended to preclude agency heads 
from utilizing the services of agency employees as assistants 
for analysis and drafting.  Of course, in adjudicatory cases 
subject to [5 U.S.C. § 557(c)], such assistants could not have 
performed investigative or prosecuting functions in the cases 
(or in factually related cases) in which they are so employed.  
Also, the agency heads are free to employ the [ALJ] who heard 
a particular case as the draftsman of their final decision and 
otherwise to assist in its formulation.570 
 
568. As discussed, there is no formal reviewing board at the DEA, and the likelihood of the DEA 
Administrator taking time from his massive Agency oversight and management responsibilities to 
conduct internet searches to identify state board websites, query them, and craft the information he 
gleans in those sites into Agency final orders in a host of cases can safely be characterized as remote.  
Thus, the reality is that the employee tasked with preparing the draft final order is also conducting 
investigative functions and simultaneously providing the Administrator with advice and drafting final 
orders.  Unless an employee on the investigative or Government counsel side is supplying the 
information (which is contrary to the apparent language in the decisions and would be ex parte in any 
event), this practice, where the same person is drafting and otherwise participating in the final 
adjudication, constitutes a violation of the unambiguous prohibition that is set forth in the APA. 
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (2012). 
569. In some cases, the Agency issues orders to the parties to provide information, but in others, 
it is apparently finding the information on its own.  See Franklyn Seabrooks, M.D., 79 Fed. Reg. 44196, 
44197 (Drug Enf’t Admin. July 30, 2014) (“An internet search of the [state board]’s public record 
actions Web page reveals . . . .”); Gregory White, M.D., 79 Fed. Reg. 24754, 24755 (Drug Enf’t Admin. 
May 1, 2014) (“An internet search of the [state board]’s public record actions Web page found . . . .”); 
William G. Hamilton, Jr., M.D., 71 Fed. Reg. 39129, 39129 (Drug Enf’t Admin. July 11, 2006) (noting 
that since the time a state suspension order was issued (which was in the investigative file), 
Administrator “ha[d] become aware of further proceedings involving [r]espondent’s state medical 
license”). 
570. ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL, supra note 417, § 8(b) at 87 (citing Morgan v. United 
States, 298 U.S. 468, 481 (1936)). 
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To the extent that decision drafters in the Agency are regularly conducting 
internet searches to glean information that is seamlessly incorporated into 
Agency final orders, this may run in some tension with the restrictions of the 
APA.571  
Even more tenuous than the Agency’s practice of using state board websites 
in an attempt to essentially confirm that facts supported in a record have not 
staled with time, is its use of official notice to actually add additional facts and 
materials to the record, and use those materials against respondents without 
providing a meaningful opportunity to challenge them.572  In four cases where 
the Government alleged only that a registrant’s state license had been 
suspended, state board orders (and their contents) that were issued after the ALJ 
transmitted the records to the Administrator were held against the respondents 
where the Agency took official notice of the board orders573—in one case even 
stating that it “made [the order] part of the record”574—and revoked the 
respondents’ DEA registrations based on the later-issued board revocation 
orders.575  On one occasion, the Agency limited its official notice of a state 
medical board order by only taking official notice of the order to the extent it 
established that the respondent was no longer authorized to practice medicine 
in the state, while declining to take official notice of the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law set forth in that order because, the Agency said, the 
Government could have—but did not—give the respondent notice that it 
intended to rely on prescribing events at issue in that order.576  Even more 
 
571. 5 U.S.C. § 554(d). 
572. See Geoffrey D. Peterson, N.P., 81 Fed. Reg. 49266, 49267 n.3 (Drug Enf’t Admin. July 
27, 2016). 
573. Id. at 49266; John R. Kregenow, D.D.S., 80 Fed. Reg. 50029, 50030 (Drug Enf’t Admin. 
Aug. 18, 2015); Roy Chi Lung, M.D., 74 Fed. Reg. 20346, 20346–47 (Drug Enf’t Admin. May 1, 
2009); Sheran Arden Yeates, M.D., 71 Fed. Reg. 39130, 39130–31 (Drug Enf’t Admin. July 11, 2006). 
574. Peterson, 81 Fed. Reg. at 49267 n.3. 
575. Id. at 49268; Kregenow, D.D.S., 80 Fed. Reg. at 50030 & n.3; Lung, 74 Fed. Reg. at 20347; 
Yeates, 71 Fed. Reg. at 39131. 
576. Jose Raul S. Villavicencio, M.D., 80 Fed. Reg. 3624, 3627 n.5 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Jan. 23, 
2015).  The Agency concluded that it could take notice of the board’s action on the respondent’s state 
medical license because “the Agency has long held that it lacks authority to continue a practitioner’s 
registration where a practitioner no longer holds state authority to dispense controlled substances,” 
noting that “the Agency has consistently taken official notice of state board decisions suspending or 
revoking a practitioner’s state authority notwithstanding that the state did not take action until after the 
issuance of a[n OSC].”  Id.  The Agency added that “adequate notice is provided either by the 
Government’s filing of a Motion for Summary Disposition (in a case where a hearing was requested) 
or by taking official notice and providing the applicant/registrant with the opportunity to refute the 
finding (when no hearing request was filed).”  Id.  The circular nature of that statement—that taking 
official notice, by itself, provides adequate notice that the Agency intends to take official notice—only 
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recently, in responding to an argument interposed by the Government that doing 
so would be contrary to due process, the Agency found and took official notice 
of evidence of a state license revocation where lack of state authority was not 
alleged at any point during the proceeding.577  The use of official notice to 
include information from state board websites can also prove confusing (and 
potentially unfairly prejudicial) when the Agency includes information about 
state suspensions or revocations that were not only not noticed, but are also 
unrelated to the licensure status of the respondent in the state at issue in the 
proceeding.578 
In addition to state board licensure information, the Agency has also taken 
official notice of the following: facts and circumstances relating to ancillary 
criminal proceedings involving a respondent;579 Food and Drug Administration 
 
adds to the confusion surrounding what notice is adequate for an extra-record fact (or document) to be 
held against the respondent. 
577. Hatem M. Ataya, M.D., 81 Fed. Reg. 8221, 8244 & n.55 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Feb. 18, 2016) 
(taking official notice that a state medical board revoked a respondent’s medical license during the 
course of proceedings and relied on that fact in revoking respondent’s registrations and denying 
pending applications, despite the Government’s argument that it did not allege lack of state authority 
in its OSC and relying on that fact would be contrary to due process because the issue was raised sua 
sponte by the Agency). 
578. Zizhuang Li, M.D., 78 Fed. Reg. 71660, 71661 n.4 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Nov. 29, 2013) 
(taking official notice that the Medical Board of California issued an accusation/petition to revoke a 
respondent’s state medical license based on the results of an action taken by the Mississippi Board and 
taking official notice that the respondent voluntarily surrendered his Louisiana medical license, without 
stating where any of that information was found or why it took official notice of those facts in a case 
where the proposed denial of a respondent’s application to be registered in California was based 
exclusively on findings made by the Mississippi Board). 
579. Ibem R. Borges, M.D., 81 Fed. Reg. 23521, 23523 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Apr. 21, 2016) 
(taking official notice of state court records to establish that the respondent was charged with 
committing particular crimes relating to controlled substances and had a jury trial scheduled but then 
declining to consider that information because it was not alleged as a basis for revocation in the order 
to show cause); Odette L. Campbell, M.D., 80 Fed. Reg. 41062, 41063 n.5 (Drug Enf’t Admin. July 
14, 2015) (taking official notice of “the Docket Sheet Entries in [the respondent’s criminal case], as 
well as Document # 27 [from that case], which sets forth the disposition of . . . [a] hearing conducted 
by the district court on [r]espondent’s violation of the conditions of her pretrial release, wherein the 
[district court] modified the conditions of her release to prohibit her from writing any controlled 
substance prescriptions,” after the Government alerted the Agency to the indictment of the criminal 
case in a post-hearing filing after being directed by the Agency to address the status of state board 
proceedings against the respondent); Wayne E. Ellison, 42 Fed. Reg. 43136, 43136 & n.1 (Drug Enf’t 
Admin. Aug. 26, 1977) (revoking registration based on the respondent’s conviction of a felony offense 
relating to controlled substances and taking official notice of the fact that the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the respondent’s convictions after the record was certified and 
transmitted). 
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National Drug Code (NDC) information;580 zip code information;581 post-
hearing Mapquest queries, including determinations of how far patients reside 
from prescribing doctor’s offices582 and how many pharmacies exist in a certain 
geographic area;583 supplementary information about doctor-prescribers in 
pharmacy cases, including whether the prescribers had action taken against 
their licenses,584 whether the doctors held any board certifications,585 and even 
whether the doctors were still alive;586 statistics “established” by prior agency 
 
580. Jones Total Health Care Pharmacy, L.L.C., 81 Fed. Reg. 79188, 79189 n.7 (Drug Enf’t 
Admin. Nov. 10, 2016) (taking official notice that, “according to the FDA’s National Drug Code 
Directory website,” a National Drug Code number on a prescription label in evidence is the drug code 
for a particular controlled substance). 
581. Mark P. Koch, D.O., 79 Fed. Reg. 18714, 18719 & n.15 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Apr. 3, 2014) 
(taking official notice, “using the Web site of the U.S. Postal Service,” that a particular zip code 
corresponds with Erie, Pennsylvania when the Certification of Registration history listed only “Erie” 
and the zip code). 
582. Jones Total Health, 81 Fed. Reg. at 79194 n.18 (taking official notice of “a query conducted 
on Mapquest” to determine approximately how far a patient resided from a prescribing doctor’s office). 
583. Perry County Food & Drug, 80 Fed. Reg. 70084, 70092 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Nov. 12, 2015) 
(taking official notice of “the results of a Mapquest search for pharmacies in the Perryville[, Arkansas] 
area[, which] . . . show that there are six pharmacies located in Morrilton[, Arkansas],” a town “which 
is only fourteen miles from Perryville,” to reject the respondent pharmacy’s claim that its closure will 
create a monopoly because there is only one other pharmacy in Perryville). 
584. Jones Total Health, 81 Fed. Reg. at 79193 n.13 (taking official notice that the Agency had 
revoked, through a prior Agency final order, the license of a doctor whose patients filled their 
prescriptions at the respondent pharmacy); id. at 79199 n.31 (taking official notice that the Agency had 
suspended and later revoked the licenses of several doctors whose patients filled their prescriptions at 
the respondent pharmacy); Edge Pharmacy, 81 Fed. Reg. 72092, 72103 n.28 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Oct. 
19, 2016) (taking official notice of state board records to find that the board restricted a doctor’s state 
license—on a date after the DEA’s inspection of the pharmacy—for cause, and that the doctor 
ultimately surrendered his state license). 
585. Edge Pharmacy, 81 Fed. Reg. at 72103 n.28 (taking official notice that “[a]ccording to the 
online records of the Florida Department of Health” a particular doctor whose prescriptions were filled 
at the respondent pharmacy was not board certified in pain medicine or anesthesiology). 
586. Hills Pharmacy, L.L.C., 81 Fed. Reg. 49816, 49830 (Drug Enf’t Admin. July 28, 2016) 
(taking official notice of the date of death of a doctor based on his “online obituary” in a pharmacy 
case where the pharmacist in charge testified that many of his customers visited a particular pain clinic 
because the (now deceased) doctor was famous). 
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orders;587 and, most recently, “that morphine does not metabolize into 
oxymorphone” in the human body.588 
Some of the facts the Agency now establishes through the use of official 
notice might be incontrovertible, such as NDC codes and zip code information.  
Some of the information it currently pours into the record at the final order stage 
might be accurate, but the registrant that it was used against may not have had 
reason (or ability) to access the information, such as doctor-prescriber license 
information.  Other information that the Agency has found as fact through 
official notice is potentially susceptible to reasonable dispute by experts, such 
as whether statistics set forth in a prior Agency order are relevant to the facts 
of a newer case, or whether particular controlled substances metabolize into 
particular chemicals.  And, of course, there is always the potential that the 
Agency could simply get the facts wrong when it takes official notice.   
The APA offers some ability to challenge the facts found through official 
notice, providing that “[w]hen an agency decision rests on official notice of a 
material fact not appearing in the evidence in the record, a party is entitled, on 
timely request, to an opportunity to show the contrary.”589  However, a 
meaningful opportunity and procedure to challenge facts is not consistently 
 
587. Vernor Prescription Ctr., 59 Fed. Reg. 6305, 6306 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Feb. 10, 1994) 
(taking official notice of a statistic regarding average purchases of a certain drug by pharmacies in 
Michigan, which was “established” in a prior agency order issued three years prior, to determine that 
the respondent’s purchases remained excessive despite the ALJ’s finding that declining purchases of 
the drug could be a mitigating factor). 
588. Wesley Pope, M.D., 82 Fed. Reg. 14944, 14964 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Mar. 23, 2017) (citing 
Edward J. Cone et al., Evidence that Morphine is Metabolized to Hydromorphone But Not to 
Oxymorphone, 32 J. ANALYTIC TOXICOLOGY 319, 319, 323 (2008)) (“Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. [§] 556(e) 
(2012), I take official notice that morphine does not metabolize into oxymorphone.”). 
589. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 556(e) (2012). 
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offered by the Agency,590 is sometimes not offered at all,591 and has been 
offered only in words but not in substance in the Agency’s more recent 
decisions, because the final orders have already been published in the Federal 
Register before the time offered to the respondent to challenge the facts has 
elapsed.592   
 
590. See, e.g., Pope, 82 Fed. Reg. at 14964 n.33 (affording “[twenty] calendar days” from the 
date of the order to file “properly supported motion for reconsideration” and affording the Government 
twenty days to respond to such a motion); Robert Markman, M.D., 82 Fed. Reg. 11369, 11370 n.1 
(Drug Enf’t Admin. Feb. 22, 2017) (affording “[fifteen] calendar days [from] the date of service” to 
“file a motion for reconsideration”); Jones Total Health Care Pharmacy, L.L.C., 81 Fed. Reg. 79188, 
79188 n.3 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Nov. 10, 2016) (affording “ten days” from the date of the order to “fil[e] 
a properly supported motion”); Hills Pharmacy, 81 Fed. Reg. at 49823 n.11 (affording fifteen calendar 
days from the mailing of the order to “fil[e] a properly supported motion”); Piyush V. Patel, M.D., 72 
Fed. Reg. 18274, 18275 n.1 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Apr. 11, 2007) (affording fifteen days after “receipt 
of th[e] order” to “fil[e] a request for reconsideration which includes supporting documentation”); 
Edmund Chein, M.D., 72 Fed. Reg. 6580, 6583 n.4 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Feb. 12, 2007) (noting that 
“publication of [the] order will be withheld for a fifteen day period in order to provide [r]espondent 
with ‘an opportunity to show the contrary’” (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 556(e))). 
591. See David D. Moon, D.O., 82 Fed. Reg. 19385, 19387 n.5 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Apr. 27, 
2017) (taking official notice of the online records of two state medical boards to find that the 
respondent does not currently possess a license in either jurisdiction, but providing no opportunity to 
refute that fact); Edge Pharmacy, 81 Fed. Reg. 72092, 72103 n.28 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Oct. 19, 2016) 
(citing 5 U.S.C. § 557(c)) (taking official notice of the Florida Department of Health “online records” 
and providing a citation to 5 U.S.C. § 557(c), which affords an opportunity to submit arguments and 
exceptions to “employees participating in the decision[] [on agency review],” but which does not 
provide an opportunity for parties to challenge facts found through official notice in a final agency 
decision); Richard J. Settles, D.O., 81 Fed. Reg. 64940, 64944 n.13 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Sept. 21, 2016) 
(citing to the New Mexico Board of Osteopathic Medical Examiners website to find that certain state 
licenses were expired, but not stating that the Agency is taking official notice of the expiration dates 
or offering any opportunity to the respondent to challenge whether the licenses were, in fact, expired); 
Gregory White, M.D., 79 Fed. Reg. 24754, 24755 (Drug Enf’t Admin. May 1, 2014) (citing an 
“internet search” to establish the respondent’s state licensure status, but providing no opportunity for 
the respondent to challenge the finding). 
592. See, e.g., Pope, 82 Fed. Reg. at 14964 n.33 (purporting, in the Agency’s decision signed on 
March 16, 2017, to afford the respondent twenty calendar days after that date to “fil[e] a properly 
supported motion for reconsideration” with the Office of the Administrator, while affording the 
Government twenty days to respond to such a motion, if filed, but the final order was published in the 
Federal Register only seven days after it was signed, on March 23, 2017); Frank D. Li, M.D., 82 Fed. 
Reg. 11238, 11239 & n.2, 11241 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Feb. 21, 2017) (purporting, in the Agency’s 
decision signed on February 13, 2017, to afford the respondent 15 calendar days from the date the 
order was mailed to “file a motion for reconsideration,” but the final order was published in the Federal 
Register only eight days after it was signed, on February 21, 2017); Jones Total Health, 81 Fed. Reg. 
at 79188 n.3, 79203 (purporting, in the Agency’s decision, which was signed on October 31, 2016,  to 
afford the respondent ten days to “dispute . . . any . . . finding[s] which [are] the subject of official 
notice[] by filing a properly supported motion,” but the final order was published in the Federal 
Register exactly ten days later, on November 10, 2016); Hills Pharmacy, 81 Fed. Reg. at 49817, 49823 
n.11 (purporting, in the Agency’s decision, which was signed on July 19, 2016, to afford the respondent 
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Even when a respondent is provided with an opportunity to rebut the 
information found through official notice, Federal Register publication puts the 
information in the public domain for the respondent’s patients, customers, 
peers, colleagues, and families to see before any dispute is resolved, unless the 
Agency delays publication in order to resolve the dispute.  In practice, the 
Agency’s final order is published long before a respondent is able to refute the 
facts found through official notice.593  On one occasion where the Administrator 
took official notice of numerous documents that were not included in the 
administrative record594 the Agency published its final Agency order seven 
days after it was signed and eight days before the time afforded to the 
respondent to file a motion for reconsideration expired.595  In that case, the 
respondent objected to the inclusion of the extra-hearing documents and 
requested an opportunity to respond to that evidence.596  Even then, the 
Administrator did not remand the case to the ALJ to allow the respondent to 
introduce new documents in order to refute those documents that were included 
via official notice.597  Instead, the Administrator ordered that the parties litigate 
the issue via filings—with the Administrator598—and ultimately took official 
 
15 calendar days from the mailing of the order to dispute the fact found by official notice “by filing a 
properly supported motion,” but the final order was published in the Federal Register only nine days 
after it was signed, on July 28, 2016).  That the orders sometimes reflect a delayed effective date 
changes nothing about the potential injury to fragile professional reputations resulting from this 
practice. 
593. See supra note 592. 
594. Lyle E. Craker, 74 Fed. Reg. 2101, 2108 n.24 (Drug Enf’t Admin. January 14, 2009) (taking 
official notice of National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA) letter, “which appears on [the 
Multidisciplinary Association for Psychedelic Studies (MAPS)]’s website,” to find the bases upon 
which NIDA denied a doctor’s application to use marijuana in a research study); id. at 2109 n.30 
(taking official notice of two reports available on the MAPS website); id. at 2111 n.41 (taking official 
notice “of the FDA’s Guideline for Drug Master Files,” and providing website link); id. at 2115 n.56 
(taking official notice of a report authored by the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB)); id. 
at 2116 n.57 (taking official notice of a press release issued by the INCB). 
595. Id. at 2133 (signing order on January 7, 2009); id. at 2108 n. 24 (“To allow [r]espondent 
the opportunity to refute the facts of which I take official notice, [r]espondent may file a motion for 
reconsideration within fifteen days of service of this order which shall commence with the mailing of 
the order.”). 
596. See Lyle E. Craker, PhD, 76 Fed. Reg. 51403, 51404 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Aug. 18, 2011) 
(describing the post-Final Order filings that resulted from the 2009 Agency final order). 
597. Id. (filing a motion for reconsideration, wherein the respondent requested “that the 
administrative hearing be reopened so that he may call additional witnesses in view of certain 
documents of which [the Administrator] took official notice in the final order,” but the Administrator 
denied that request). 
598. Id. (directing the respondent, in Administrator’s “interim order,” “to submit a list of all 
witnesses he would call if his request to reopen the administrative hearing were granted[,] to provide 
a summary of the proposed testimony for each witness,” and to “indicate precisely which documents 
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notice of several documents submitted by the respondent.599  The entire process 
took more than two years, and during that time the Agency’s final order with 
the officially-noticed documents—which was already published—remained 
unchallenged, at least in the public’s view.600  Even if a registrant were 
ultimately to prevail on an official notice issue, the effects on the registrant’s 
patient or customer base would be catastrophic and irreparable. 
Also, whether the officially-noticed facts prove to be incontrovertibly true, 
probably true, arguably true, sort of true, or not true at all, the ever-escalating 
use of official notice still raises the unattractive specter of an unidentified 
Government employee sitting at a computer terminal somewhere in the office 
of the final adjudicator, performing investigative research into state board 
websites, other agency websites, and even biology reference materials and other 
sources.  This phenomenon runs the risk of violating the APA’s unambiguous 
provision that, subject to exceptions not relevant here: 
An employee or agent engaged in the performance of 
investigative or prosecuting functions for an agency in a case 
may not, in that or a factually related case, participate or advise 
in the decision, recommended decision, or agency 
review . . . [of initial decisions], except as witness or counsel 
in public proceedings.601 
The Agency’s decision drafter certainly is not a “witness or counsel in 
public proceedings,” and he or she certainly is “participat[ing] or advis[ing]” 
the final Agency decision maker by drafting what will ultimately become the 
final decision of the Agency.602  Therefore, the APA provision unequivocally 
prohibits him or her from “engag[ing] in the performance of investigative or 
prosecuting functions” for the Agency.603  But the language of the Agency’s 
final orders gives at least the appearance that this dynamic has become standard 
 
he sought to introduce for purposes of his motion for reconsideration” and whether he was requesting 
official notice be taken of the documents or whether they would be introduced through witnesses if his 
request to reopen the hearing were granted); id. (“[h]aving ruled on which new documents would be 
considered part of the record (through [her] taking official notice thereof),” the Administrator afforded 
the respondent “an additional opportunity to file a final brief” and afforded the Government time to 
respond to that brief). 
599. Id. (taking official notice of four documents and declining to take official notice of seven 
documents, noting that those seven documents “will not be considered part of the administrative record 
considered by the agency in this adjudication,” which indicates that the other four were considered to 
be part of the record). 
600. The first Craker final order was published on January 14, 2009, 74 Fed. Reg. 2101, and the 
second was published on August 18, 2011.  Craker, 76 Fed. Reg. 51403.   
601. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (2012). 
602. See id. 
603. Id. § 554(d)(2). 
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operating procedure through the increasingly aggressive use of official 
notice.604 
 While official notice is certainly authorized in administrative enforcement 
proceedings, the essential question is whether the Agency’s decision makers 
(and decision drafters), in their roles as impartial adjudicators, will be able to 
resist the temptation to shore up the Government’s case through the use of 
official notice in preparing the Agency’s final orders.  Even if the bar 
representing the regulated community is actually afforded the opportunity (and 
instructions for how) to confront officially noticed facts, it does little to dispel 
the inescapable sense that the purportedly-neutral Agency final order 
adjudicator is being placed in the role of minding that the Government has 
dotted its “i’s” and crossed its “t’s,” assisting in filling in gaps at the last 
moment where needed.  With the current practice, the Government could be 
perceived by the regulated community and the public as essentially working 
with a safety net in the event that one of its prosecutors misses an important 
detail, forgets a declaration signature, or has its evidence staled through the 
passage of adjudication time.  Respondents, on the other hand, are afforded 
little more than a passing moment, if anything, to refute the new evidence used 
against them and—even if they did manage to challenge the facts found through 
official notice before the final order was published—the Agency has rendered 
no hint that it would be willing to defer Federal Register publication in order to 
resolve the dispute (which it would presumably need to do by remanding the 
matter back to the impartial adjudicator), before the respondents would need to 
appeal the entire final order, rather than merely challenging an officially-
noticed fact found within it. 
M. Is the Agency Marginalizing its ALJs, and its Due Process Hearings? 
1. Restraining (and Overruling) Decisional Independence 
There is little doubt that the Agency’s more recent final orders could be 
read as conveying an increasing discomfiture with the decisional independence 
of its own independent ALJs.605  In one recent line of final orders, the Agency 
accepted and published the recommended decisions of its ALJs, but deleted 
 
604. E.g., Franklyn Seabrooks, M.D., 79 Fed. Reg. 44196, 44197 (Drug Enf’t Admin. July 30, 
2014) (“An internet search of the [state board]’s public record actions Web page reveals . . . .”); 
Gregory White, M.D., 79 Fed. Reg. 24754, 24755 (Drug Enf’t Admin. May 1, 2014) (“An internet 
search of the [state board]’s public record actions Web page found the following . . . .”). 
605. See generally John A. Gilbert, Jr. & Andrew J. Hull, A Matter of Substantial Discretion: A 
Recent Rift Between DEA and its ALJs Could Significantly Impact Registrants, FOOD AND DRUG L. 
INST. MAG., November/December 2015, at 9. 
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those portions of the ALJ’s recommended decisions which cited Universal 
Camera Corp. v. NLRB,606 a decision wherein the Supreme Court set forth the 
level of deference properly accorded to the factual determinations rendered by 
federal agency ALJs.607  In JM Pharmacy, the Agency adopted most of the 
ALJ’s findings of fact and conclusions of law but, citing the ALJ’s discussion 
of Universal Camera, included the statement that “[t]o make clear, the Agency 
is the ultimate factfinder.”608  Even setting aside the fact that the Agency, by its 
regulations, has qualified its own authority over aspects of the adjudication,609 
it is not so much the accuracy of the statement that presents an issue, but the 
Agency’s election to include the seemingly confrontational declaration in its 
final order.  Setting aside considerations regarding the wisdom of supplanting 
and qualifying clear Supreme Court precedent with pronouncements ensconced 
in prior Agency final orders, the Agency’s decisions risk the appearance of an 
increasing willingness on the part of the Agency to disregard facts found by 
impartial ALJs and substitute its own, different facts.   
There can also be little doubt that the Agency’s precedents have 
demonstrated an increasing aggressiveness in publicly scolding its ALJs in final 
orders published in the Federal Register.610  The Agency has also, in a published 
 
606. See, e.g., Trenton F. Horst, D.O., 80 Fed. Reg. 41079, 41079 n.2 (Drug Enf’t Admin. July 
14, 2015) (citing Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 496 (1951)); Jana Marjenhoff, D.O., 
80 Fed. Reg. 29067, 29070 n.9 (Drug Enf’t Admin. May 20, 2015) (citing Universal Camera Corp., 
340 U.S. at 496). 
607. Universal Camera Corp., 340 U.S. at 496.   
608. JM Pharmacy Grp., Inc., 80 Fed. Reg. 28667, 28667 n.2 (Drug Enf’t Admin. May 19, 2015). 
609. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (2012) (“On appeal from or review of the 
initial decision, the agency has all the powers which it would have in making the initial decision except 
as it may limit the issues on notice or by rule.” (emphasis added)); 21 C.F.R. §§ 1316.52, 1316.67 
(2017) (regarding the respective duties of the ALJ and the Administrator as limited by Agency 
regulations). 
610. See, e.g., Syed Jawed Akhtar-Zaidi, M.D., 80 Fed. Reg. 42962, 42962 n.2 (Drug Enf’t 
Admin. July 20, 2015) (criticising the ALJ including the pointed observation that “every Administrator 
and Deputy Administrator who has exercised [Agency authority] . . . has rejected the ALJ’s view”); 
Farmacia Yani, 80 Fed. Reg. 29053, 29063 (Drug Enf’t Admin. May 20, 2015) (stinging in an Agency 
final order that the correct legal analysis was “[c]ontrary to the ALJ’s understanding”); Moore Clinical 
Trials, L.L.C., 79 Fed. Reg. 40145, 40155, 40157 (Drug Enf’t Admin. July 11, 2014) (stating that 
“[n]ot only is the ALJ’s reasoning counterfactual, it reflects a stunning misunderstanding of the CSA,” 
and, while addressing another portion of the ALJ’s analysis, stated “I reject the ALJ’S rumination as 
totally irrelevant”); Clair L. Pettinger, M.D., 78 Fed. Reg. 61591, 61596–61600 (Drug Enf’t Admin. 
Oct. 3, 2013) (reasoning by ALJ dismissed as “illogical,” that the correct legal analysis was “[c]ontrary 
to the ALJ’s understanding,” and that “in future cases . . . the ALJ should rest assured that” the 
Agency’s legal analysis is the correct one); T.J. McNichol, M.D., 77 Fed. Reg. 57133, 57144–49 (Drug 
Enf’t Admin. Sept. 17, 2012) (excoriating ALJ throughout the Agency final order for legal and factual 
analysis, with characterizations such as “reflects a stunning disregard for Federal law,” “[c]ontrary to 
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decision, recently reminded its ALJs that “[o]nce the [A]gency has ruled on a 
given matter . . . it is not open to reargument by the [ALJ].”611  The effect on 
the level of decisional accuracy or fairness resulting from chastising 
independent Agency ALJs is not altogether clear, and neither is the purpose for 
doing so in published decisions readily apparent.  The extent to which a federal 
agency head differs in legal analysis from one of the agency’s ALJs seemingly 
presents as a concept capable of dispassionate expression without gratuitous 
vitriol.  Further, an analysis included by an ALJ that differs in some respect 
from prior final orders could prove to be more legally correct, and could 
persuade the current or future DEA Administrators to engage a legal issue in a 
different light.  This is particularly so in the recommended decision structure of 
the APA612 which is utilized by the Agency in its decisional structure.613  It is 
hardly hyperbole to observe that the fostering of an environment where the 
Agency’s final orders communicate hostility towards recommendations not to 
its liking by its own ALJs does not further the purposes of Congress in creating 
a recommended decisional structure.  The obvious concern in the gratuitous 
chastisement of ALJs by their employing agency is that intemperate language 
set forth in published Agency final orders risks the perception that the Agency 
is seeking an improper means to impact future hearing decisions.   
 
the ALJ’s ludicrous suggestion,” “absurd,” “ignor[ing] numerous decisions of both federal and state 
courts in criminal cases,” and other phrases evincing disdain for the ALJ’s ability and judgment), aff’d, 
T.J. McNichol v. DEA, 539 Fed.Appx. (11th Cir. 2013); Grider Drug #1 & Grider Drug #2, 77 Fed. 
Reg. 44070, 44070, 44082 n.40 (Drug Enf’t Admin. July 26, 2012) (mocking openly, in Agency’s final 
order, ALJ by equating the proceedings conducted by the ALJ to a portion of “Justice Douglas’s 
dissenting opinion in Sierra Club v. Morton,” 405 U.S. 727, 742–744 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting), 
wherein Douglas analyzed whether a tree or other inanimate object should be accorded legal standing 
in court proceedings; declaring that “the ALJ’s sole function is to make findings that are relevant and 
material to the allegations raised by the Government[]”; and accusing the ALJ of “fail[ing] to exercise 
anything more than minimal control over the parties’ respective presentations”); Randall L. Wolff, 
M.D., 77 Fed. Reg. 5106, 5112 n.15 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Feb. 1, 2012) (dismissing ALJ’s legal analysis 
as a “rumination”); George Mathew, M.D., 75 Fed. Reg. 66138, 66140, 66148 (Drug Enf’t Admin. 
Oct. 27, 2010) (accusing ALJ of “ignor[ing] extensive Agency precedent,” and dismissing her legal 
analysis, stating that the correct legal analysis is “[c]ontrary to the ALJ’s understanding”); East Main 
Street Pharmacy, 75 Fed. Reg. 66149, 66150 n.2 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Oct. 27, 2010) (dismissing ALJ’s 
analysis as “reflect[ing] a clear misunderstanding of her role,” and characterizing her procedural ruling 
and case time management as “disturbing”); Jeri Hassman, M.D., 75 Fed. Reg. 8194, 8235 (Drug Enf’t 
Admin. Feb 23, 2010) (dismissing ALJ’s legal analysis as “erroneous”).  These examples, which are 
not intended to constitute an exhaustive list, involve the work of multiple ALJs. 
611. Pettinger, 78 Fed. Reg. at 61600 n.13 (penultimate alteration in original) (citing Iran Air v. 
Kugelman, 996 F.2d 1253, 1260 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (quoting Joseph Zwerdlin, Reflections on the Role 
of an Administrative Law Judge, 25 ADMIN. L. REV. 9, 12–13 (1973))). 
612. 5 U.S.C. § 557(b). 
613. 21 U.S.C. § 824(c) (2012); 21 C.F.R. § 1316.65(a). 
CURRENT NAVIGATION POINTS IN DRUG DIVERSION LAW (DRAFT) MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW VOL. 101 
444 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [101:333 
In fact, in Superior Pharmacy I & Superior Pharmacy II, the Agency was 
forced to address the respondent’s contention that the Agency’s “public 
scolding” of the assigned ALJ in a prior case caused the ALJ to have a general 
bias against respondents.614  The Agency did not deny the fact or severity of its 
prior reprobation aimed at the ALJ in that case, but dismissed the assignment 
of error based on the “extensive protections provided to ALJs under federal law 
to ensure decisional independence, including that they are not subject to 
performance appraisals, their pay is set . . . independent of any evaluation by 
the Agency, and they are subject to discipline only upon a showing of good 
cause by the [Merit Systems Protection Board].”615  The arguably dismissive 
attention devoted to this issue by the Agency misses the point that, although 
ALJs are endowed with statutory protections and their own personal integrity, 
subjecting impartial Agency judges to gratuitous personal criticism in decisions 
published in the Federal Register risks eroding the confidence that the public 
places in the fairness of adjudications by the Agency under the APA.  In 
conjunction with the more recent practice of the Agency revisiting all of the 
evidence and making findings without regard to the findings of the ALJ, such 
practice conveys the message (accurate or not) that the underlying purpose 
could be to bully the ALJs into issuing recommended decisions more in line 
with the wishes of the Agency and its Administrator. 
2. Summary Disposition Without Motion or ALJ Recommendation 
It has long been the practice of the Agency, even in the face of a timely 
hearing request, to grant its prosecutors summary disposition against a 
respondent where the Government has alleged that the respondent does not 
possess the state authority required to issue or maintain a DEA registration.616  
This practice, while authorized nowhere in statute or regulation, is ostensibly 
founded in the notion that the CSA authorizes the Agency to issue registrations 
to “practitioners,” and that by definition under the CSA,617 a practitioner must 
possess “authority under state law to handle controlled substances.”618  
Although in the revocation section of the CSA, Congress provided that the 
 
614. Superior Pharmacy I & Superior Pharmacy II, 81 Fed. Reg. 31310, 31339 n.66 (Drug Enf’t 
Admin. May 18, 2016). 
615. Id. (citation omitted). 
616. See, e.g., Emmanuel O. Nwaokocha, M.D., 82 Fed. Reg. 26516, 26518 (Drug Enf’t Admin. 
June 7, 2017); Frederick Marsh Blanton, M.D., 43 Fed. Reg. 27616, 27617 (Drug Enf’t Admin. June 
26, 1978). 
617. 21 U.S.C. § 802(21). 
618. James L. Hooper, M.D., 76 Fed. Reg. 71371, 71372 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Nov. 17, 2011), 
pet. for rev. denied, Hooper v. Holder, 481 F. App’x 826 (4th Cir. 2012). 
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abridgement of state authority is a discretionary basis for sanction,619 the 
Agency has taken the position that its view of the other provisions essentially 
renders the discretionary revocation provisions related to state authority as 
meaningless surplusage.620   
While summary disposition has been used historically by the Agency’s 
prosecutors, the Agency recently confirmed in Phong Tran, M.D. that summary 
disposition is also available to respondents.621  In that case, the Agency alleged 
that the respondent lacked the state authority to handle controlled substances 
required to maintain his multiple certificates of registration in the state of 
California.622  Specifically, the Government alleged that, in response to state 
criminal charges relating to unlawful billing which had been levied against the 
registrant, the Medical Board of California petitioned the court handling the 
criminal charges for an order suspending the registrant’s state “medical license 
during the pendency of the criminal proceedings,” and the court imposed a 
condition of bail which prohibited the registrant from practicing medicine 
during the pendency of his criminal matter.623  The Government filed for 
summary disposition, but the motion was denied because the prohibition on 
practice was uncontrovertibly a condition of bail release, not a suspension or 
encumberment of the medical license itself.624  In other words, the ALJ 
concluded that the “[r]espondent (albeit at the peril of his release conditions) 
maintains the state authority requisite to retain his DEA . . . [registrations],” 
despite the Government’s argument to the contrary.625  After the Government’s 
motion was denied, the respondent was granted leave to file, and did file, a 
motion for summary disposition of his own, which was granted by the ALJ.626  
In its final decision, the Agency likewise concluded that the registrant’s state 
medical license was neither suspended nor revoked.627 
 
619. 21 U.S.C. § 824(a)(3). 
620. Rezik A. Saqer, M.D., 81 Fed. Reg. 22122, 22126 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Apr. 14, 2016) 
(stating that “[i]t is not clear . . . why using the word ‘shall’ rather than ‘may’ would make any 
difference, as [21 U.S.C. §] 824(a) grants the Agency authority to either revoke or suspend”).  Thus, 
in Saqer, the Agency essentially held that its prospective exercise of discretion would be to revoke in 
every case.  See id. The treatment of a compelled result offered by the Agency as a meaningful exercise 
of discretion is likely to be an interesting issue to the extent it is evaluated by the courts on review. 
621. Phong Tran, M.D., 82 Fed. Reg. 31070, 31075 (Drug Enf’t Admin. July 5, 2017). 
622. Id. at 31070. 
623. Id.  
624. Id. at 31074. 
625. Id. at 31071 (all but first alteration in original) (citation omitted). 
626. Id. at 31071–72. 
627. Id. at 31072, 31075.  The Agency declined to adopt the decision of the ALJ, id. at 31072 
n.10, instead issuing its own decision with different analysis.  The Agency’s decision that the registrant 
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While the Agency’s confirmation of the availability of summary 
disposition to respondents seemed to somewhat balance the playing field for 
respondents, in the case of Richard J. Blackburn, D.O., the Agency took an 
even more aggressive stance regarding its ability to find facts without a due 
process hearing despite a timely request for such a hearing.628  In response to a 
doctor’s registration application, DEA prosecutors filed an OSC alleging that 
he lacked the requisite state authority and that he had made a materially false 
statement.629  The respondent timely requested a hearing on both counts.630  The 
ALJ granted a summary disposition motion filed by the Government regarding 
lack of state authority, but, finding the state authority issue case dispositive, 
declined to decide the issue of the material false statement allegation and 
forwarded the case to the Administrator for a final order.631  Notwithstanding 
the fact that the Government never made a summary disposition motion 
regarding the material false statement allegation before the ALJ,632 and the fact 
that the ALJ declined to make findings or recommendations on that allegation, 
the Agency sustained both the lack of state authority and material false 
statement allegations.633  In support of its factual determinations, the Agency 
cited “attachments” filed by the Government in its no-state-authority motion, 
and referred to the material in the “attachments” as “reliable and probative 
evidence.”634   
The ALJ assigned to hear the case had determined that the respondent had 
raised a triable issue of fact by asserting that any irregularities were mistakes, 
and not intentional false statements.635  The Agency dismissed the ALJ’s 
 
maintained the requisite state authority despite the bail condition prohibiting practice was based, in 
part, on the Government’s concession in its opposition to the respondent’s motion for summary 
disposition that the respondent maintained such authority.  Id. at 31075. 
628. Richard Jay Blackburn, D.O., 82 Fed. Reg. 18669 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Apr. 20, 2017). 
629. Id. at 18669. 
630. Id. 
631. Id. at 18670. 
632. The Government styled its request for relief before the ALJ as a “Motion for Partial 
Summary Disposition,” and sought merely to press its right to prove up the material false statement 
charge at a contested hearing.  Id. at 18669.  It was not until it filed exceptions to the ALJ’s refusal to 
grant a hearing on the material false statement charge that the Government broadened the scope of 
relief to include both a remand for the hearing that had been requested before the ALJ or a ruling in its 
favor as a matter of law.  Id. at 18670.  The Agency found that this portion of the Government’s 
exceptions constituted sufficient notice to the respondent of the summary disposition issue and ruled 
in the Government’s favor.  Id. at 18673 & n.6. 
633. Id. at 18673. 
634. Id. at 18672–73.  One of the “attachments” relied upon by the Agency was actually a 
printout from a state medical board webpage.  Id. at 18670. 
635. Id. at 18672. 
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determination, considered the “attachments” filed by the Government as 
evidence in support of its no-state-authority summary disposition motion on the 
issue of the material false statement, and found against the respondent without 
conducting the hearing he had requested.636  Although the Agency 
acknowledged that, in ruling upon summary judgment motions, “the ‘usual rule 
[is] that all doubts are resolved against the moving party,’”637 it was unfettered 
by that convention in Blackburn.638  Even though there was not even a motion 
filed for summary disposition of the material falsification allegation, the 
Agency reasoned that summary disposition on the material falsification issue 
was appropriate because the respondent did not “offer counter-affidavits or 
other evidentiary material supporting the opposing contention that an issue of 
fact remains, [and did not] show a good reason . . . why he [was] unable to 
present facts justifying opposition to the motion.”639  Thus, the respondent and 
his counsel were unable to challenge any of the evidence offered against him, 
despite having timely requested an evidentiary hearing.640 
Even more concerning than the Agency’s troublesome reliance on 
“attachments,” is language in numerous final orders placing conclusive factual 
reliance on something even less.  In several cases, the Agency found a hearing 
waiver based exclusively on the representations by the Government that no 
hearing request had been filed.641 
The Agency’s decision to embrace a more robust view of its ability to find 
facts without a hearing, like its increasing inclination to disregard the factual 
and legal findings of its ALJs, may significantly impact the manner in which 
both sides litigate administrative enforcement cases before the Agency in the 
future.  All parties will need to consider whether Blackburn stands for the 
proposition that, by merely “attaching” any manner of documents to charging 
documents, requests for hearing, or motions, evidentiary challenges as to 
reliability, authenticity, or other objections available at a contested hearing, can 
be avoided.  Further, on this current trajectory, if the Agency is willing to find 
a hearing waiver based on no more than a “Government[] representation,”642 it 
will be interesting to see if a more robust level of representations are permitted 
 
636. Id. at 18672–73. 
637. Id. at 18673 n.7 (alteration in original) (quoting 10A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2727.1 (4th ed. 2017)). 
638. See id. at 18673 & n.6. 
639. Id. at 18673 n.7 (penultimate alteration in original). 
640. See id. at 18672, 18673 n.7. 
641. John Warren Cox, M.D., 82 Fed. Reg. 29329, 29329 (Drug Enf’t Admin. June 28, 2017); 
Lee B. Drake, M.D., 82 Fed. Reg. 11057, 11057 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Feb. 17, 2017); Gentry Reeves 
Dunlop, M.D., 82 Fed. Reg. 8432, 8432 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Jan. 25, 2017). 
642. Cox, 82 Fed. Reg. at 29329. 
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to play a larger role in the Agency’s factfinding.  The registrants’ bar in 
particular will now need to consider whether a request for hearing under the 
regulations could potentially result in summary disposition of the matter on 
grounds other than lack of state authority, even in cases where the Government 
has not made a motion for summary disposition on such other allegations.  
IV. GOING FORWARD 
It would be difficult to conceive of a world where diversion law would be 
in a greater state of flux.  The various components that have acted (Congress, 
the Agency, and the diversion bar) have not acted as experience might have 
predicted.  In the face of expressed concern at rising opioid addiction and death, 
Congress has imbued the regulated community with the right to submit CAPs, 
and imposed upon the Agency the duty to consider those plans.643  Regarding 
manufacturers and distributor registrants—but, notably, not practitioner 
registrants—Congress has surgically pared back the evidence that may be 
considered by the Agency in Public Interest Factor Five by narrowly redefining 
“factors as may be relevant to and consistent with the public health and 
safety,”644 and created a definition of “immediate danger to the public health 
and safety”645 in a manner that renders Agency utilization of an immediate 
suspension order against those types of registrants all but impossible to defend 
in the federal courts.  Whatever the relative merits of the Ensuring Patient 
Access and Effective Drug Enforcement Act of 2016, there is little that can be 
distilled from the legislation that either ensures patients enhanced access to 
controlled medication or makes drug enforcement more effective.  Access to 
medication will likely remain largely unimpeded by federal enforcement 
efforts, and law enforcement efforts aimed at curbing diversion may actually 
be hampered by the loss of the DEA’s authority to effectively utilize immediate 
suspension orders in cases involving manufacturers and distributors.  Further, 
if the Agency elects to delay proceedings while it adjudicates corrective action 
plans submitted by respondents in administrative proceedings, the process of 
enforcing anything could be substantially elongated. 
The Agency’s approach has also evolved in a manner that arguably ran 
contrary to what many may have expected, and it has seemingly attempted to 
effect change through a robust utilization of adjudication in place of 
rulemaking.  While some news accounts have reported that the Agency’s 
 
643. See supra Section II.A. 
644. See supra Section II.C. 
645. See supra Section II.B. 
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administrative enforcement levels have decreased,646 as discussed throughout 
this Article, it also appears that the notice and burden standards it places on its 
own prosecutors may have increased.  That said, once a case has been filed and 
reaches the final order stage, the Agency has not been shy about holding the 
respondents to strict procedural rules, and in the last few years, has rarely ruled 
against the sanctions sought by its regulators.647  It could be persuasively argued 
that the Agency’s aggressive expansion of the reach of its adjudications may 
have extended to a level far beyond the legal or practical limits of that tool.  
Agency final orders have more aggressively utilized official notice, summary 
disposition, and litigation by consent, and have arguably demonstrated a 
voracious appetite for supplanting the facts and law recommended by its 
impartial ALJs with the Agency’s own facts and law based on its review of the 
 
646. See, e.g., Bernstein & Higham, supra note 3, at A1; THE POST’S VIEW, supra note 3. 
647. Of the twenty-eight final orders issued in 2016, all but three resulted in the respondents’ 
applications being denied or their registrations being revoked.  Even those three cases where there was 
not a denial or a revocation were hardly positive for the applicants/registrants.  In one case, the 
registration at issue had expired and thus no decision was made on whether the Agency could have 
revoked based on the facts.  Turning Tide, Inc., 81 Fed. Reg. 47411 (Drug Enf’t Admin. July 21, 2016).  
In the other two non-revocation/denial cases, the Agency restricted the respondents’ licenses to certain 
schedules because the relevant state authority had so restricted those respondents’ state licenses.  
Abolghasem Rezaei, M.D., 81 Fed. Reg. 25425 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Apr. 28, 2016); Ibem R. Borges, 
M.D., 81 Fed. Reg. 23521 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Apr. 21, 2016).  In both of those cases, the Agency took 
note that, had allegations been made other than lack of state authority, the Government would have 
made a prima facie case for full revocation.  Rezaei, 81 Fed. Reg. at 25426 n.2 (finding that the facts 
“clearly would have supported a prima facie case for revocation under the public interest standard”); 
Borges, 81 Fed. Reg. at 23523 (“The conduct . . . could serve as the basis for a request for total 
revocation based on public interest grounds . . . [or] conviction of a felony related to controlled 
substances[].”).  In 2015, thirty-seven cases were published, and only ten of those did not result in 
denial of an application or revocation of a registration.  Two cases were dismissed because the 
applications were withdrawn.  Chung-Kuang Chen, M.D., 80 Fed. Reg. 57020 (Drug Enf’t Admin. 
Sept. 21, 2015); Matthew Valentine/Liar Catchers, 80 Fed. Reg. 50042 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Aug. 18, 
2015).  One application was granted pursuant to an earlier order setting forth conditions the applicant 
had to meet in order to be granted a registration.  Abbas E. Sina, M.D., 80 Fed. Reg. 53191 (Drug Enf’t 
Admin. Sept. 2, 2015).  Two cases were dismissed because the respondents’ registrations expired and 
they filed no renewal application or new application.  Victor B. Williams, M.D., 80 Fed. Reg. 50029 
(Drug Enf’t Admin. Aug. 18, 2015); AIM Pharmacy & Surgical S. Corp., 80 Fed. Reg. 46326 (Drug 
Enf’t Admin. Aug. 4, 2015).  Two cases were dismissed because the respondents regained state 
authority, lack of which was the only allegation in those cases.  Nicholas Nardacci, M.D., 80 Fed. Reg. 
50032 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Aug. 18, 2015); Jeffrey S. Holverson, M.D., 80 Fed. Reg. 50033 (Drug 
Enf’t Admin. Aug. 18, 2015).  Two applications for registration were granted with conditions and an 
initial suspension.  Odette L. Campbell, M.D., 80 Fed. Reg. 41062 (Drug Enf’t Admin. July 14, 2015); 
Trenton F. Horst, D.O., 80 Fed. Reg. 41079 (Drug Enf’t Admin. July 14, 2015).  One application case 
was held in abeyance and the Agency ordered that the application be granted or denied based on certain 
conditions.  Farmacia Yani, 80 Fed. Reg. 29053 (Drug Enf’t Admin. May 20, 2015). 
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record.648  The Agency has even experimented with conducting contested 
proceedings outside the reach of its ALJs during the preparation of its final 
orders.649  Left on its current trajectory of robust dependence on final orders 
over formal APA rulemaking, the future could produce continued struggles 
with consistency, temperance, and clarity in the guidance the Agency transmits 
to the practicing bar and the regulated community. 
The diversion bar has similarly responded in a surprising fashion.  In the 
face of arguably expansive Agency adjudications, one may argue that the 
registrants’ bar has collectively exhibited an almost sheepish complicity in its 
pursuit of redress in the courts.650  Likewise, Government counsel has not 
sought adjustments to edicts announced in final orders that run contrary to or 
otherwise cause detriment to their litigation positions, and sometimes even their 
sense of fairness.  Mark Twain once famously quoted his close friend, Charles 
Dudley Warner, in observing that “Everyone complains about the weather, but 
nobody does anything about it.”651  Changes in diversion practice have been 
largely treated by the practicing bar with a similar sense of fatalistic 
inevitability. 
The many changes recently inflicted on diversion litigation present like 
dangerous rocks hidden beneath the surface of shallow, murky, drug-infested 
waters.  Like ship captains negotiating unchartered, shallow waters, litigators 
on both sides of the aisle would be wise to navigate slowly and cautiously based 
on a study of what we know so far.  That said, there are no guarantees that those 
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with legislating and adjudicating authority will not be adding more perilous 
boulders beneath the waterline, and faulting the helmsmen for failing to deduce 
their existence and location prior to impact. 
